кѥ˥塼

޸Ρкѥ˥塼̤ưͻ֥Ǥϵ岹Ȳ˻ߤΤúи󾧤ޤиӽиȤϰ㤤ޤߤʴ㤤ΤǤ

2010ǯ04

餪٤ߤˤʤ⤤ȻפޤɤʷײΩ
ƤƤä㤤ޤ

ˤʤ衼ʤƤͤ⡣

Ǥ顢FLASHǤ⸫ƤߤޤǤ⡢ڥå
Ǥ衣

ַкѻɸפʤƽФƤޤ͡

⡢˱Ƥޤ



FLASHSPкѻɸ


ɤǤߤ褦ʡȻפå򤷤ĺȤ줷Ǥ
↓↓↓
͵blog󥭥󥰤
Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ϡɥޥ󥵥åܵҤ˥ʤĤƤ
ȤäǤ衼åѤǤϡꥷĤγդ
졢󥯥ܥ¤ߤˤʤäΤȤ⤦
ʬ䤹СꥷιĤϥʤΤȡ

2ǯʪꥷĤ꤬13%ˤʤäȸ
28ˤ38%ޤǾ徺Ȥοϡ椬
©ˡξ¤ڤĶ٥ˤΤǤ
͡ɤǤ⤤ɡ

ȤȤǡꥷκ꤬кѤ礭
ꤲƤޤ

ե󥹤䥤ꥢʤɤϡɥĤƥꥷ
ʤ֤򰭲Ƥ񤷤Ƥ褦Ǥɥ
餹СιιĤ椯Ƥ褦ʥꥷ
褦ȤƤ⡢̤פʤΤ­Ƨ
ȸ

ʤƤ⡢ꥷ㤬Ʒ˸ϤȤ
򼨤ƤʤȤˤϡšȹͤƤ櫓Ǥ

IMF⡢饮ꥷٱ礷ȤϻפäƤ⡢
㼫ȤΤкѺƷץꤷʤ¤ꡢ
ꥷٱ礹뤳ȤϤǤʤΤǤ

Ǥϡꥷϡäδ֡˳뤳ȤˤʤΤ

ꥷǤϡϢΤ褦˥ȥ饤Ƥޤ
̱ϡ񤬹ԤäƤͿåȤʤɤȿȯƤ
櫓Ǥ

Ĥޤꡢ̱¦ϡ۽̺ˤȿФȡޤ
ʬʤǤϤޤ󤬡šǤ⡢٤Ȥ
ФȤۤɡꥷФƤߤȤȤϤʤ
ʤ롢ȡ

̱ڤ겼ΤϷȸи
ɡ϶줷ʤȡȿФˡ餤ʤȤ
ʤΤȾǤ᤯դеĤۤɡξ
᤯æѤǤ롢ȡ

Ȥ򶵤ƾ夲ͤϡɤˤʤΤǤ礦

⤽⡢ꥷϡκ𤫤餹С桼
ˤϤʤ뤳ȤǤʤä櫓ǤĤޤꡢڶ⤬¿ơ
ȤʤƤʤäȡ򥴡ɥޥΤ
Ԥΰηäڤơǥ桼
̤Τȡǡ桼˲ǡϰ
ˡͭʾǤޤǹĤȯԤ뤳Ȥǽ
ˤʤäƤȡ

Ĥޤꡢꥷι̱⡢ꥫΥ֥ץ饤
ѼԤƱ褦ˡμϰʾ򤳤ޤäƤ
ȤȤʤΤǤơХ֥뤬ƤȤ櫓Ǥ

ΤȼΤˤޤꥷι̱ϵդƤ
ȡ

ꥷϡ519ˡ110ɥΤ⤬ɬפˤʤ
ȸޤĤޤꡢλޤǤˤΩƤ뤳ȤǤʤ
ȡ˥ǥեȤˤʤ붲줬ΤǤ


Ĥ꤬38%Ȥ϶äȤå򤪴ꤤ
ޤ
↓↓↓

͵֥󥭥

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ɥޥ󥵥åδ屡˸ƤФ졢㤷
Ƥޤ

İˤСɥޥ󥵥åμϡ饹٥
󤤡ȡΤʤС饹٥Ҥ򤹤ͤϡ
οͤʬ餱ȤȤƹĤȤȤ
äƤ뤬ɥޥȼ򤷤ܵҤϡȤ
ʤäȡ

ˤƤ⡢Ȥϡɥޥ󥵥å򤳤Ǥ⤫
Ǥ⤫ȹޤޤ

ʻ˥ɥޥθȤΤʤ顢̱
򿩤餦ΤʬäƤ뤫Ǥ礦͡

Ǥ⡢֥뤬ǽˤʤ褦˵¤ʤ᤿
ΤȼȤǤ뤳Ȥ˺ƤϤޤ󡣤ơ
Ȥˤ¿ۤ⤬륹ȥ꡼Ȥ󶡤Ƥ
ȤΤä٤Ǥ


SEN. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, D-Mo.:
You think you are so smart? Any street gambler
would never place a bet with a bookie or a house
with the record that is revealed in the documents
that this committee has gathered.

ֵϡʬƬɤȻפΤΰѰ񤬽᤿
ˤä餫ˤ줿褦ʼӤΤǾҤ
褦ʳΥ֥顼ʤƤʤΤ

SEN. JOHN MCCAIN, R-Ariz.:
Mr. Chairman, I don't know if the -- if Goldman
Sachs has done anything illegal on those charges
have been brought and it's going to be a subject of a
lot of our discussion today.
But, from the reading of
these e-mails and the information that this
committee has uncovered, there's no doubt their
behavior was unethical and the American people will
render a judgment, as well as the courts.

ֵĹɥޥ󥵥åϡ˻ޤ줿ƵˤĤ
ơơ¿εˤʤꤽʷ˴ؤˡʤ
ȤäΤɤϡˤʬʤe
Ѱ񤬽᤿ɤǤߤȡι԰٤ϵ
ʤˤȤ뤳Ȥ狼롣ơȽǤʤ
̱ȽǤ򲼤Ȥˤʤ

SEN. CARL LEVIN, D-Mich.:
Wall Street is on the wrong side of this fight. It insists
that reining in that -- those excesses would unduly
restrict the free market that is the engine of
American progress.
But this -- this market of ours
isn't free of self-dealing or conflict of interest. It isn't
free of gambling debts that taxpayers end up paying.

֥륹ȥ꡼Ȥϡ襤ˤư¦ˤʤäƤ롣
ơ뤳ȡĤޤꡢԤ᤮ϥꥫ
ȯŸˤȤäƤΥ󥸥Ǥ뼫ͳʻԾ˵뤳
ȤˤʤȼĥƤ롣椬λԾϡʼ
߹԰١ˤȿΤʤԾǤϤʤΤǽŪˤǼ
ԤΥĥʧ֥ʤ¸ߤʤԾǤϤʤ

DANIEL SPARKS, former partner, Head of Mortgages
Department, Goldman Sachs:
The culture at Goldman Sachs was one in which
excellence and integrity are expected.

֥ɥޥ󥵥åʸϡǤϡͥȴ
ԤƤ

JOSHUA BIRNBAUM, former managing director,
Structured Products Group Trading, Goldman Sachs:
We provided significant liquidity to our customers in a
difficult and challenging market while also managing
to post a profit during this period.

ֲ桹ϡԾ줬ѤʾˤäˡɤˤפФ
ʤܵҤФήư򶡵뤷Ƥ

FABRICE TOURRE, executive director, Structured
Products Group Trading, Goldman Sachs:
I deny categorically the SEC's allegations, and I will
defend myself in court against this false claim.
I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee to answer these false charges. I wish
to repeat, I did not mislead IKB or ACA, two of the
most sophisticated institutional investors in these
products anywhere in the world.

ֻϡSECμĥƵ򤭤äѤꤹ롣ơȽ
ˤƤ줬ְäǤ뤳Ȥĥϡ
ƵְäƤ뤳Ȥ餫ˤ뤿Ѱ
Ƭ뵡ƤȤ򴶼դ٤IKB
ACAߥ꡼ɤȤϤʤϡͻʤ˴
ƤǺǤ줿ȤʤΤ

SEN. CARL LEVIN:
June 22 is the date of this e-mail. "Boy, that
Timberwolf was one [EXPLETIVE DELETED] deal."
How much of that "[EXPLETIVE DELETED] deal" did
you sell to your clients after June 22, 2007?

622e᡼դǤ롣ؤᤷᡢ
Timberwolfϡä١Ρ2007ǯ622ʹ
εҤˤɤäΤ

DANIEL SPARKS:
Mr. Chairman, I don't know the answer to that. But
the price would have reflected levels that they
wanted to invest...

ֵĹʬޤ󡣤ʤϡ餬񤷤
˾ȿǤΤǤäǤ礦

SEN. CARL LEVIN:
Oh, of course.

֤

DANIEL SPARKS:
... at that time.

֤λš

SEN. CARL LEVIN:
But they don't know it's a -- you didn't tell them you
thought it was a [EXPLETIVE DELETED] deal.

֤ΤʤΤϡȹͤ
ȤȤˤϸʤä

DANIEL SPARKS:
Well, I didn't say that.

֤ˤĤƤϸäƤϤʤ

SEN. CARL LEVIN:
No. Who did? Your people, internally. You knew it
was a [EXPLETIVE DELETED] deal, and that's what
your...

ְ㤦ïäΤο͡ϸäƤϡ
줬ǤΤäƤ

DANIEL SPARKS:
And again, I...

֤⤦١š

SEN. CARL LEVIN:
... e-mail showed.

e᡼ˤ񤤤Ƥ

DANIEL SPARKS:
I think the context, the message that I took from the
e-mail from Mr. Montag, was that my performance
on that deal wasn't good.

Montage᡼ΥåȤΤϡμ
ɤʤäȤΤȻפ

SEN. CARL LEVIN:
How about the fact that you sold hundreds of millions
of that deal after your people knew it was a
[EXPLETIVE DELETED] deal? Does that bother you at
all; you sold the customers something?

ֵҤ줬ΤäǡĤȤ
ˤĤƤϤɤʤΤˤʤʤäΤǤΤ
ΤäΤ

DANIEL SPARKS:
I don't recall selling hundreds of millions of that deal
after that.

֤θDz⤽ζͻʤäɤϻפФ

ά

SEN. CARL LEVIN:
My question, is there not a conflict when you sell
something to somebody, and then are determined to
bet against that same security, and you don't
disclose that to the person you're selling it to?

ֻμϡï˲ˡȿʤɤ
ȤȤơƱڷˤĤơȿ¦Ҥ褦
ȷ뤳ȤϤʤΤǡϡĤˤϡ
ΤȤ餫ˤ뤳ȤϤʤ

SEN. CARL LEVIN:
Do you see a problem?

꤬ʬ뤫

LLOYD BLANKFEIN, CEO, Goldman Sachs:
In the context of market-making, that is not a
conflict. What -- where -- what clients are buying or
customers are buying is, they're buying an exposure.

֥ޡåȥᥤδطǤϡȿˤϤʤʤ
㤦ΤϡšϥꥹäƤΤ

The thing that we are selling to them is supposed to
give them the risk they want. They are not coming to
us to represent what our views are. They probably --
the institution clients we have wouldn't care what our
views are. They shouldn't care.

ֲ桹Τϡ餬ߤƤꥹȤȤ
ʤäƤ롣ϡ桹ΰոɤ򼨤˲桹Τ
ˤäƤ櫓ǤϤʤϡĤޤꡢȤϡ
桹ɤǤȵˤʤΤˤ뤳Ȥ
ʤ



ɥޥǤϤʤȻפȤå򤪴ꤤ
ޤ
↓↓↓

͵֥󥭥

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

Ǥꥷ̲ߤϲǤ礦

֤ȡš

֥ۤʤʹʡ

ΤäƤ衢ɥ饯ޤǤ

ְ㤦衢桼


ͽۤޤ

ϡ桼Ǥ͡ϥɥ饯ޤǤ

ǡΥꥷιĤ꤬ƭƤޤʤ2ǯ
ʪĤ꤬13.14%ˤޤķ;夬äȤ13
Ȥ徺Ȥޤ

ïǤ¶󤷤ƥꥷιĤ񤷤褦
ʤƹͤƤͤϡ

꤬⤤ȤȤϡǥեȤγΨ
⤤ȤȤǤ顣

֤Ǥ⡢ǥեȤ򵯤ʤС13.14%꤬
ǤΤǤ硩

ϤǤǤ⡢⤬֤äƤʤäꡢϡ
֤äƤȤƤⲿǯԤ줿ꤷ

֤ɡɥĤٱ礹뤷IMFäƻٱ礹ΤǤ硩

äˤϤʤäƤޤ

äѤޤۤɡϢΥȤˬƤߤޤ
桼Υ졼ȤοܤǧȻפäǤ
̲ߤΥ졼ȤǺܤƤΤǤ󡢱ߥ졼
⡢ݥɤ⡢ƿ̱⡣ǡƤ顢ꥷΥɥ饯
Υڡ⤢ä櫓Ǥ

󡪡

ɤȤ

ꥷϡ桼ȤäƤΤǤϤʤΤ

ΤʤȤǡɥ饯ޤȤƤΤ줬
ꥷκþ֤򤫤ƤΤ


ɤȤȻפޤ

ϢΥȤΤΥڡˤϡ񤤤ƤΤǤ

Foreign Exchange Rates, 2000 to Present

 ơA,B,CˡAustraliaBrazilCanadaChina,P.R.Denmark,EMU member coutries
Greece

Greece Ȥꡢñ̤ϡDrachma ȤʤäƤޤ

ɤȤǤ礦

򥯥åƤߤޤ

20003ʹߤΥ졼ȤǺܤƤޤơ
2001ǯ11ND

ND?ԸС

Ϣʶ路ȤϻߤߤǤ͡

ޤɤƥꥷĤ꤬ƭƤΤ

Фˤϡꥷ԰¸ȤʸäƤ
Τˡš

ɡɥĤʤɤٱ򤷤褦Ȥ⡢⤷ꥷ㤬ܵ
ˤʤäƺƷ˼ȤळȤʤȤСʤʤ
Ʒ񤷤ȤäʤΤǤĤޤꡢĸԤȤ
ϡϤ䥮ꥷĤѤ뵤ˤϤʤʤȡ

Ʒƻ˾褻뤿ˤϡ̱β
뤳ȤˤʤޤꥷǤ絬Ϥʥȥ饤
äƤꡢƤ줫ͽꤵƤΤǤ

ȥ饤ޤ褦ˤʤʤСꥷ
㲼뤳ȤϤʤΤǤϤʤǤ礦


Ĥ꤬10%ĶƤΤȻפäå򤪴ꤤޤ
↓↓↓
͵֥󥭥

ĤƥǥեȤ򤪤를Ǥ⡢8.8%ޤǾ夬
äȤޤ顢¾ΥǥեȾ֤ȤȤ

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

3δȸӥʻؿ䤫ȯɽ
ޤ

3λؿϾ夬äƤΤǤ礦ȤⲼ
ƤΤơǥեæѤϴΤ

ĤʤСƼҤɤƻ֤򤷤Ƥ뤫ǽˤ
Ҳ𤹤ȤǤϡ褺դ򸫤ĺ
ɤΤ褦ȽǤ뤫ͤƤߤȻפޤ

Ǥϡ褺ǯ٤δȸӥʻؿɤΤ褦
˿ܤƤߤƤߤޤ礦2000ǯٰʹߤưǤ

ӥ1



2007ǯ٤˾徺塢2008ǯ٤ϤۤܲФơ
θ㲼ƤͻҤޤ

Ǥϡˡ2009ǯ2ʹߤưߤƤߤޤ礦

ӥ2


ǡǤ礦

Τˡǯ4ۤܰӤƵƤȤ
櫓Ǥ23Ⱦ徺ƤƤޤޤǤ97
ˤޤǤΤ3ϡ8֤98
Ƥ櫓Ǥ

ϡΥդߤƤɤˤʤäǤ礦

Ȥʪϲ³ƤΤĤޤꡢǥե˲
ξǧʤȽǤ٤ʤΤ

δȸӥʻؿȯɽˤĤơƼҤϼ
Τ褦󤸤Ƥޤ


С֣δȸӥʡ1.1ޥʥ
̾סִȸӥʡ09ǯ2.5㲼
¤

3ȸӥʻؿǯ桾1.1

SankeiBiz䥵ӥʪؿ Ϣ³ޥʥ
¡

MSNХ˥塼䡢ǯٴȸӥ ɣ
Х֥¤ֲ


Τ09ǯ١ȸӥʻؿ
ǤΤϻ¤Ǥ礦ǶưˤĤƤϤɤǤ
礦1.1ªǤʤΤǤ礦ޤ18
Ϣ³ޥʥˤʤäƤª٤ʤΤǤ礦

8֤98˲󤸤ȤʤΤϤɤ
Ǥ礦

ϡ8֤˴ȸʪؿ98ˤޤǾ徺
ĴȻפޤ



ʪⲼߤޤäΤǤϤʤȻפå򤪴ꤤ
ޤ
↓↓↓

͵֥󥭥

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ХΤ22볹餽󤯤ʤȤˤ
ѡ˥ؤDZԤäȸޤƤϡͻ
פˤĤƤǤ

ΥǥХƥּ˴ؤʬȴФƤߤޤ


A comprehensive plan to achieve these reforms has passed
the House of Representatives. A Senate version is currently
being debated, drawing on the ideas of Democrats and
Republicans. Both bills represent significant improvement
on the flawed rules we have in place today, despite the
furious efforts of industry lobbyists to shape them to
their special interests. I am sure that many of those
lobbyists work for some of you. But I am here today because
I want to urge you to join us, instead of fighting us
in this effort. I am here because I believe that these
reforms are, in the end, not only in the best interest
of our country, but in the best interest of our financial
sector. And I am here to explain what reform will look like,
and why it matters.

֤פ¹Ԥ뤿к̲ᤷ屡
Ƥϸ߿Ǥꡢ̱ޤȶޤιͤƧޤΤǤ
롣ˡƤȤ⡢ߤη٤뵬롼٤Ѥ
Ǥ롣äȤȳΥӥȤϡפˤʤ
˺ľȤäǤ뤬ӥȤ¿
ΤƯƤ뤳ȤΤƤ롣䤬
褿Τϡ䤿臘ΤǤϤʤ䤿֤ˤ
뤳Ȥ¥Ǥ롣ϡϤ桹ιפˤ
ǤϤʤǽŪˤ϶ͻȳפˤʤȿƤ뤫
餳褿ΤƼϡβװƤɤ
ΤƲʤΤȻפ

First, the bill being considered in the Senate would
create what we did not have before: a way to protect the
financial system, the broader economy, and American taxpayers
in the event that a large financial firm begins to fail.
If an ordinary local bank approaches insolvency, we have
a process through the FDIC that insures depositors and
maintains confidence in the banking system. And it works.
Customers and taxpayers are protected and the owners and
management lose their equity. But we don’t have any kind
of process designed to contain the failure of a Lehman
Brothers or any of the largest and most interconnected
financial firms in our country.

ֺǽˡ屡ǿˡƤϡ桹տޤʤäΤޤ
Ǥ롣ȤΤϡ絬Ϥʶͻؤþˡɤä
ͻƥꡢɤäƷкΤꡢƤɤä
ꥫǼǼԤ뤫ȤȤޤǤ롣ζԤ
þˤʤäȤˤϡϢˮ¶ݸҡFDIC)̤
ѰդƤ롣Ĥޤꡢˤä¶Ԥݾڤ졢ͻ
ƥοѤݻΤǤ롣٤Ϥȵǽ
ܵҤǼǼԤݸ졢ƳȷбĿؤϼʬλ
ʬ򼺤Τ桹ˤϡ꡼ޥ֥饶¾絬
ʣʶͻؤˤ󤹤褦ʺݤμԤ

That’s why, when this crisis began, crucial decisions
about what would happen to some of the world’s biggest
companies — companies employing tens of thousands of people
and holding hundreds of billions of dollars in assets
— had to take place in hurried discussions in the middle
of the night. That’s why, to save the entire economy
from an even worse catastrophe, we had to deploy taxpayer
dollars. And although much of that money has now been paid
back — and my administration has proposed a fee to be paid
by large financial firms to recover the rest — the American
people should never have been put in that position in the
first place.

ֺζͻȯζؤβҤ˲Τ
ȤˤƽפȽǤ˹ƤƲʤä
ؤβҤȤΤϡͤεϤοƯƤꡢ鲯
εϤλ񻺤ͭƤ褦ʲҤȤȤ桹ηк
뤳Ȥ򤹤뤿ˡ桹ǼǼԤΤȤ
ʤäΤϡ줬ͳʤΤƤĤ
¿ֺѤƤΤΡơܤϻĤΤ
뤿ˡ礭ʶͻؤ˻ʧ碌뤳ȤƤƤΤǤ뤬
ꥫ̱ϡ⤽⤽Ωɤ٤ǤϤʤ
äΤ

It is for this reason that we need a system to shut these
firms down with the least amount of collateral damage to
innocent people and businesses. And from the start, I’ve
insisted that the financial industry — and not taxpayers
— shoulder the costs in the event that a large financial
company should falter. The goal is to make certain that
taxpayers are never again on the hook because a firm is deemed
“too big to fail.”

֤Ҥդο͡դδȤδź»Ǿ
ޤþ륷ƥɬפȤΤϡͳˤ
Τ絬Ϥʶͻؤþʾˤϡǽ餫顢ǼǼ
ǤϤʤͻȳȤȤô뤳ȤϼĥƤ
ŪϡҤ礭٤ʤ٤ȤͳǼǼԤ
ȴޤʤȤμ¤ˤ뤳ȤʤΤ


Now, there is a legitimate debate taking place about how
best to ensure taxpayers are held harmless in this process.
But what is not legitimate is to suggest that we’re enabling
or encouraging future taxpayer bailouts, as some have claimed.
That may make for a good sound bite, but it’s not factually
accurate. In fact, the system as it stands is what led to
a series of massive, costly taxpayer bailouts. Only with reform
can we avoid a similar outcome in the future. A vote for reform
is a vote to put a stop to taxpayer-funded bailouts. That’s
the truth.

ֺǼǼԤ˳ڤФʤ褦ˤˤϤɤаɤΤ
ޤȤ⤬ԤƤȤǤ롣ޤȤǤʤ
ΤϡïĥƤ褦ʡǼǼԤˤäƵߺѤ褦
ȤͤǤ롣ɤʹ뤫⤷ʤºݤ
ǤϤʤΤ¡ƥब٤ⲿ٤Ʊ褦
ʡƤΤǼǼԤˤߺѤԤ碌Τפ򤷤
С桹ϾƱͤη̤Ȥ뤳ȤǤʤΤ
˻ɼꤸ뤳ȤǼǼԤΤˤߺѤߤᤵ뤳Ȥ
ʤΤ줬¤

And these changes have the added benefit of creating
incentives within the industry to ensure that no one company
can ever threaten to bring down the whole economy. To that
end, the bill would also enact what’s known as the Volcker
Rule: which places some limits on the size of banks and
the kinds of risks that banking institutions can take. This
will not only safeguard our system against crises; this will
also make our system stronger and more competitive by instilling
confidence here at home and across the globe. Markets depend
on that confidence. Part of what led to the turmoil of the past
two years was that, in the absence of clear rules and sound
practices, people did not trust that our system was one in which
it was safe to invest or lend. As we’ve seen, that harms all
of us. By enacting these reforms, we’ll help ensure that our
financial system and our economy continues to be the envy of
the world.

֤ơѹȳ˥󥻥ƥ֤ͿĤβ
ҤкΤǤƳȤʤɷ褷Ƥʤ褦ˤΤǤ롣
ŪΤ˥ܥ륫롼ȤΤƤΤΩˡ롣
ɤƤȤСԤεϤ¤ߤꡢޤԤ
餦ȤǤꥹξ¤ߤΤˤäƥƥ
ΤꥹǤʤƥ궯뤳ȤȤʤꡢ
ޤˤƤǤϤʤˤƤ⿮Ǥ򿢤դ뤳
ȤˤäƶϤ뤳Ȥˤʤ롣Ծϡǡ
ΤǤ롣2ǯ֤κ⤿餷ΤΰĤϡΤʥ롼
ʾǡƤȤȤǤꡢ͡ϡ桹ζͻ
ƥˤƤϡ¿񤷤ͻ񤷤ꤹ뤳ȤǤ
ϿʤäΤǤ롣桹ߤƤ褦ˡȤϲ桹
Ƥ˳Ϳ롣פΩˡ뤳Ȥˤꡢ桹ϲ
ζͻƥȷкѤ˾ŪǤ³뤳ȤΤ
Τˤ

Second, reform would bring new transparency to many financial
markets. As you know, part of what led to this crisis was firms
like AIG and others making huge and risky bets — using derivatives
and other complicated financial instruments — in ways that defied
accountability, or even common sense. In fact, many practices
were so opaque and complex that few within these companies —
let alone those charged with oversight — were fully aware of
the massive wagers being made. That’s what led Warren Buffett
to describe derivatives that were bought and sold with little
oversight as “financial weapons of mass destruction.” And that’s
why reform will rein in excess and help ensure that these kinds
of transactions take place in the light of day.

ˡפˤä¿ζͻԾ˿Ʃ⤿餵롣
ζͻ˴٤줿ΰϡAIGʤɤ̤Τƥꥹ
ҤԤäƤҤʤΤҤϡǥХƥ֤䤽
ʳʣʶͻʤѤơƤޤǤQ̵
뤹褦ʳʹҤԤäƤΤ¡¿ξ
ƩǤʣǤäơҤΤʤǤꥹ礭ʬ
˾ΤƤΤϵǤäޤƤ䡢ĤǤˤΤ
ꥹ礭ΤƤʤäΤǤ롣餳
ХեåȤ򤷤ơؤɴĤȼʤǥХƥ֤ϡ
ͻ˲ʼȸ碌ΤǤ롣ޤפˤäƹԤ
򥳥ȥ뤷ǥХƥּ뤤ǹԤ뤳
ȤΤʤΤˤ褦ȤΤϡͳǤ


There has been a great deal of concern about these changes.
So I want to reiterate: there is a legitimate role for these
financial instruments in our economy. They help allay risk and
spur investment. And there are a great many companies that use
these instruments to that end — managing exposure to fluctuating
prices, currencies, and markets. A business might hedge against
rising oil prices, for example, by buying a financial product
to secure stable fuel costs. That’s how markets are supposed
to work. The problem is, these markets operated in the shadows
of our economy, invisible to regulators and to the public.
Reckless practices were rampant. Risks accrued until they
threatened our entire financial system.

֤ѹˤ¿οۻȼǷ֤ߤ
ͻƻ桹ηкѤƲ̤٤ޤȤ䤬
ȤȤ򡣤ϡꥹ¤֤򤫤
ȤʤΤƻ򤽤ŪΤ˻ѤƤ¿
βҤ¸ߤƤ롣ʤ̲ߤưꥹΤǤ롣
㤨СҤʤξ徺Фƥإå򤫤뤫⤷
ʤdzȤꤵ뤿˶ͻʤ뤳Ȥˤ
ƥإå򤫤ΤǤ롣ޡåȤϤΤ褦ˤƵǽƤ
ȤߤΤǤ롣ϡޡåȤDZĤ
ƤȤȤɤˤϸʤȤǡޤδƻ
θʤȤǡʼԤƤͻƥ
Τ򶼤ͤʤۤɥꥹޤäΤ

 That’s why these reforms are designed to respect legitimate
activities but prevent reckless risk taking. And that’s why
we want to ensure that financial products like standardized
derivatives are traded in the open, in full view of businesses,
investors, and those charged with oversight. I was encouraged
to see a Republican Senator join with Democrats this week in
moving forward on this issue. For without action, we’ll
continue to see what amounts to highly-leveraged,
loosely-monitored gambling in our financial system, putting
taxpayers and the economy in jeopardy. And the only people
who ought to fear this kind of oversight and transparency are
those whose conduct will fail its scrutiny.

֤顢βװƤϤޤȤʳưºŤΰǸ
ʥꥹơ󥰤ɻߤ褦ȤƤΤơ顢
ɸಽ줿ǥХƥּϥץ˹Ԥ褦ˤƤδȡ
ƤȡƴɤܤϤ褦ˤȤ櫓
ʤ뤿˶ޤξ屡İ̱ޤεİ˲ä
äȤܷ⤷ư򵯤ʤв桹ϡХ
å򤫤ƴƻܤˤ֥뤬ζͻƥ
ʤˤƹԤ뤳Ȥ³뤳Ȥˤʤ롢ơǼǼԤȲ
кѤ˻³ǤμδĤƩ򶲤
Фʤʤ͡ȤϡιԤãʤ͡
ΤǤ

ǸޤǤɤ߲ͭ񤦤ޤ

↓↓↓
͵֥󥭥

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ڲʤιƭ

㲹­ʤɤŷԽΤǡڤ餬ȸ
ޤ
η̡ڤβʤƭ

 

ʤϡڤβʤˤĤƶ۵ĴԤ21η̤ȯɽ

Ƥޤ41216νʬˡ

 

٥ġʿǯ20

ͤʿǯ21

쥿ʿǯ44

夦ꡡʿǯ17

ʤʿǯ22

ȥޥȡʿǯ15

Ф줤硧ʿǯ20

 

ޤη̤ϻפäۤɤǤϤʤ⤷ޤ󡣾夬äȸ

Ƥ2-3٤äǤ顣㤨СȾʬڤä٥Ĥǯ150

٤Ȥ顢줬ǯ180٤ˤʤäƤä˲᤮

 

ϤޤǤʿѤοʤΤǤĤޤꡢۤ

夬äƤʤȤ⤢С夬äƤȤ⤢Ȥ

Ǥ㤨СΤȤǤϡ600ߤΥ٥ĤиƤȤ

⤢ȸޤ

 

СĤ٤졢ΤĿ٤餻ϰ褬Ф

Ȥ󤸤Ƥޤǯϰ礤˵ˤʤȤ

Ǥ

 

֤ʤ®ưФ˾Ҳ𤷤ڤβ

ζ۵ĴԤäꡢϵʳڤԾ˽Ф褦Ȥ

¥ꤷƤ櫓Ǥ

 

ơη̡ʤä夦ʤɤԾ˽в褦ˤʤä

ȸޤǡʳڤФԤȿϡ

ɹ褯ͤȡʳڤϡ󤫤

ϤޤäΤǤϤʤơǯäƤΤǤ

 

 

 

ʳ

 

ʳڤФơ̤ƤڤΤȤ򵬳ڤȸƤ

Ǥڤϡ礭ˤäƣӡ̡͡ʼˤ

ƣ¡äʤɤ˿ʬƤ뤽Ǥ

 

ʳڤϡʤäƤꥭĤƤꡢ礭꾮

ꡢϿŤ褯ʤʤɤͳǡʳȤ줿ڤ

ޤ

 

ǡʳڤϡϲùѤʤɤȤή̤Ƥ

ȤȤǤʬή̤뤳ȤʤѴƤȤ

ѴΨ̤4ˤãȤޤ

 

ʻ¤ΤäƤޤȡ䤿ϻפǤäʤ

ȡԤʤä夦ʤɤʤ顢ʤäʤ

ȤˤʤäƤΤȡ

 

⤽פǤ硣

 

Ǥ⡢äԤäƲΥѡʤɤʳ

䤷Ƥ⡢ԤȿϰϤʤΤǤʤä夦Ǥ

̤˹ʤ衢ȡĤޤꡢ줿ڤΤ4䤬ʳȤ

ͳѴƤΤ¤ǤȤƤ⡢ƾԤΤ

ΤǤ礦ҤäȤԤ¦ˤⲿ餫ͳΤǤ

ʤǤ礦

 

ϡڤ­ˤʤäƤ뤫鵬ʳڤ˸äƤޤ

ơʳڤԾ˶뤹褦򤫤Ƥäϡ

ʤԤΤ˳Ƥ褦ˤǤޤ

 

ͤƲϡ­ˤʤäƤ뤫鵬ʳ

ڤԾ˽ФƤ꤬ʤΤǤ⤷̾˵ʳ

Ծ˽ФɤʤȤǤ礦

 

Ĥ4ѴƤȤȤϡ100Ƥ⡢פ60

¸ߤ60ζǴ֤˹äƤȤȤǤǤ顢

˵ʳڤԾ˽ФȤˤʤС60פʤ

ˡ100ζ뤬ʤ뤳Ȥˤʤäơ

 

⤦ɤʤ뤫ʬǤ͡Ĥޤꡢڤβʤ˽Ƥ

櫓ǤǤϤޤ󤫡٥ĤΤ᤮ꤷ

ȥ饯ǥ٥Ĥʬʡ

 

פˡԤʤä夦Ȥʳڤ

ѴƤͳʤɤȸƤ櫓ǤͳϤ

ǤϤʤΤǤʤä奦ޤǻԾ˽ФƤޤȡ뤬¿

ʤ᤮Ʋʤ˽Τǡ¦Թ;äڤʬ

ƤäʤΤǤʬݤϡͤΰ¤ڤʬ

Թ礬Ǥ顢¤ʤĤʤʳڤ

ʬ롢ȡ줬̾λѤʤΤǤ

 

󡢾¦ʤ˹äڤ褦Ȥ

ꤷޤƱʤǤСܤ줤ܤȤ

Τϡ;ȤΤǤ礦ääפ褦ʤΤϷ

Ǥ顣ʳڤǤ⡢ʤ鳰줿٤˱

Ʋʤ¤ä顢ʳǤ㤤ȤԤɬ¸ߤ

ǤơƵʳڤʬʤԤ

뤳ȤˤʤΤǡȤȤƤμϸäƤޤȡ

 

 

 

Ψȿ­

 

ˤƤ⡢Τ褦ڤʤɿȤζ­Ȥ֤ȯ

ȥƥӤΥ磻ɥ硼ɬȸäƤۤķӤĤޤ

ʤСμΥͥϻİԤοդ褤ȤиŪʬä

뤫ʤΤǤ¾ˤ⤢Ǥ礦롢ͥط

٤á

 

٤뤳ȤϿʹ֤ƤǷ礫ʤ԰٤Ǥꡢޤ礤

ʤڤߤǤ⤢ޤạ̈ʪˤܤʤȡ

ʪϻİΨԤʤΤǤ

 

ǡɤ櫓桹ܿͤ¿ϺǶˤʤäơޤ˿ȼ

Ψ㤵ۤΤȤ⿩ȼΨΥåפʤ뤳

¿ʤäƤΤǤŤǤ͡

 

ƥӤΥơƥӤ˽б餹Ȥϸޤ

˼Ψ㤤Τܤȡͳǰפڤȼĥ衼

åѤι񡹤Ȥ̰ǡμΨϹ⤤Τȡ

ʤ³ޤȤꤢޤǡ



ʾϡۿкѥ˥塼ͭǤΰǤפ
ߤʤΤǤ͡



Ԥʳڤ鵬ʤƤʤȤ
ϡäΤȻפäå򤪴ꤤޤ
↓↓↓
͵blog󥭥󥰤

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ǥХƥּ褦ȤưꥫǶޤäƤ
褦Ǥ21ƾ屡ӰѰϡǥХƥֵƤ
ķ褷ΤȤ

εƤϡ屡԰Ѱ񤬤ޤȤ᤿ͻˡ
Ƥ礵ͽǤꡢζͻˡƤϡ᡹
ܲĤǿĤϤޤ븫̤ǤȤޤ

Ȥǡ˼䤷ޤ

ǥХƥ֤äƲʤΤǤ礦

ɤʤȤܤʤʬäƤƤ⡢ʤʹ
ȡɤƤΤ

⡢ʼǿͤοͤҤɤ⤫餵ȡʤ
˺äƤޤ⤷ޤ

ϡǥХƥ֤äƲǤȸȡȤϡ
϶ͻʤǤΤǤ

derivativeššderiveܸȡͳ褹פȤ
̣ñ줬äơñͳ褹Τderivative

Thousands of English words are derived from Latin.

ֲȤѸθդϡƥ줫ƤΤ

 ǤϡͻǥХƥ֤ˤϡŪˤɤʤΤ뤫ȸ
С

㤨СطǤϡؿʪϡؿ
ʪץ󡣰شطǤϡ̲ʪ̲ߥץ

ʪ䡢ʪʪǥХƥ֤Ȥ
ˤʤޤ

֤ǡɡǥХƥ֤äƲ

Ǥ͡ʬ䤹褦ȤƤ⡢ǥХƥ
񤷤褦ǤšǤ⡢Τ顢Τ褦ʤ
Ƥޤ

ޤĤʪԤκäǤ

֥ꥫǤϹĤʪԤƤ뤬ܤǤ
ʪƳ٤ǤϤʤ

ʹͤФơʪϷɡǧ뤳Ȥ
ƱǤϤʤȤȽä櫓ǤϿŤ˸
Ƥ٤ȡ

ƳԤϡĤͭԤʪԤȤˤ
äơĤ줬ɤΤ褦ư褦Υꥹ
򤹤뤳ȤǤ褦ˤʤ롢ĤޤꥹإåǤ
ǡѤͭפʤΤȼĥΤǤ

ΤˡʪԤȤˤäơʤưꥹ
ưꥹưؤưꥹ򤹤뤳Ȥǽ

ޤʵäơܤǤǥХƥּԤ
褦ˤʤäΤǤ

ǥХƥ֤͡ʥꥹ򤹤ʤ󶡤
ΤǤäơ̤ζͻ񻺤ͻؤˤȤäͭפ
ΤǤΤǤСΡǥХƥ֤ʤ
夬äƤΤǤ礦

ǶˤǥХƥȽμϤϡܥ륫FRB
ĹˤΤǤ¶ݸˤäƼͻؤϡ
Ԥ̳ǰ٤Ǥꡢ굡Ūʹ԰٤ˤϼФ
٤ǤϤʤȡ⤷굡ŪӥͥԤΤǤС¶
ݸоݤ鳰٤ȡ

ơХΤ⹱νԡǤ⤳ʤȤ
äƤΤǤ

Next, these reforms would bring new transparency
to financial dealings.  Part of what led to this crisis
was firms like AIG and others making huge and risky
bets – using things like derivatives – without
accountability.

ּˡζͻפ϶ͻФƩ⤿餹
Ȥˤʤζͻ⤿餷ΰĤϡAIG
ʤɤβҤʡƥꥹ礭ҤԤäƤ
ȤǤ롣ǥХƥ֤Τ褦ʤΤѤơ⡢
Ǥ餦Ȥʤ

 Warren Buffett himself once described derivatives
bought and sold with little oversight as “financial
weapons of mass destruction.”  That’s why through
reform we’d help ensure that these kinds of
complicated financial transactions take place on an
open market.

֥ХեåȻἫȤؤɵΤʤǥХƥ֤
ϡضͻ˲ʼ٤ǤȤĤƸäȤ
롣桹ͻפ̤Ƥʣʶͻ
ԾˤƹԤ뤳ȤΤʤΤˤ褦ȤΤϡ
줬ͳʤΤǤ


Because, ultimately, it is a marketplace that is
open, free, and fair that will allow our economy to
flourish.

ֲΤʤС桹ηкѤ˱ɤ뤳ȤΤϡˤˤ
ƤϡơͳǡƸʻԾǤ뤫


ХΤʤɤϡǥХƥּԤˤϡ
ϡǥХƥּԤλԾǡ
ؤƱ٤ǤȤäƤΤǤ

桹ܿŪʴФ餹СǥХƥ֤Ȥ
СäܳŪʵ򤹤ΤʤΤǤ
ɤ⤽ǤϤʤ褦ǤȤԾ̤ơ
ؤ֤ȤǹԤΤǤСǧ롢ȡ

˽Ҥ٤褦ˡ¶ݸнȤʤͻؤ
ĤƤϡǥХƥּ礭¤ǽϻĤä
ޤ

ˤƤ⡢桹ߤ顢ʤ˴ˤȻפ뵬
ƤǤ⡢륹ȥ꡼ȤȿФλ򼨤Ƥ롢ȡ

ǤǤ礦

ǥХƥ֤μꡢؤϤäꤵƤ
СϤAIGþΤ褦ʤȤϵʤˡšȻפ
ΤǤ

ϡ륹ȥ꡼ȤʥǥХƥ֤ɤɤ
ȯܵҤä٤뤿ˤϡ
ˤʤȹͤƤ褦ʤΤǤ

Ǥ⡢Υɥޥ󥵥åκƵǤ餫ˤʤ
褦ˡϥǥХƥ֤䤷ƤȸäƤ⡢פ
˥ΤбĤƤ褦ʤΤʤΤǤ⡢μ¤ƹ
٤褦ˤʤäƤǤϤʤʬ⥲˻ä
ơ¿ʬĤȤ¿褦ʥʤΤǤ

ꥫǤϡǥХƥ֤äƲʹơϡ
إåμʤˤʤšʤɤͤϤʤʤäƤ
褦Ǥ

AUDIE CORNISH: So what exactly is a derivative?

֤ǤϡǥХƥ֤äƲʤΤǤ

Professor LYNN STOUT (UCLA School of Law):
A derivative is nothing more than a bet on what's
going to happen in the future. So for example, an
interest rate swap is a bet that interest rates are
going to rise or fall. If the interest rate goes up, one
party simply pays off the bet to the other party.

֥ǥХƥ֤ȤΤϡҤʳβʪǤʤɤ
뤫ҤΤ㤨Сåפξˤϡ
뤫뤫Ҥ뤳Ȥˤʤ롣夬С
¾ФʧΤ


Ȥޤͻȯǽ礭ʡȻפä
å򤪴ꤤޤ
↓↓↓
͵֥󥭥

 

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

褦ƹǤϡ꡼ޥþäƲ
Ǹİ񤬹ԤƤޤ

ˤƤ⡢ɤΤʤΤǤ礦͡꡼ޥθCEO
ϡôԤХ󥹥Ȥˤߤ褦Ȥrepo105
ѤƤȤΤʤäʤơFRBĹΥ
ʥ󥭻Τʤäʤơ

repo105Ȥϲޤ礦

repo105Ȥϡʴ軻μʤΰĤǤ¾repo108
Τ⤢äȤޤ

ǤϡrepoȤϲ̣Τ

ܤǤݼȸΤޤܤξ
ݼϡôݤˤķ߼ڼΤȤǤǤϡ
ꥫrepoƱʤΤ

¤ϤǤϤʤꥫrepoȤϡ㤤ᤷդκ
̣ޤ㤨СҤͭĤ1ָ
ˤ㤤᤹顢ĤäƤȤ櫓Ǥ
ǤʤȤ򤹤뤫ȤСפ˥å夬ɬפ
Ǥ1ָˤϤ⤬äƤ뤬ΤޤǤδֻⷫ
Ĥʤ顢ĤŪѤƸⲽ褦ȡ
ơ1ָˤ⤬äƤ顢öѤĤ㤤
ȡ

¦餹СϡפˡĤôݤ
1֤ߤȤƱǤȤƤϺķ
㤤äȤˤʤäƤ⡢1ָˤϤޤκķ᤹
Ǥ顢ôݤ˼äƤΤƱȡ

㤤ᤷդκķ㡢¼ŪˤϺķô
Ȥȹͤ򡢥ꥫǤrepoȸƤǤ
Τȡ

顢꡼ޥ󤬥ݼ򤷤ƤȤäƤ⡢
Ǥľ˲ȤϤʤʤΤǤΤʤСû
Ĵã뤿˰Ūǧ줿ǤꡢܤǤ
ȤäΤѤƤ뤫Ǥ

ǤϡʤΤ

ϡι԰ټΤˤä˰ˡʤȤƤ⡢
ԤȤˤäưտŪ˸򤵤褦ʺ̳
ȤͿ뤫Ǥ

Ĥޤꡢñ˸СȤɤ٤ȡʴ
軻ԤäȸäƤ⤤Ǥ礦

Ǥϡɤäʴ軻ǽˤʤäΤ

ƹη軻ϻȾȤ˹ԤƤޤơƴ
׿Ȥʤɤ˸ɽ뤳ȤˤʤäƤޤ

ǡ¿ζͻؤϡХ֥뤬ޤǤϡХå
פڤ꤫κ粽ؤƤ櫓Ǥ

ñ˸Сǽʸ¤ڶ򤷤ơ;夬꤬³
ƤϢξڷʤɤ񤷤Ƥȡ
Τ褦˥Х֥뤬Ƥ櫓ǤʤȡɤʤǤ礦
ĿȤʤɤ餹СͻؤڤƤ
񻺤ˤ򿶤Ƥʤۤˤʤ櫓Ǥ
ɤƱǤڶ⡢⤦ŪˤСĴã
Ψ⤤Τɤ˴ؿޤä櫓ǤĤޤꡢХ
å⤯ʤǧ줿ȡ

ǡ꡼ޥϹͤǤȤХå㤯ߤ
ˡϤʤΤȡХå뤿ˤϡ
䤻вǽʤΤǤ

ǡšʬǤ礦

repoѤ櫓Ǥ1֤ͻ̤Ƥʤ
ȡκķôݤȤƺФ顢ȡơ
᤮1֤Фʤˡޤκķ㤤ᤵ
Ȥڶ⤬ֺѤ롢ȡ

ǡäƥХå㤯뤳ȤΤȡ

졢Ʊ褦ʤȤԤäƤ⡢⤷repoڤǧ
ƤХ󥹥Ⱦ˷׾夷ΤǤС
⤢ޤľ˺̳Ƥ򳫼Ȥˤʤ
꡼ޥϡrepo򡢺ķѤ԰٤Ȳ
׾ǧΤǤĤޤꡢڶǤϤʤȡǤ顢
ŪˤޤͭƤķ񻺤
ꤽ줬Ѳ櫓Ǥ

ķѤȤΤǤСϲ
⤢ޤ󡣤1ָˤ㤤᤹󤬤ʤ
ƤΤǡϼ¼ŪˤϼڤǤΤǤĤޤꡢ
⤬ȤϸäƤ⡢˱ڶ⤬ȯƤ
ȡ줬¤ǤΤˡΤȤХ󥹥Ȥ򸫤
Ǥʬʤ櫓Ǥ

꡼ޥ󤬹Ԥärepoγۤϡ500ɥä
ޤĤޤꡢΰ꡼ޥͭ륭å
褦˸櫓Ǥ

ͤ԰٤Ǥ礦

CEOϡʹȤʤäȸäƤޤ

ΤˡCEOĹΩˤΤ٤ˤĤ
ΤʤȤ¿ΤϡϤΤȤǤ礦
ۤrepo򤷤ƤСβҤϤʤ˷
äΤȵ˻פʤȦޤ󡣤
ϡϢˤƤƱǤʤˤФΤϤ
ȡפʤäΤǤ礦

ˡäȰʴطԤޤϡŬ
ʼƨƺˡͤǤ

ΤδƺˡͤʤΤȸ

˺줽ˤʤޤrepo105105ϲ̣
Τrepo108ξ108ϡ

ϡ100ߤΤڤΤ105ߤβͤκķ
ôݤȤ󶡤뤳ȤɬפȤȤǡؤΤ
ǤȤΤǤ

Ĥޤꡢ1֤ۤɤѤ뤿ˡʤ˹⤤
ʧ蘆ƤȤȤˤʤΤǤǤ顢
٤򷫤֤з֤ۤɡפˤϱסƤȤ
äΤǤ



ʴȤϹ󤤤Ȼפäå򤪴ꤤޤ
↓↓↓
͵֥󥭥

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

Сʥ󥭵Ĺ20ƲͻӥѰθİ
ǾڸƤ餫ˤʤޤϢ䤬ڸɽ
ΤǤ

ʤİϡϻ֤20θ11˳Ϥ졢
Ԥδؿϡ꡼ޥѤ105Ȥ˽
ޤäƤȸƤޤ꡼ޥϡμˤäƿ
ߵϤκ̳ƤȤΤǤ


Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and
other members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify about the failure of Lehman
Brothers and the lessons of that failure. In these
opening remarks I will address several key issues
relating to that episode.

֥ե󥯵ĹХåѰƤ¾ΰѰγޡ
ϡ꡼ޥþȤþؤȤˤĤƾڸ
줿Ȥ򤢤꤬פޤ

The Federal Reserve was not Lehman's supervisor.
Lehman was exempt from supervision by the Federal
Reserve because the company did not own a
commercial bank and because it was allowed by
federal law to own a federally insured savings 
association without becoming subject to Federal
Reserve supervision.

Ϣϥ꡼ޥδļԤǤϤʤä꡼ޥϻԤ
ͭƤʤäˡơϢδĤ뤳Ȥʤ
ݾڤȹͭ뤳Ȥˡˤäǧ
ˡϢˤĤȽƤ

The core subsidiaries of Lehman were securities
broker-dealers under the supervisory jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
which also supervised the Lehman parent company
under the SEC's Consolidated Supervised Entity 
(CSE) program. Importantly, the CSE program was
voluntary, established by the SEC in agreement with
the supervised firms, without the benefits of
statutory authorization.

֥꡼ޥŪҲҤϡSECɤڷ֥
ԤǤäơSECϤϢ١CSE)βǡ
ޥοƲҤˤĤƤĤפʤȤϡ
CSEǤդΤΤǤäȤȤĤޤꡢĤоݤȤ
ҤSECȤιդˤäǧ줿ΤǤꡢˡŪʵ
̳櫓ǤϤʤ

Although the Federal Reserve had no supervisory
responsibilities or authorities with respect to Lehman,
it began monitoring the financial condition of Lehman
and the other primary dealers during the period of
financial stress that led to the sale of Bear Stearns to
JPMorgan Chase. In March 2008, responding to the
escalating pressures on primary dealers, the Federal
Reserve used its statutory emergency lending
powers to establish the Primary Dealer Credit Facility
and the Term Securities Lending Facility as sources of
backstop liquidity for those firms.

Ϣϡ꡼ޥ˴ؤƲδǤʤСθ
ʤä٥󥺤JP륬󡦥ؤ
ѤˤĤʤäͻΤޤäʤˤơ꡼ޥ
ʳξڷȼԤκ̳֤ƻ뤷Ϥ᤿2008ǯ
3ڷȼԤζĥȤ˱Ϣˡˤ
ǧ줿۵ͻθǽѤơڷȼͻ٤
ʪڷ٤ߤ٤β
Ҥؤήưٱ礹⸻Ȥʤ褦ˤ뤿Ǥä

 

To monitor the ability of borrowing firms to repay,
the Federal Reserve, in its role as creditor, required
all participants in these programs, including Lehman,
to provide financial information about their
companies on an ongoing basis. Two Federal Reserve
employees were placed onsite at Lehman to monitor
the firm's liquidity position and its financial condition
generally. Beyond gathering information, however, 
these employees had no authority to regulate 
Lehman's disclosures, capital, risk management, or
other business activities.

ּҤֺǽϤƻ뤹뤿ˡϢռԤΩ
Ȥơ꡼ޥޤᤳͻ٤ѤƤ
ФŪ˺̳󶡤褦˵᤿2ͤϢ
꡼ޥ֤졢꡼ޥήưξȺ̳
ƻ뤷򽸤뤳Ȱʳˤϡ
2ͤοˤϲθ¤ʤäĤޤꡢ꡼ޥξ
䡢ܡꥹϤ¾αĶȳưˤĤơ
򤹤븢¤ϤʤäΤ

During this period, Federal Reserve employees
were in regular contact with their counterparts at the
SEC, and in July 2008, then-Chairman Cox and I
negotiated an agreement that formalized procedures
for information-sharing between our two agencies.

֤δ֡ϢοSECΥ󥿡ѡȤŪϢ
ä2008ǯ7ΤȤΰѰĹΥå
ϡ2Ĥȿδ֤ˤƾͭ붨θ
Ԥä


Cooperation between the Federal Reserve and the
SEC was generally quite good, especially considering
the stress and turmoil of the period. In particular, the
Federal Reserve, with the SEC's participation,
developed and conducted several stress tests of the
liquidity position of Lehman and the other major
primary dealers during the spring and summer of
2008.

ϢSECζϴطϡͻκˤäȤθ
СŪ˶ˤɹǤääˡϢϡSECλ
äơ꡼ޥ䤽ʳξڷҤήưξ
ǧ륹ȥ쥹ƥȤȯơ2008ǯνդƤˤ
ƤΥƥȤ򲿲󤫼»ܤΤǤ

The results of these stress tests were presented
jointly by the Federal Reserve and the SEC to the
managements of Lehman and the other firms.
Lehman's results showed significant deficiencies in
available liquidity, which the management was
strongly urged to correct.

֤Υȥ쥹ƥȤη̤ϡϢSECζƱˤꡢ
ޥڤ¾ξڷҤηбĿؤФ줿꡼ޥΥ
Ȥη̤ϡѲǽήư礭­ƤȤ
ΤǤꡢбĿؤϤξ֤Ȥ줿

 The Federal Reserve was not aware that Lehman
was using so-called Repo 105 transactions to manage
its balance sheet. Indeed, according to the
bankruptcy examiner, Lehman staff did not report
these transactions even to the company's board.

Ϣϡ꡼ޥ󤬥Х󥹥Ȥ礻뤿˽
105ѤƤ뤳ȤΤƤʤäΤ
ˤС꡼ޥοϤμҤμ
ˤ𤷤ƤʤäȤȤ

However, knowledge of Lehman's accounting for
these transactions would not have materially altered
the Federal Reserve's view of the condition of the
firm; the information we obtained suggested
that the capital and liquidity of the firm were
seriously deficient, a view that we conveyed to the 
company and that I believe was shared by the SEC
and the Treasury Department.

֤꡼ޥ󤬹ԤäƤȤ򲾤ΤäƤ
ȤƤ⡢βҤξ˴ؤϢθ礭Ѥ
ȤϤʤäǤ桹ϡܤήưˤ
ƿ­뤳Ȥ򼨤Ƥ桹Ҥ
ոϡSECڤӺ̳ʤȤⶦͭ줿

Lehman did succeed at raising about $6 billion in
capital in June 2008, took steps to improve its
liquidity position in July, and was attempting to raise
additional capital in the weeks leading up to its
failure. However, its efforts proved inadequate.
During August and early September 2008,
increasingly panicky conditions in markets put
Lehman and other financial firms under severe
pressure.

֥꡼ޥ2008ǯ660ɥλܤĴã뤳Ȥ
7ˤϡήưξ֤
ơþ벿֤ˤϡܤɲĴã
ƤϤ⽽ʬǤϤʤä2008ǯ8
9νˤơԾΥѥ˥å꡼ޥ¾ζͻ
ؤ򽱤ä

In an attempt to devise a private-sector solution for
Lehman's plight, the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and
SEC brought together leaders of the major financial
firms in a series of meetings at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York during the weekend of September
13-15. Despite the best efforts of all involved, a
solution could not be crafted, nor could an acquisition
by another company be arranged. With no other
option available, Lehman declared bankruptcy.

֥꡼ޥεФ̱ͤȤơ
Ϣ䡢̳ʡSECϡ91315δ֤ν
׶ͻؤμǾNYϢ˽ơϢβ򳫺Ť
ƤλüԤκ¤Ϥˤ⹴餺
Ĥ뤳ȤϤǤޤ¾βҤˤȤȤ
ȤϤǤʤä¾˼¸ǽʤ꡼ޥ
þ


The Federal Reserve fully understood that the
failure of Lehman would shake the financial system
and the economy. However, the only tool available
to the Federal Reserve to address the situation was
its ability to provide short-term liquidity against
adequate collateral; and, as I noted, Lehman already
had access to our emergency credit facilities. It was
clear, though, that Lehman needed both substantial
capital and an open-ended guarantee of its
obligations to open for business on Monday,
September 15. At that time, neither the Federal
Reserve nor any other agency had the authority to 
provide capital or an unsecured guarantee, and thus
no means of preventing Lehman's failure existed.

Ϣϡ꡼ޥþжͻƥȷкΤ礭
ưɤͿ뤳Ȥʬ򤷤ƤϢˤϡ
֤ΩʤȤͭƤΤϡʬô
äû򶡵뤹뤳ȤǤäơ
Ҥ٤褦ˡ꡼ޥϴ˶۵ͻ٤ѤƤ
꡼ޥ915Ź򳫤ˤϡλܤȤ
ƥ꡼ޥؤͻФ̵¤ݾڤɬפäȤ
餫ʤȤǤ롣λǤϡϢˤ⤽Ƥʳ
ɤˤ⡢ܤ򶡵뤷ݾڤ򤹤븢¤ϤʤäΤ
ޤꡢ꡼ޥþɤʤ¸ߤʤäȡ

The Lehman failure provides at least two important
lessons. First, we must eliminate the gaps in our
financial regulatory framework that allow large,
complex, interconnected firms like Lehman to
operate without robust consolidated supervision.
In September 2008, no government agency had
sufficient authority to compel Lehman to operate in a
safe and sound manner and in a way that did not
pose dangers to the broader financial system.

֥꡼ޥþϾʤƤ2ĤνפʶͿƤ줿
Ĥϡ꡼ޥΤ褦ʵʣǤߤȤ
ҤϤϢĤ뤳Ȥʤư뤳Ȥ
ʶͻؤεʤʤФʤ
ȤǤ롣2008ǯ9Ǥǡʤܤδ
⡢꡼ޥФͻƥ˴Ϳʤ褦˰
ˡDZĶȤԤȤ򶯤뽽ʬʸ¤ͭƤʤ
äΤ

Second, to avoid having to choose in the future
between bailing out a failing, systemically critical 
firm or allowing its disorderly bankruptcy, we need a
new resolution regime, analogous to that already
established for failing banks. Such a regime would
both protect our economy and improve market
discipline by ensuring that the failing firm's
shareholders and creditors take losses and its
management is replaced.

ˡͻƥΤˤȤäƽʰ̣IJҤ
þˤʤäȤˡߺѤ뤫̵
þ򤵤ƤޤȤ2Ĥ褫򸫤Ĥ
ʤȤ֤򤹤뤿ˡ桹ϡˡ
ɬפȤ롣ĤޤꡢþԤŬѤƤƱ褦
뤳ȤɬפǤȤȤС
þҤγȺĸԤ»ꡢޤбĿؤ
뤳ȤΤʤΤˤʤ뤳Ȥˤäơ桹ηкѤ
ꡢޤԾεΧ뤳Ȥˤʤ

Thank you. I would be glad to respond to your
questions.


Сʥ󥭵Ĺϡ105μʤƤȤ
ΤʤäȤޤޤҤηбĿؤΤʤä
ȡƤޤϢ䤬μˤĤΤäƤ
Ƥ⡢̤ѤʤäǤȡ

Ϥ⤷ޤ󤬡

ߤˤơǤ򤫤Ƥޤäƹ

Ф˺ѤޤʤäǤȤպθ
դϰʹƤޤ

10ǯۤܤФƤϡȯζ򵯤褦ʤ
Ȥ򤷤ƤϷ褷ƤʤȤۤɸäƤƹʤΤǤ
š

ˤƤ⡢륹ȥ꡼Ȥ̳ĹФ褦
ϡ


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