кѥ˥塼

޸Ρкѥ˥塼̤ưͻ֥Ǥϵ岹Ȳ˻ߤΤúи󾧤ޤиӽиȤϰ㤤ޤߤʴ㤤ΤǤ

2009ǯ06

5ͭΨȯɽˤʤޤ

0.2ݥ㲼ʤ0.44ܤˡ

졢Υ٥Ȥ

1ͤФͤƯ0.44ʤȤ
ȤǡϸǤ

ʬˤȻפäϡζΨεդȹͤ餤Ǥ

Ψ10ܤä顢10̾1̾ʤޤ󤬡
ͭΨξˤϡΨ10ܤä顢1
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ȤȤǡͭΨϡͤʤФʤۤɡῦ
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2006ǯ2007ǯȤۤ2ǯͭΨ1ܤĶƤ
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ΨΥդϡͭΨΥդҤä֤
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ͭΨܥȥǤäΤϡ2002ǯ10.50
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ΨǸ5.5ϿΤϡ2003ǯ4ʤΤǤ
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ĤޤꡢͭΨ˷ʵҴȿ
Ψϡ˥饰ȼȤȤ
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μ¼GDPΥդǤϡޤǤϳǧǤޤ󤬡4-6
Ǥ뤳Ȥͽۤ뤳Ȥ顢ͭΨ⡢
ǤĤȤͤޤ

Ψϡʬϰ³ȹͤƤ褵
ʵޤ


Ψΰ³ȤϤäƤ⡢ꥫ٤ޤš
ȹͤ褦Ȼפäå򤪴ꤤޤ
↓↓↓
͵blog󥭥󥰤

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ǤФޤ

ƤΨħҤ٤衣

֤ȡꥫͤϡ񤬲Ψ㤯ȿ
ˡܿͤ⤬ʤ͡

ΤˡʤȤäȸƤޤ͡

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ȥ졼Τλˡܤƹ͢Ф
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ǡξϡȤǰפԶѹդǤʤΤȡ
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ȤϸäƤ⡢ܤϹǤ顢ɤޤǿäʬ
ޤ󤬡ꥫΰϤݤΤ

ϡ˥ǥѡȤ˽ФΥͥ㤦
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ƹ¦ȸСߤ¤Τ󡢤ȼĥޤ

äȱߤ򶯤褦ܤȤϤ򤻤衢ȡ

ܥɡפʤΤȯԤšȤƤޤǤޤ

ܥɤϡॹܥɤȤϴطޤ

ΥܥɤϡĹĤΤȤǤꡢդǥɥ
ιĤȯԤɤȤƤǤ

ɥƤιĤȯԤǺΰŤСȯ
Υɥ뤬ߤž뤿ˡɥ㤤ꡢɥ
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ʤ˴ñ˰إ졼ȤȥǤСϫϤʤΤ

⤷ʤΤǤϡܤΤȤ뤳ȤǤʤȤ
ǡĤݾڳĤȤΤ򥢥ꥫȯԤΤǤ

ܳȯԤNTTܤݾڤĤƳĤ򥢥ꥫ
ȯԤ櫓Ǥ

ɥ¤ˤʤääơ

ˤʤäƹΥ٥ȥȡХ󥯤٤äǤ

ǤʤȤΤäƤ뤫ȤС䤬ô򤷤Ƥ
Ǥ


Ϥȡ

ƤǰפԶѹդ뤿ˤϡܤ߲
ᡢơƹϲμ٤ȤȤ
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ʤǤ͡顢ƤΨžƤΤǤ

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ȤʤäȤȯɽˤʤޤ2008ǯνᤴϡۤܥ
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졢Х֥뤬Ƥƥ꡼ޥ󡦥åꡢꥫ
ͤ򤹤褦ˤʤäʤΤǤ

ܤβȷפΨϤȤȡϤѡȡ
10ǯۤɤСޥʥȤθФƤޤ


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λߤʤȡѤʤȤˤʤ뤫šȡ

кѤȤˤϡˤʤΤϴޤ٤
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ϸ

ܤΨϡ1970ǯˤ20ĶƤΤθ
ܰӤ㲼Ƥ櫓Ǥ

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Ĥޤꡢܤξ硢߲꤬͢ĶˤʤäƤ櫓
ǤϤʤΤǤ

͢ĶϡޤǤʤ̥ŪdzǤ褯뤳
ʤΤǤ

顢ܤߤμСšȤäĥϡ
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Τˡꥫ̱򹵤Сǰֻ︺
̤ԤǤ뤫⤷ޤ

ƹˤĤƤ⡢ǰֻκθϡꥫͤβ
μˤȤ⡢ꥫδȤιݶϤ
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Ǥ⡢ץ饤ɤι⤤ꥫͤϡΤȤǧ᤿ޤ

顢ĤޤǤ⡢ǰԶѹդϡ߲꤬ʤ
ȸ³Ƥ櫓Ǥ

ơ椬Υ꡼Ǥ⡢ոݤ
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⥢ꥫΨޤ褦ǤС椬ηʵ
Υƥݤ϶ˤƴʤΤˤʤǽޤ

 

Ψ᤮Ⱦ԰¤Ȼפäå򤪴ꤤ
ޤ
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Ĥ⤴ɡơå꤬Ȥޤ

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

󡢤ԤοʤΤϡ¸ΤǤ͡

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䡢⹻ˡ饹᡼ȤֻԤϺ줬
äƤפȤΤʹȤޤ

줫40ǯ

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50ǯۤˤϡ3ͤۤɤʤäԤο
ϡǤ94͡

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¼Ū˸ơ2ܰʾˤʤäƤޤäƤΤǤ

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ȡ12ФλҶ1ʿܿϡ1981ǯ4.75
2008ǯˤ1.51ܤ˸äƤȤޤ

פˡ1/3˸äȤȤǤ


ǻλ֤Ǥ

Ԥ1ŤλŻϡΤ٤Ƥɤʤä

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ơ1/3Ǥ顢Ż1/6ˡ


Ż̤Ǥʤ󽷤㲼αƶäޤ

顢ǶλԤ󤿤ϡͽɿŤ¤μŤϤ
ǤΤǤϤʤΤǤ礦


ˤƤ⡢ʤ˻Ԥ󤬲ˤʤäΤ⡢
ܤʤäȤͳǤ뤫⤷ޤ


ԾϴǤϤޤ󤬡ܤְ㤤򵯤ޤ

٤ˤ⡢⤦Ծ츶Ƴ٤Ǥ


Τˤ⡢㤨СԤɾȽѼ¦ɤʬ
СŤȻפΤǤ



ԤѤʤȻפäå򤪴ꤤޤ
↓↓↓
͵blog󥭥󥰤

 

Υ


äȡå⤷ޤ󤬡

ˤΤǡָǤȤϡɤǤ礦


ΥʥǤ

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

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Ķʪξ徺⤿餹줬ʤȤƤ⡢
Х֥ȯ⤿餹ǽ뤫顢ȡǥХ֥뤬ȯ
ʤƤ⡢ǥХ֥뤬ȯǽ뤫顢ȡ

100ǯ1٤ȸ⡢Х֥ȯΤä
ˤʤäƤޤ顢Ʊ򷫤֤ʤΤǤСи
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ʪβ


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ǯƱ1.1Υޥʥϡߤȡ



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ȤˤʤСиάɬ򤤤䤬ܤȡؤ
ϤʤǤ礦

ʪϲβפȡ

ɤ򤻤ޤ

5ˤʤäơޤʪ礭ưƤΤȡ

ȤȤǡǡåƤߤޤ

 

           ؿĴ
2008/1     100.5 100.8
2008/2     100.4 101.0
2008/3     100.8       101.1
2008/4     100.8       100.8
2008/5     101.6       101.5
2008/6     102.0       101.9
2008/7     102.4       102.4
2008/8     102.6       102.4
2008/9     102.6       102.3
2008/10    102.4       102.1
2008/11    101.6       101.5
2008/12    101.1       101.0
2009/1     100.5       100.8
2009/2     100.4       101.0
2009/3     100.7       101.0
2009/4     100.7       100.7
2009/5     100.5       100.4


褺ؿʤˤߤȡ5ϡΤ
ǯ5٤С1.1ΥޥʥˤʤäƤޤ

5100.5ϡ٤0.2󲼤äƤ
ϤΤΡ12οȤۤƱǤ

顢ˤʤäΤϡäȥԥȤϤΤ褦ʵ
ΤǤ

ˡǯ45οͤ򸫲

100.8101.6˵޾徺ƤޤΤȤ
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ĤޤꡢǶưǤȤ⡢ǯ5Υ
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Τ뤿ˤϡĴѤߤλؿưİ
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Фϡ˴ؤۤιͤ
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ƹǤϡͻǥХ֥ɻߤ褦Ȥȡɬװʾ
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ۤΤ褦˻񻺥Х֥Τ˶ͻȤȤΤϡ
֡ĩͦĩȡ


ϡʪĤĤ븽¤ǧʤ⡢񻺲ʹƭ
θɬפǤ뤳ȤĥȻפޤ

 

ʪư褯ʬäȤå򤪴ꤤޤ
↓↓↓
͵blog󥭥󥰤

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ˤʤޤ

ϡĥΤǤ͡

Τäơ

ͭǤΥޥۿǤ

빽ϫϤäƤޤ

⤦֥񤯥ͥ륮

ʤƾ̤ǤۿʬΥޥƤҲ
ޤ





ǶᡢиάȤȤ褯褦ˤʤäƤޤ

 

㤨С24ϢˮԾѰиάϤ᤿

OECDγνиάƤƤɬǰפʤ

󤸤Ƥޤ

 

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ʬǤ͡

 

ƱԶͻн褹뤿ˡޤǼäƤ

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ʤȤȡ⤦кѤȿžΤʹ줽Ǥ

 

Ǥ⡢Ϥޤäᤤ褦Ǥ

 

ȤΤ⡢24FOMCϡΤ褦ʤȤҤ٤Ƥ뤫

 

ַкѤμ̥ڡ߲Ƥ

 

פˡкѤθ³Ƥ뤬ߤΥԡɤϼ

äƤ롢ȡ

 

ȤȤǡƹϡޤʵǤäȤϸƤʤΤǤ

 

ǤĤȤʳǤ

 

Ǥ顢Τ褦ʳǽиάΤϻǡʵ

ӤƤޤȤˤʤ꤫ͤʤȷǰ

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ǤϡɤΤ褦ʥߥ󥰤ǽиάͤ٤ʤΤǤ礦



ά

Ķʪδط

 

Ȥǡϡեä뤿ˤϤɤ뤳Ȥ

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ե򤷡ϡեäᡢ̲߲ͤΰݻޤ

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¨̲߶̤夲뤳Ȥˤäƥե

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Ǥ⶯Ϥ˼»ܤΤ꡼󥹥ѥĹǤ

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ܥ륫ϡ1979ǯFRBεĹ˽Ǥޤܥ륫

åȸƤФ줿ͻǹԤޤ

 

ȤΤ⡢󼡥륷åαƶʤɤΥꥫϡ

2ΥեΨǺޤƤΤǤнΤû

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ޤƤޤͻη̡ɥ徺

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ˤƤͻ뤳Ȥˤäơʪξ徺

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ܤηи餤СɤŪ䥼

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եϵʤ⤷ޤ󤬡Ķϡ

ʤιƭ⤿餹ǽϹ⤤ΤǤ

 

ƹǽХ֥뤬ȯϡͻ¤λȤۤܽŤʤ

ʪϤۤɾ徺Ƥޤ

 

ܤǤϡХ֥뤬ȯ1980ǯȾλϡʪؿ

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פˡͻ¤ɬʪ徺Ȥϸ¤ʤȤ

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ޥ͡ץ饤äСǤʪϾ夬Τ

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MVPQ

 

 

Mϡʾή̡Vϡʾή®١ơPϡʪQ
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䥵ӥμ̡

 

ʾή®٤ǤꡢơǼΤ䥵

ӥǤСM=PȤʤʤФʤޤ

 

ȤȤǡʾή̤СȼʪϾ夬ꡢ

ȿФ˲ʾζ̤Сʪ㲼롢ȡ

 

ñʹͤǤ

 

ʤȤ¿˵ޤ

 

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Τ褦ʾˤʤСβͤڤȤƤβ٤

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̾ξˤϡή̤褦ȡϸ

뤳ȤˤʤȡΤ䥵ӥФפ޷Ѳ櫓

ǤϤʤΤǡʪ˱ƶڤ֤ȤϾʤ櫓ʤΤǤ

 

 

Ǥϡα̿ϤɤʤΤǤ礦

 

㤨СԤĶѤȤޤ

 

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¼ˤѲʤƤ⡢Ԥؤλʧ©Ⱦʤ

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ȤȤǡĶϡ񻺲ʤξ徺ǽ

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ޤǸȡǤϡΡܤǤϡĹŪ

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ǤХ֥ܤǵʤäǡǤϵΤ

 

椬ĶĹ餯ѤƤ֡ܤˤϡߥ

勵ʥ٤ȸƤФȤޤ

 

ĿȤϡܤλ񻺤ˤ򤷤ʤä⤷

󤬡λ񻺡ˤϳ¶ޤߤޤ񻺤

ʤ夲ϤͿΤǤ

 

꡼󥹥ѥĹϡͻ¤ͻž塢û

Ͼ徺ƤΤˡĹ̤Τޤ޿ܤƤȤ

פȸޤݤϡ椬Ϥᡢ;

⤬ƹ̤ήƤȤʪäƤޤ

 

Ĥޤꡢ䡢ͻθ̤ϡĺϤΥǥ뤳Ȥʤ

ǤʤʤäƤΤǤ

 

ꥫǤ϶ͻžƤ⡢ܤǤϡŪ

³ƤȤˤäơꥫζͻθ̤Ƥޤä

ȤȤ˵դ٤ʤΤǤ




Ѥϡޤǡ


иά٤ˤƤ뤫⡢Ȼפå
ꤤޤ
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͵blog󥭥󥰤


ͭޥοߤϡ

http://premium.mag2.com/mmf/P0/00/75/P0007553.html

1֤Τ֤ޤ



 

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ληǡƥӤϤäǤ

ɤƤǤ礦

졢ϡ

ληήȡİΨ夬뤫Ǥ

졢ˡ

ʤꡢۤˤסʤơ

Τˤϡ۸ʤΤ⤷ޤ󤬡

ȸޤȤľȤ߿Ȥ

ʤȤΤ顢Ϳޤεİˤϡִäƽ
ľƤפʤƤȤ򤤤ͤ⡣

򤤤Ǥ͡¤򤤡

ΡȤʤƤΡ99οͤˤʤꤿ
ƤߤʤΤǤ

ˤʤꤿȻפäƤ⡢ñˤϤʤʤ
Ǥ

ɬפǤ˾⡢μиɬפǤ

ϡʤƤȤǤʤšȸäƤߤ椫ɬ
פ⡣

ܲǤϡˤʤꤿȻפäƤʤƤȤ
ˡΥȾ夬λϡİǤʤΤ˼̱ޤ
ۤˤʤƸޤ׵򤷤䤬äơȡ

Τˡޤ߿⤷ޤ

ʬФǤϤʤͿޤаѰĹ
򤷤顢ʬξФޤǤǤ

ΰ̣Ǥϡ̱ޤεİȤ䤫ڹ礤Ϥʤ
⤷ޤ

ʸ礬ΤǤСаѰĹ˸ȡ

ǤϡɤơаѰĹϡλôФȤƤ
Τ

ϡĶ󤿤ʤȤǤ

ΤޤޤǤϡ̱ޤϾƤʤȻפäƤ뤫Ǥ

¤ƻԤĤȤϤǤʤȡ

ϺǤϡƤʤȷ׻ƤΤǤ


顢̱λٻΨ90ĶȤꥹȤƤ
Ǥ

ˡեƥӤƬǥ󥱡ȤȡȷĶ
ơˤդ路ͤΰ֤񸶻᤬ʤäƤޤޤ

ϡǤĤλ˽Ϥ뤳Ȥ
ǽɤȤȤǤ

ǯ滳üǤȼäޤ

ܺ긩̱򤷤ƤΤȡ


줬ñʤؤΰؤȤȤǤС̱֡
󥰤ΤɬǤ礦

ޤǤĤƤǤϤʤȡ

⤷ˤʤ뤿ǤС

ϡˤʤǽǤС

ʤȡ񸶻ϡäȵܺΤˤʤ뤳Ȥ򤷤Ƥ뤫
šȡ

ΤȤݥȤǤ

⡢ʬβ֤λ򼭤ΤǤϤʤȡ

ȡ̱Τȡ

ɤ狼äߤȡ

Ǥ⡢
ƥӤ繥񸶻ϡϡܺԲ
ʤΤȤȤǤϤʤΤǤϤʤǤ礦

ΤˡƥӤ˽б餹СܺPRΩĤǤ礦

񸶻Υƥӽб֤ϿҾǤϤޤ

ǤʤСۤɥƥӤ˽б餹Ϥޤ

⤷ꡢäˤǤʤ줿šϡδְ㤤
ˤǤʤ줿

ǽϾʤ⤷ޤ󤬡ҤäȤšȤȤ
ǤϤޤ

˿͵ǹͤ顢ͿޤεİΤʤ񸶻˾
ΤʤɤʤǤ礦ȤäƤƤƤΤ


ǤϡˡλˤʤäƤޤä顢ܤϤɤʤ
ΤǤ礦

괺ܺ긩ƻϩ֤뤫⤷ޤ

ܺ긩̱ϡССפȶ֤Ǥ礦

ʳΤȤϡɤʤΤǤ礦

ǯ꤬褹ΤǤ礦

ҹ𲽤Ͽߤ뤳ȤǤΤǤ礦

οͤϡīɤ褷ƤΤǤ礦

ڤϤɤʤΤǤ礦

νδطϤɤʤΤǤ礦

ϵ岹ȲкϡɤΤǤ礦

ơккˤĤƤϡɤǤ礦


λкѤˤĤƤܤиȤϻפʤΤ
š

񸶻᤬äƤȤϡܺ긩Υޥ󥴡ϷܤPR
ȤƬ⤫Ӥޤ

ȤȤϡܤμ֤ŵʤʤɤ򳤳⤯Ȥ
ˤʤΤǤ礦


äѤꡢȤƤϤǤϤʤ褦ʵޤ

̱ޤϡȤһ򺣤Ωơ񸶻ư
褹٤ǤϤʤǤ礦

ΰ̤ΤȤ򤷤ʤȡ̱δؿ򽸤뤳ȤǤޤ

ϡ⤦ưƤΤǤ礦

 

 

λϡ˰ؤȻפå򤪴ꤤ
ޤ
↓↓↓
͵blog󥭥󥰤

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ĤơG5Ȥäơ5кѤƤ
夬ޤ

G5ϡƹ񡢱ѹ񡢥ե󥹡ɥġܤ5ĤǤ

åΤޤݲ󤬡¢ääƤȤ
ˤϡվ˹Ԥʹ򤷤ƤǦӤdz̩˽ʤ
Ȥʤɤޤ

ߤβͤɤ뤫кѤˤȤäƤפʤȤ
ä櫓Ǥ

ȤɤǤ礦

G5˥ꥢȥʥäG7ȤʤꡢƤ˥
äG8ȤʤäƤޤ

ơߥåȤˤϡ񡢥֥饸롢ɡեꥫᥭ
äޤ

ȤȤǡG8ɤäǤϤʤȻפäƤ

G2λʤΤȤ

G2ȤϡΡɤȤɤιؤΤǤ礦

ƹEUʤΤǤ礦

ǤϤʤ褦Ǥ

ƹؤΤǤ


СǶƹϡܤʤ˵ˤƤʤ
ҡ

ƹκǰֻ褬Ǥꡢơƹ
ͭǤСƹưˤդʧȤϡ
Ǥޤ

ܤGDPϡƹˤĤ2̤ΤϤǤϤʤä
ΤǤ礦

餳ˬƤȤˤϡ1̤Υꥫ
2̤ηкǤܤȤ礨СɤϾڤ뤳
ǤȶĴΤȡפޤ

2̤ϰ̤ʤäƤΤȤ

GDPܤGDPǯǯˤȴȤμ
ˤʤäƤȤΤǤ

դ

GDPοܡ䡡ñ̡10ɥ

 GDP

















ƥɥƤGDPϡǯ󤰤󿭤ӤƤޤ

ܤϡۤ­Ƨ߾֥ץ饹ǶߤȤäȤ
ʤΤǤǤ

GDPϡ2007ǯ34鲯ɥ٤Ǥ2008ǯˤ
43鲯ɥ٤ãƤΤȤ

ӥ꡼Х֥ʿǤإ졼Ȥưʬ̣ȡ
ȤˤʤȤȤʤΤǤ礦

ȤȤˤʤȡܤϡ⤦2̤ηкפȤ
ȤȤǤʤʤäƤޤޤ

1GDP٤СšȤäƤ⡢ϡ񤳤
2̤ηкȸäƾʤǤ礦

뤤ϡ⤦衢Ĥޤꡢƹɤȴ˥塼
ꤷ塹Ƚ򤷤ƤΤ⤷ޤ

ơʤȤï⤬Ƥ뤫餳G2ȤȤ
褦ˤʤäƤΤΤޤ

䡢פޤ

ꥫȤ񤬡ڤʥѡȥʡȤưȤ
Τȡ

ƱȤϡˤĤƤȻפޤ

ξȤ⡢кŪפͤ顢줾줬ºŤ뤳Ȥ
פˤĤʤȤȤ򴶤Ƥ뤫餳Τ褦˿
äƤäǤϤʤǤ礦


¿ο͡ϡޤޤʹ٤С˳
ƤȤΤǤ礦

ͤҤȤ꤬ޤ˳ǤäƤ⡢ΤȤƤ¿ۤγ
ߤͭƤޤ

ĤޤꡢкǤ뤳Ȥϻ¤ʤΤǤ

GDPƹȴˤϡ᤯Ƥ10ǯۤɤϤ
ȸƤޤ⤷δ֤˿̱Фƥɥ뤬뤳
ȤСҤäȤ5ǯۤɤƹɤȴ
ηкˤʤ뤳Ȥäƹͤʤ櫓ǤϤʤΤǤ

ǡʤȡƥɥʳ˴̲ߤ̤̲
ϤʤȤϤäƤ⡢Ϥɥϰ̤ϡȤʪˤʤʤ
㲼ƤޤȤͤ櫓Ǥ


кѤʬۿޤ礭ѲƤǽǤ
ȹͤ٤Ǥ

 

ƹ٤äܤλϡʡȻפä
å򤪴ꤤޤ
↓↓↓
͵blog󥭥󥰤

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

3֤ۤɡ֥ιǤޤǤ

ˡϡޥۿǤޤǤ

ޤ

¤ϡץ饤١Ȥͳǡļˤ˵äƤޤ

ļˤϡĹ긩縶ԤȤȤǤ

νǤȤϡȺǶᳫȯʤǤϰǤꡢ
ˤϤޤĤܤޤ

ǡʤƤ֡ĤܤͻҤʤɤߤƤǤ

֤ҤäȤseijiϡϼ͡

㤤ޤ

¾ͤĤܤǤ

֤Ǥϡɤ¾ͤĤܤʤɤ򡩡

Ĥܤ©ʪ򸫤ΤڤߤǤ

֤Ǥ⡢ФĤܤš

ˤ⤤ʤȻפǤ礦

Τ˿ФĤܤϡޤɤ󤳤αưߤ
ʤΤǡʪλѤʤɡ

ФĤȡ⤦ʪ褦ȡ

񤫤餫äФξʥޥ㥯äѤˤǤ


ΤǡռĤܤʤȵ
ʤǤ礦

Ǥ⡢ۤθȡ̵Υߥ󥳤ȤȤ˾ʥޥ㥯
ǧǤޤ

¤Ի׵ĤʤΤǤ͡

ޤǡɴ󤬤⤦Ŀ򤹤ȤȤΤä
Τ褦ˡޥ㥯櫓Ǥ顣

䥴ϤޤĤޤǤȥܤĤܤξ
ޤ顢󤫤餺䥴Ĥܤ椬δDZˤ뤳
ȤǤ礦


ɴ󤿤ˤϡʤλѤޤƥ
³Ƥ餤Ȼפޤ

ϡȥ©ĤܤΤ褦ˤʤäߤΤǤ
ɴˤ𤬤Ǥ礦š

ͤ⡢Ĥܤˬ뤳Ȥä顢󡢤褯ˤʤä
ʪѻƲ



ܤϡĤʤФʤȻפäå򤪴ꤤ
ޤ
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͵blog󥭥󥰤


䤬ǤϰǤϡͯ夬ĤƤΤǡߤ
ʤƤĿϲǽʤ褦Ǥ

ɤʤ˽뤯Ƥ⡢֤ͯޤ

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ƹǶͻװƤȯɽޤξƤ褦

᤮ȤոȡʬǤϤʤȤոǤ


᤮Ȥոϡ㤨СԤ߶ͻؤ
Ƥޤ

Ԥ˸碌СζͻϡԤΤ
Ϥʤȡ

ΤˡĸڷʧäꤷΤϡԤ
Ϥޤ

ˤڷʤ˹⤤դĤΤԤǤϤ
ޤ

쥸åȡǥեȡåפ䤷ΤԤǤϤʤȡ

߶ͻؤϡɤ߶ͻؤȤбķ֤ѻߤ
ʤФʤΤܤäƤ褦Ǥ

߶ͻؤȤϡܤǤСѶˤ修ȹߤʤ
ΤǤ礦

֥ץ饤ʤɤˤϴؤäƤʤΤˡšȸäƤ
Ǥ


ǡݡ륯롼ޥʤɤϡ٤ˤäƤʤ
ȡʹ֤Ϥ˺Ƥޤšȡ

We need to do it whilestrike while the iron is hot.


ŴǮǤơ


ХΤϡζͻϡ̵Ǥʸ⤿餷
ȽҤ٤ޤ

a culture of irresponsibility

PBSλʲԤǤ른ࡦ졼顼᤬ȥʡ̳Ĺ˼
䤷ޤ

̵ǤȤϤɤȤɤƤʤȤˤʤäΤȡ

ȥʡ̳ĹϡФ˼᤮
Ƥޤ

΅ơˤʤäƤȤȤǤϤʤǤ礦


Υȥʡ̳ĹϡΤ褦ʤȤҤ٤Ƥޤ


And we want to see the unemployment rate start to
come down and come down substantially.
 We want to 
see costs of credit, availability of credit come
back to
more nomal place.

  It's not going to back to where it was between 2004 
and 2007.

That was an unsustainable boom. Borrowing costs 
were unsustainably
low. That's what helped produce 
this huge boom in credit,
huge boom in housing prices,
assetprices. We can't go back to that.

ֲ桹ϡΨ㲼Ϥ褦ˤʤΤ򸫤
ȤƼε񤬡äʻѤΤ򸫤

2004ǯ2007ǯκΤ褦ʾ֤뤳ȤϤʤǤ

  ϡ³Բǽʥ֡äΤȤϡ³Բ
ǽʤۤ㤫ä줬ͻ֡⤿餷ʤξ徺
⤿餷񻺲ʤξ徺⤿餷Τξ֤ˤ
Τ


䡢פΤǤκʤȤΤϡ¤
Ȥ⤤ʤǤϤʤ餤ʵƤ⡢
ޤǼפΤϡʬ񤷤ޤ

Τʤ顢³Բǽʥ٥μפǤäǤ

ΤȤϡ褯ΤƤɬפǤ礦


ŴǮǤƤȤΤʬ뤬ɤ߶ͻؤ
ʤȤΤȻפäå򤪴ꤤޤ
↓↓↓
͵blog󥭥󥰤

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ХΤ17ͻפˤĤƤޤ

Ϣĸ¤Ϳ롢ȤݸΤȿ
ߤȤ

Ǥ⡢ɤʤΤǤ礦

Ϣˡʤ¿θ¤椵뤳Ȥ֤βˤĤ
ΤǤ礦

졢ܤ֤Ƥߤʬ䤹Ȼפޤ

ԤڷҡݸҤ굡äꤷơͻ
ƥΰ򶼤Ȥäơϲ򤷤Ƥ
ȤϽФʤȻפޤ

ʸΤ϶ͻģǤ礦

Ԥϡ̲߲ͤΰȷкѤΰ˺
Ϥ٤ǡŻʳˡ̶ͻؤδĤͻ
ƥΤΰˤĤƤޤǤΤϡŤ
ô򤫤äǡ褷ƸΨŪȤϻפʤǤ

ХΤΥԡߤƤߤޤ礦


With the reforms we're proposing today, we seek to put
in place rules that will allow our markets to promote
innovation while discouraging abuse.

桹ƤװƤʤäơ桹ϡԾ줬ѤĤġ
١¥ʤ뤳ȤǤ褦ʵ»ܤ


We seek to create a framework in which markets can
function freely and fairly, without the fragility in
which normal business cycles suddenly bring the risk
of financial collapse; we want a system that works for
businesses and consumers.

ֲ桹ϡԾ줬ͳˡƸ˵ǽ뤳ȤǤ褦Ȥߤι
ۤؤ롣ˤϡ̾ηʵ۴Ĥʤͻƥ⤿
餹褦ȼ夵Ϥʤ桹ϡȤԤΤ˵ǽ륷ƥब
ɬפ


There are those who will say that we do not go far
enough, that we should have scrapped the system altogether
and started all over again. I think that would be
a mistake. Instead, we've crafted reforms to pinpoint
the structural weaknesses that allowed for this crisis
and to make sure that these problems are dealt with so
that we're preventing crises in the future.

ֲ桹ϤޤʬǤϤʤȤ桹ϡټΤѻߤƤ
⤦ٻϤᤫľ٤äȤ͡롣ϴ
㤤Ȼפꡢδ븶Ȥʤä¤Ūʼ˾
ƤװƤۤƤޤ꤬졢
򤹤뤳ȤǤ褦ʲװƤۤƤ


There are also those who say that we are going too
far. But the events of the past few years offer ample
testimony for the need to make significant changes.

֤ޤ桹Ϥ᤮Ȥͤ⤤롣ǯ˵ä¤ϡ
ѲɬפȤȤȤʬƤ

The absence of a working regulatory regime over
many parts of the financial system -- and over the
system as a whole -- led us to near catastrophe.

ֶͻƥ¿ʬФʬǤʤä顢ޤ
ΤȤƤζͻƥФʬǤʤä顢
Τ


We shouldn't forget that. We don't want to stifle
innovation. But I'm convinced that by setting out clear
rules of the road and ensuring transparency and fair
dealing, we will actually promote a more vibrant market.

֤ΤȤ˺٤ǤϤʤΥ١⤷Ϥʤ
Τʥ롼ꤷƩȸݤ뤳Ȥˤäơ
äȳϤΤԾ¥ʤǤȳοƤ


This principle is at the heart of the changes we're
proposing, so let me list them for you.

֤줳桹Ƥפ濴ˤ롣Ū˼

First, we're proposing a set of reforms to require
regulators to look not only at the safety and soundness
of individual institutions, but also -- for the first
time -- at the stability of the financial system as
a whole.

ˡ桹ϡɤġεؤΰˤĤƤ
դ򤹤ΤǤϤʤƤΤȤǤ뤬ΤȤƤζͻƥΰ
ˤĤƤդ뤳ȤװƤƤƤ

One of the reasons this crisis could take place is
that while many agencies and regulators were responsible
for overseeing individual financial firms and their
subsidiaries, no one was responsible for protecting
the whole system from the kinds of risks that tied
these firms to one another.

֤δ1Ĥͳϡ¿εɤġζͻؤ
λҲҤδĤǤäƤïҤȤȤơζͻؤ
¾ζͻؤ˷դ褦ʥꥹΤΥƥ뤳ȤˤĤ
ƤϡǤļԤʤäȤǤ

Regulators were charged with seeing the trees, but
not the forest. And even then, some firms that posed
a so-called "systemic risk" were not regulated as strongly
as others; they behaved like banks but chose to be
regulated as insurance companies, or investment firms,
or other entities that were under less scrutiny.

ֵɤϡڤ򸫤ǤϤä򸫤ǤϤʤäޤ
⥷ƥꥹ˱ƶڤܤȤߤ줿ҤǤ⡢Ϥ˵뤳
ʤäΤäβҤϡԤΤ褦˹ưݸ
ҤȤƵӤϡҤȤơϡƻ
ʤȿȤơ

 As a result, the failure of one firm threatened
the viability of many others. The effect multiplied.

֤η̡ĤβҤþ¾¿βҤ¸³ƶ

 There was no system in place that was prepared for
this kind of outcome. And more importantly, no one has
been charged with preventing it. We were facing one of
the largest financial crises in history -- and those
responsible for oversight were mostly caught off guard
and without the authority needed to address the problem.

֤̤бƥϤʤä˽פʤȤϡ
򤹤ǤäΤʤäȤ桹ϡԾζͻ
ΰĤľ̤Ƥơɤϡ԰դͤ줿
н褹뤿θ¤ʤäΤ


 It's time for that to change. I am proposing that the
Federal Reserve be granted new authority -- and accountability
 -- for regulating bank holding companies and other large
firms that pose a risk to the entire economy in the event
of failure.

ֺѳפλʤΤ ϡϢ䤬ʸ¤Ϳ뤳ȤƤ
롣ԻҤȷкΤ˥ƥꥹڤܤ褦礭ʲҤ
ǤǤ


 We'll also raise the standard to which these kinds of firms
are held. If you can pose a great risk, that means you have
a great responsibility.

ֲ桹ϤޤβҤŬѤƤ롣⤷礭ʥ
ڤܤΤǤ줬Ǥ礭Τ

 We will require these firms to meet stronger capital and
liquidity requirements so that they're more resilient and
less likely to fail.

ֲ桹ϡβҤäȶ٤ˤʤꡢþ뤳Ȥʤʤ褦
ˡʬʻܤήưȤ׵᤹

 And even as we place the authority to regulate these large
firms in the hands of the Federal Reserve -- so that lines
of responsibility and accountability are clear -- we will
also create an oversight council to bring together regulators
from across markets to coordinate and share information,
to identify gaps in regulation, and to tackle issues that
don't fit neatly into an organizational chart.

ֲ桹ϡ礭ʲҤ븢¤ϢͿΤǤ뤬
ǤϰϤΤˤʤ褦ˡ桹ϡİѰߤĤ
ˤäơ뵬ɤĴȤȤ˾ζͭޤꡢ
Υåפ򸫤ĤơɤɤôǤ뤫Ϥäꤷ
褦б뤿Ǥ


 We're going to bring everyone together to take a broader
view -- and a longer view -- to solve problems in oversight
 before they can become crises.

ֲ桹ϡޤȤᡢ깭ϤǡơĹŪʻǤߤ褦
ˤʤ褹

 

 As part of this effort we're proposing the creation of what's 
called "resolution authority" for large and interconnected
financial firms so that we're not only putting in place
safeguards to prevent the failure of these firms, but also a set
of orderly procedures that will allow us to protect the economy
if such a firm does in fact go underwater.

֤ϤΰĤȤơɤȸƤФΤߤƤ롣
ϤʣʶͻҤΤΤΤǤꡢҤþɤ
ɱҺ֤Ǥʤ⤷Ҥ¾þ褦ʾˡ
кѤ뤳ȤǤ褦Ȥ³֤뤿ΤΤǤ

 Think about this: If a bank fails, we have a process
through the FDIC that protects depositors and maintains
confidence in the banking system.

֤ͤƤۤ⤷Ԥˤȡ桹ϡ¶ݸҤ̤
³ꡢˤä¶Ԥݸ졢ѥƥο꤬ݻ

 This process was created during the Great Depression when
the failure of one bank led to runs on other banks, which 
in turn threatened wider turmoil. And it works. Yet we don't
have any effective system in place to contain the failure 
of an AIG, or the largest and most interconnected financial 
firms in our country.

֤μ³ϡ網λߤ줿ĤζԤþ
¾ζԤμդ򴬤礭ʺȤʤä٤
ǽƤ롣桹ˤϡAIGþ褦ʸŪ
ͭƤʤAIGϡ椬ǺΡƺǤʣȤͻ
ҤʤΤ

 And that's why, when this crisis began, crucial decisions 
about what would happen to some of the world's biggest
companies -- companies employing tens of thousands of
people and holding trillions of dollars in assets -- took place in
emergency meetings in the middle of the night. And that's why
we've had to rely on taxpayer dollars.

֤줬δäȤ礭ʲҤδĤˤɤ
⤿餹ΤǤȤȤˤĤƽʷǤʤ줿ͳʤ
ͤνȰۤɥλ񻺤ͭ褦ʲҤФ
ʱƶͿ뤫νʷǤϡζ۵޲ĤǤʤ줿
줬ǼǼԤΤäͳʤΤ

 

 We should not be forced to choose between allowing a 
company to fall into a rapid and chaotic dissolution, or to 
support the company with taxpayer money. That's an 
unacceptable choice. There's too much at stake, and we're 
going to change it.

ֲҤ纮򵯤ʬ򤵤뤫ϡǼǼԤΤǤβҤ
ٱ礹뤫Τɤä١ʤɤȤȤϵ٤ǤϤʤ
ϼԲǽ;ˤ¿طԤ¸ߤƤ
롣桹ϡѤ뤳Ȥˤʤ


 Second, we're proposing a new and powerful agency charged 
with just one job: looking out for ordinary consumers. And
this is essential, for this crisis was not just the result
of decisions made by the mightiest of financial firms; it 
was also the result of decisions made by ordinary Americans
to open credit cards and take out home loans and take on
other financial obligations.

ˡ桹ϡĤλŻǤĿϤȿߤ
ȤƤ롣̤ξԤ򸫼ȿδϡϤʶͻ
ԤäˤäƵäȤǤϤʤ̤Υꥫ̱
åȥɤäꡢڤꤿꡢ¾κ̳äꤷ
Ȥη̤Ǥ⤢äΤ


 We know that there were many who took out loans they knew
they couldn't afford, but there were also millions of Americans 
who signed contracts they didn't always understand offered
by lenders who didn't always tell the truth.

ֲ桹ϡʬֺѤ뤳ȤϤǤʤΤäƤʤ齻
ڤ¿ο͡ȤΤäƤ롣ޤ餬򤹤
ȤΤǤʤƤη˥򤷤ɴͤΥꥫ̱
Ȥ¤ߤϡ¤𤲤ʤäΤ

 Even today, folks sign up for mortgages or student loans or 
credit cards and face a bewildering array of incomprehensible 
options. Companies compete not by offering better products, 
but more complicated ones, with more fine print and more
hidden terms.

ֺǤ⡢䥯쥸åȥɤη˥󤹤͡
ơǤʤץƤǤ롣¦ϡ褤
ξʤ󶡤ΤǤϤʤʣʤΤ򡢤ơ꾮ʻǽ
졢줿郎Τ󶡤Ƥ

 So this new agency will change that, building on credit card
reforms I signed into law a few weeks ago with the help of
many of the members of Congress who are here today. This 
agency will have the power to set standards so that companies
compete by offering innovative products that consumers
actually want -- and actually understand. Consumers will be 
provided information that is simple, transparent, and accurate.

ֽäơοȿϡΤȤѤ뤳Ȥˤʤˤ
IJΥС¿λƱơ˻䤬򤹤뤳Ȥˤ
äˡΧȤʤä쥸åȥɲפ˴ŤƤǤ


 You'll be able to compare products and see what's best for 
you. The most unfair practices will be banned. Those ridiculous
contracts with pages of fine print that no one can figure out --
those things will be a thing of the past. And enforcement will 
be the rule, not the exception.

֤ʤϡʤӤǽˤʤꡢɤ줬֤褤ʬǤ
ԸʴԤ϶ػߤ롣ïⲿ񤤤Ƥ뤫ʬʤ褦ʾʻ
ǽ񤫤줿ϡϤΤΤȤʤ롣§Ȥʤꡢ㳰ǤϤ

 For example, this agency will be empowered to set new rules
for home mortgage lending, so that the bad practices that led 
to the home mortgage crisis will be stamped out.

㤨Сȿϡο§ߤ븢¤Ϳ롣
˻餷᤿Ԥݤ뤿


 Mortgage brokers will be held to higher standards. Exotic
mortgages that hide exploding costs will no longer be the
norm. Home mortgage disclosures will be reasonable, clearly 
written, and concise.

ֽΥ֥ϡ긷§˽Ȥˤʤ롣ƭ
뤳Ȥ򱣤褦ѤʥϡϤǤϤʤʤ롣
ξ󳫼ϡŪǡΤ˽񤫤졢ʷʤΤˤʤ


 And we're going to level the playing field so that non-banks 
that offer home loans are held to the same standards as banks
that offer similar services, so that lenders aren't competing to
lower standards, but rather are competing to meet a higher bar
on behalf of consumers.

ֲ桹ϡ󶡤ΥХ󥯤ƱͤΥӥ󶡤
ԤŬѤƱΤ˽褦ˤ뤿ˡ򤽤롣
ˤäߤϡ򲼤붥򤹤ΤǤϤʤԤΤ
⤤Ȥˤʤ

The mission of this new agency must also be reflected
in the work we do throughout the government. There are
other agencies, like the Federal Trade Commission,
charged with protecting consumers, and we must ensure
that those agencies have the resources and the
state-of-the-art tools to stop unfair and deceptive
practices as well.

֤ȿλ̿ϡ桹ԤŻȿǤ뤳Ȥˤʤ롣Ԥݸ
ŪϢˮѰΤ褦ȿ뤬Τ褦ʵؤԸ
ǺŪʹ԰٤ߤᤵ뤿Ρ񸻤üŪʼʤͭ뤳Ȥ
ΤʤΤˤʤФʤʤ


 Third, we're proposing a series of changes designed to
promote free and fair markets by closing gaps and overlaps
in our regulatory system -- including gaps that exist
not just within but between nations.

軰ˡ桹εηϤΥåפ䥪СåפȤˤäƼͳ
ǸʻԾˤʤ뤳Ȥ¥ʤ뤿ΰϢβפƤ롣ϡ
˸¤餺Ȥδ֤¸ߤ륮åפޤ


 We've seen that structural deficiencies allow some
companies to shop for the regulator of their choice
-- and others, like hedge funds, to operate outside
of the regulatory system altogether. We've seen the
development of financial instruments, like many
derivatives, that are so complex as to defy efforts
to assess their actual value. And we've seen a system
that allowed lenders to profit by providing loans to
borrowers who would never repay, because the lender
offloaded the loan and the consequences to somebody
else.

ֲ桹ϡɤʬ֤褦ʲҤȤ¤Ūʷ٤
Ƥޤ㤨СإåեɤΤ褦˵ηϤγdzư򤹤
Ҥ⤢롣桹ϡͻʤο򸫤Ƥ¿ΥǥХƥ֤Τ褦;
ˤʣˤʤäƤơºݤβͤɤۤɤΤΤǤ뤫ɾ褦
ʤʤۤɤΤΤ롣ơ褷ֺѤ뤳Ȥ
ʤ褦ʼڤ˥ͿƤ⡢פ夬褦ʥƥ򸫤Ƥ
ߤϡ¾Ѥη̤¾ͤ˵ڤ֤Ȥˤʤ

 

 And that's why, as part of these reforms, we will
dismantle the Office of Thrift Supervision and close
loopholes that have allowed important institutions to
cherry-pick among banking rules. We will offer only
one federal banking charter, regulated by a strengthened
federal supervisor. We'll raise capital requirements
for all depository institutions. Hedge fund advisors
will be required to register with the SEC.

֤줬βװƤΰȤơ߶ͻشĶɤѻߤפʵ
ؤԵ§ΤʤĤޤ߿򤹤뤳Ȥ褦ȴդ
ȤƤͳ

 We're also proposing comprehensive regulation of credit
default swaps and other derivatives that have threatened
the entire financial system. And we will require the
originator of a loan to retain an economic interest
in that loan, so that the lender -- and not just the holder
of a security, for example -- has an interest in ensuring
that a loan is actually paid back. By setting common-sense
rules, these kinds of financial instruments can play a
constructive, rather than destructive role.

ֲ桹ϡ쥸åȡǥեȡå׵ڤӶͻƥΤ򶼤
¾ΥǥХƥ֤ˤĤƤ⡢ŪƤ롣ޤθ
ͭԤФƤϡηкŪͿݻ褦׵᤹롣
뤳Ȥˤäơ㤨СڷݻԤǤϤʤߤ꤬ͻ񤬼º
ֺѤ뤳Ȥμ¤ʤΤˤ뤳Ȥ˴ؿ뤿Ǥ롣Q
Ūʥ롼ߤ뤳Ȥˤäơμζͻʤϡ˲ŪʤΤǤϤʤ
Ū餸뤳ȤǤ


ˤƤʤȤäƤȤȤǤ͡


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