кѥ˥塼

޸Ρкѥ˥塼̤ưͻ֥Ǥϵ岹Ȳ˻ߤΤúи󾧤ޤиӽиȤϰ㤤ޤߤʴ㤤ΤǤ

2010ǯ08

ƮȸäˤϡǤäߤ

줬İԤδꤤȤΤǤäƤ餱Ƥ⡢ɬ
餹뤫ѤƤΤưΤ

Ȥɤβ֤ʤȷβ֤

ͤˤϲ롣ΤޤۤäƤˤϤ̡
Фȷ󤬤㤷Ф櫓Ǥ

Ȥ顢3ΤοƻؤΩƤݡϲä
ȡ

Ǥ⡢ȷͤϡϻä̼ǤŻޤ褷
ʤǤ͡ȸäơ

ءƻפäƤȡȥʤΤȤ

ȥ

¤ϡ̱γͤϤ¸ΤʤǤ礦3ͤäƤ
˹ԤäƤΤǤ͡ϸȤǤ
󤬡


֤ؤä㤤ˤޤ礦

ȷ֤ϡ

ֲǤäƤޤ衣Ǥ⡢ȥš

ȷ֤㤢ȥ

֤㤢ϡš

ȷ֤ˡϺϲߤޤ

֤

Ϻ֤ȤƦäƤΤɡǿ٤
櫓ˤ⤤ʤšʤľͷ

ּ¤ϡ顼򿩤٤Фǡš

ȷֿϡǤΡ

֤㤢򤪴ꤤ

ȷ֥ˡʤƤΡ

Ϻ⻦ȤȤš

֤Ҥϲ򡩡

ȷ֤餤äǤ硣ϺϡƦ̣
Τȡ

ϺƦϲȤǿ٤Ȥơϡ򿩤٤褦ʡ
㤢򿩤٤

ȷ֤䤢⤷֥ȥ硪

Ǥ̣͡ΤäƤޤ

ȷͤߤʤääʡ

¾ˤ⤤Τš

Ϻ֤졢Ρ

֤Ϥ

Ϻִڹοͤʥλɿȡ

äƤޤ

Ϻ֤㤢͡

ȷ֥㤢䤬ƻʧ碌Ƥ餤ޤ

ȷϤĤⵤ

ȷ֤򤤤Τʤޥޤˤ͡

褺ϥȥɤ˥ǡμ
䡢ǡǸ˥

 

˵Υ󥿡ʹƤԤܼҤ𤷤ޤ

֥ȥǤ

֤áȥ


ˤƤ⡢ˤʤäơɽ˽ФʤʤƤäƤ
ä麤ޤǤ⡢褯ʹƤǤΤǤ͡

ȥʤƸդϤ줤⤷ޤ󤬡פ
߾֤ˤʤäƤǤϤʤǤ

ߡššؤϥʥ᥯򶲤졢ʥ᥯ϳ򶲤졢
ؤ򶲤롢ȡ


ϡ̤ͥϺ򶲤졢Ϻ
̱λٻȤǡ򶲤졢ơ̤ͥΩ
뤿ˤȷϤɬפȤȷϡο
ȤʤʤˤϡλٱɬפȤ롢ȡ

ˡϺȷ⤪˽Τǡ
οѤư˽ФȡϤѺ뤳Ȥ
ʤ롢ȡ

줾˥ɤä֡

褷ܵǶϤ褦ʤɤȤϻפäƤʤ֡

άŪ߷ôطȤǤ⤤ޤ礦

̱ޤɽϰϺǡϿΤޤޤǤ
䲿ƹͤƤȤȤǤ礦

 

ȥȤϡȤäΤȻפå
ꤤޤ
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Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ܤккδˤȯɽޤ

⸻ʤʤDzȤȤʬʤǤ
ޤ󡣤ΰ̣ǤƱ𤷤ʤ櫓Ǥ
Ȥι̱Ʊ𤵤褦Ǥĺޤ

ȤΡ̴̱ͦͿȤȤˡȤƸ
Ȥ򤤤ȤƤΤǤ

ˤƤ⡢ккδˤɤȡ䤪Ȼ
äƤޤ櫓ǤΤʤСֺǽ˽ФƤդ
եæѤ̤ɸȤǤ

ʪΤȤʤ󤫵ˤʡȻϸ

ʪΤȤФ굤ˤƤ뤫顢ɤƤФȽ
ʤꡢơԶθܤ򤽤餷ƤޤȤˤ
뤫Ǥ

涵ϸޤǥեϲʾŪݤǤ롢ȡ
ơʾŪݤǤ뤫顢Ԥʾ̤
вǤΤȡ

ʪ㲼Τϡʾζ̤ʲ᤮뤫
ƤΤǤϤޤ󡣶ǽϤ¤μפ٤
礭᤮뤳ȤʪʤΤǤȤ顢
եʾŪݤȤ򤷡äơǥեθ
ԤˤȤͤŬɤϤʬȤ
ΤǤ

䡢ߤʤޤϤȤ¿Ȥ
ͤǾƤޤäƤΤǤ

ккδˤȤˤϡäڤʤΤǽ
ˤ٤ǤϤʤΤǤ礦

㤨Сα߹ˤɤбΤȤ߹ϲε
äƤΤȤܤ¤ȤξɤΤ褦Ÿ˾
ΤȤ

äķӤޤ˰Ĥ

¿οͤǥեȱ߹ѤĤ夲ƤǤ
ǤϡǶܤǥեǤϤʤʪǯΨѡ
Ⱦ夬³ƤȲꤷƤߤƲǤʪ
֤ǤϤʤʪϾ夬äƤΤȡǡ
ǺΤ褦ʱ߹ˤʤä顢ܤϤɤʤäƤ뤫

Ǥ㤨СʪǯǯΨ3%ۤɤǾ徺³
Ƥꡢơ1ɥ83ˤʤäƤޤäȡ

ǥե줬Ƥʤʬ߹αƶϷڤѤǤ
ȸΤ

ϡΡ

⤷ǯܤʪ夬äƤȤơ͢дȤΥ
ߤ졼Ȥϡäȱ߰¤ˤʤäƤϤǤ
ΤʤСͷʤɤ徺Ƥʬߤ˴
͢äʤȺλʤʤ뤫Ǥ

Ĥޤꡢ1ɥ뤬83Ȥ84ȤǺäƤ
Τ¤ȤƤ⡢⤷ޤǤܤʪ夬äƤ
ȤСܤ͢дȤˤߤϺʾˤʤäƤȤ
ȤʤΤǤ

ʪˤϡɽ΢ޤ̤⤢а̤⤢롢
ȡɤư̤ФߤƤޤΤǤ礦ǡ⤦
餱Ƥ롢ȡ


ˤƤ⡢οáܤк
кǤФȡ桹ϤʤʤƤʤǤΤ
¤ǤϤʤǤ礦

ǤϡμƤʤΤ

ϡ桹¤ܤ󤶤褦ȤƤ뤫ʤΤ

Ρ椬δȤϡ˭٤ʼ긵⤬ʤ顢
˲󤽤ȤʤΤ

ΤǤ礦

ϴñʤȤʤΤǤ

Ĥޤꡢҹ𲽤αƶ⤢ꡢʤʤ񤬿Ӥʤ
顣Ĥޤꡢʤ顣󡢺٤Ƥ㳰⤢
Ǥ礦㤨С10ǯ20ǯԶΤʤǤ⡢Τ
򹯿ʤʤɤ礭Ĺ뤲ƤȸäƤǤ礦
Ūˤϡ夲ϤʤʤӤƤʤɤ
Ƥ롢ȡ

ǡä٤ʤȤͽۤ뤫顢Ȥ
­ƧΤȡơȤ򹵤ϫƯԤκ
Ѥ򹵤뤫鼺ȼԤƤޤȡ

Ǥ⡢ξ夬ʤȤƤ⡢͢Фˤä
٤Ȥ⤢ޤ¤ˡ꡼ޥ󥷥åޤǤϡ
͢ФȤʤäƴˤ䤫ʷʵ̤Ƥ
櫓Ǥ

Ǥϡ͢Ф뤷ʤǤϤʤȡ

Τˤ⤷ޤ󤬡͢Ф˺߹⤬
Ƥ櫓ǤĤޤꡢ߹⤬ȡ͢дȤκλ
ʤʤäƤޤ٤뤳ȤǤʤʤ롢ȡǡʤ
ȡĤˤϳæФޤȤФƤΤȡ

Ǥϡ߹˻ߤФǤϤʤȡ

ΤˡܡܶԤزǤäƽФʤϡ
ȸФǤ

椬ڤ˹⤤ΨǺƹ񤬡߰¥
ˤ褦ʰزۤäƸƨȦޤ󡣤
ʤȤ򤹤СȤǤʤꥢ󤬤ϤǤ롢ȡ
˿ϤäȵĤ顢ϡزʤ
դ˽ФȤϤʤΤǤ

زǤʤСܤ͢дȤϡȤζ
ǤĤȤϤǤʤΤ

ʤȤϤʤΤǤܤؤ߰¤ˤäƤ
ȤǤʤƤ⡢⤷¶ڤ겼뤳ȤǽǤ
СȤκλ饤礭뤳Ȥǽˤʤꡢ椬
͢Х᡼ⳤæФ뤳ȤʤɬפϤʤʤΤ

Ǥϡ椬ˤơݶϤݻȤȤǡ
˰뤳ȤǽǤΤ

ϡѤ񤷤Ǥȡ

ǤʤƤ⡢ǥեΤʤ¶οӤߤޤäƤޤä
ΤˡäȲʤɤȸС̱ۤäƤȦ
ϤʤǤ礦

ΤˡʤΤǤ¶ʰʤɤǤʤ
٤Ǥ礦

Ťˤʤäƹͤȡˤϡܿͤ¶Ⱦ
ʬȤ1/10ǤƯƤϫƯԤ櫓Ǥ
顢ŪˤϡδȤȸ߳Ѥ浪Ȥ뤳Ȥ
⤽̵ȤȤ˵դʤФʤޤ

ȤСĤʤϡǤ뤳Ȥ
Ǥʤ褦ʤ椬񤬳ȯ뤷ʤȤȤˤʤ
ޤ

ɡܤȤζǤäƤ
ϡƤ뤳ȤˤäƹϫƯԤƯ󶡤
뤿ˤϡȼεѤȯ򤷡ݻƤʤ
ȤȤʤΤǤ

Ĥޤꡢܤϡִ̱ȤФŤ餤øˤä
䤷ꡢϡȼεѤ侦ʤȯ褦
Ȥäͥ褦֤٤ʤΤǤơϫ
ƯԤΰˤƤ⡢Χ˻Ҥɤٵ뤷ꡢ⹻
̵򤹤ΤǤϤʤϤӤӤ褦
ҤɤФȽʤɤ֤٤ʤΤǤ

ˤƤ⡢٤ʤȤϺ򤷤褦Ȥʤ
ΤǤäϫƯԤκѤԤʤȡ

ȤСȤ٤褦ʴĶ꤬ɬפǤ롢ȡ

ǤϡɤСȤ٤Τ

ִñˡϡ߰¤ˤ͢жϤ򶯲뤳ȤǤ
礦ǡ줬ʾˤϡ¶η⤦
ˤơ¶򲼤뤳Ȥͤ櫓Ǥϸ
Ū񤷤ȡ

ȤСĤϡȤϫƯԼȤᤷơ
ϤǽϤ᤭ܤ¾ι񤬿Ǥʤ褦ʤ
ФۤʤȤȤˤʤΤǤ

ΤˤϡƻϤɬפǤΤȡ

Ȥϡʾ̤䤷ɤʤȤ
ǤϤʤΤǤ


ϡΤΥˡ褯õꡢ餬ߤʤ
ΤȤ̣ܿΤʬ
Ƥ餤ܤȤȤƤ뤳Ȥͤޤ


ƻϤɬפȤȤʡȻפå򤪴ꤤ
ޤ
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Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ܶԤϡ׻ζͻ򳫤ɲö
ͻºꤷޤ

Ūˤϡǯ12Ƴⶡʤε
򸽺ߤ20ߤ30ߤۤȤΤǤâ
֤ޤǤ3ǤϤʤ6ȤʤȤȤǡ̤
ơ3λⶡ뵬Ϥ20ߤȤʤꡢ6
ⶡ뵬Ϥ10ߤˤʤȤȤǤ


ޤȤ⤢äơ礭ƤȤ
Ǥ

ϡηˤĤơɤͤޤ

ٲ᤮褫ä

ܤƤ⤷ʤ⤷ʤ褫ä

Ǥ⡢οڤγȽƤ˴ؤƤϡѰ
ΤͤȿФɼꤸΤȤ

ȿФΤϡҿİѰ

Ĥϡ3ˡοڤ10ߤεϤ20
ߤεϤ˳礹ȤˤȿФ򤷤Ƥޤ

ϡɤפޤȿФĿİѰΤȡ

ȤǤʤͤ

ϡϻפޤϿǰӤȻפΤǤ

ǡ¾ˤȿФ⿴פäͤʤȤ
ȻפΤǤͤб򤷤Τȡ

ĤޤꡢѤʰϤĥäơȤޥߤޡå
˾ƤʤǤϤʤȡ

Ρ䤬ʤȤΤ

ϡ

椬δȤϡ;͵⤬ǹοˤ뤫
Ǥǯ3λǡͻؤʤɤִ̱Ȥθ
⡦¶ĹϡȲǹ202ߤ⤢ΤȤ

Ҳ𤷤褦ˡ椬δȤϡǶᡢͭ
ĤĹμҺĤͭư˽ФƤȤǡʤƤ
ȤϡĴã̤ǤäƤϤʤΤǤ

Ǥ顢鿷ڤ礹ȤäȤǡ
̤δȤͭ񤬤ȤȤ;ͤ줺ñ˻ⷫ
˺äƤԤʤɤȤäǤϤʤ

ȤΤ⡢οڤ϶ǤϤʤ
Ǥ뤿ᡢⷫ˺äƤԤ⡢Ĺ֤
Ĵãǽˤʤ뤫Ǥ


ȤȤǡȤǤСؤɸ̤ϤʤǤȻפ
η⡢ܶԤ׻ζͻ
ŤȤȤǡʤηɰդ򼨤Ȥä
ΤǤ礦

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ޤ
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Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

Сʥ󥭵Ĺ4ĤɲôºҲ𤷤ޤ
ΤΥեɸͤϴ˲ǽʤ
Ĥ3Ĥ⡢˾˼»ܤβǽ
ȤǤ

ĤޤꡢСʥ󥭵ĹϡޤޤʤϻĤƤȤ
ΤΡ٤϶ˤƿŤǤ롢ȡ

ǤϡϤޤǿŤǤΤϡˤ
ƹͤƤߤȻפޤ

⤴Ҳ𤷤ȤꡢСʥ󥭵Ĺ
˾˹ԤȸäƤ뤳ȤФơ
Ρ٥кѳؾޤޤ롼ޥ󶵼Ƚ򤷤Ƥ

ʤơΤȡ

եɤοʬΤ褦ʥ롼ޥ󶵼Ǥϲȸä
ΤǤ礦


PBSNEWSHOUR Ǥ

Yes, he said we will do something if the situation
warrants. But here we are. You know, this is -- we're now 
32 months into this slump. Unemployment is disastrously
high. Growth, we -- the economy needs to grow about 2.5
percent annual rate just to keep unemployment from
rising. It's not doing that.

ϡкǤĤȤˤʤȸä桹
ϤɤʤäƤΤ桹Ϻ32֤Υפ
ޤޤǤ롣ΨϲŪ˹⤤кĹΨϡšΨ
ʤ褦ˤ뤿ˤϡ2.5%ĹΨɬפǤ롣
ϤʤäƤʤ

What would it take to justify action? So, you know, it was
a good signal that he is saying, you know, the Fed is kind 
of, sort of willing to do something, maybe, which is better
than previous statements. But, if this isn't a situation
that warrants action now, what would be that kind of
situation? Do we have to have a whole Great Depression
to get the Fed moving?

ֹư뤿ˤϲɬפǤȤΤबϢ
ϴDz򤷤褦ȤäƤΤϡɽϤƤ
롣ưǤʤȤ顢ɤʤʤȹ
ưʤȤΤϢ䤬ưФˤϡ網˴٤ɬפ
Τ


ά

I think it should be throwing everything, including the
kitchen sink, at the problem. I mean, Doug is saying that
there's -- the Fed has done all it can do. That's not what
the Fed says. The Fed says it has ammunition; it
continues to have the ability to act. So, we should take
them at their word and see them actually act. They can do
purchases of long-term bonds. They can raise their
inflation target, which, you know, Ben Bernanke, when he
was a Princeton economics professor, advocated for Japan
when it was in a similar situation.

ϢϡФƤκȯư٤ȹͤ롣Dougϡ
ϢϤǤ뤳ȤƤäƤȸϢθȤϰ
ϢäƤȸ³ưǤȸäƤ롣
Ĺķ뤳ȤǤ롣ϥեɸͤ夲
뤳ȤǤ롣ϥСʥ󥭻᤬ץ󥹥ȥηкѳؤζ
äȤˡܤ褦ʾˤäȤܤ˴᤿ΤǤ
Τ

Sure. The -- the Fed has -- it has in its mind and more or
less publicly an idea of what it wants the inflation rate
to be over the next five years. It's -- that's believed to
be about 2 percent. If the Fed were to make it known
that, look, we actually think it should be 3 percent, that
would at least give some incentive for people,
corporations that are sitting on piles of cash to say, you
know, that cash is going to be worth a little bit less. We
should spend more, give it a -- make it a little bit more
attractive for people who are deciding that they have a
good investment project, but they're not really sure
whether they should borrow for it.

Ϣϡ桢5ǯ֤ˤ륤եΨɤȤͤ
Τϡ2%ǤȿƤ롣⤷Ϣ䤬
Τ餻뤳ȤäȤС3%ǤʤФʤʤȻפ
3%Сξ˺¤Ǥ̱Ȥ˥󥻥ƥ֤Ϳ
Ǥ⤬ͤʤʤȤȤˤʤΤ桹
ϤäȻٽФ򤷤ʤФʤʤ褤Ʒ郎ȻפĤĤ⡢
ΤΤڤ٤ȽǤĤƤʤ͡ˤȤä
̥ϤΤΤˤʤФʤʤ


It will make them think, well, it will be a little easier
to service that debt. It's something that can move
decisions at the margin. There is a whole list of things
that the Fed can do. They are all uncertain, because we
are in uncharted territory. We haven't been in this kind of
situation, where short-term interest rates, which the Fed
really controls directly, are basically zero. We haven't
been in this situation since the 1930s.

֤СϡڶθʧϳڤˤʤȹͤǤ
Ʒ迴򤵤뤳ȤǤ롢ȡϢ䤬ԤȤΤǤ
ɽ롣ϡԳΤʤΤΤʤв桹ϳ
ʤΰˤ뤫桹ϡΤ褦ʾ˻äȤϤʤ
Ϣ䤬ľͶƳûŪ˥ˤʤäƤΤǤ
롣1930ǯʹߡʾ֤ˤʤäȤϤʤΤ

But that's not a reason not to act. And yet the Fed is sort
of saying well, you know, it's -- things are uncertain.
Maybe things will improve. And this may not look like a
crisis to the Fed, but to the very large number of people
who are unemployed, to the near-record number of people
who have been unemployed for more than six months and 
more than a year, this is a crisis. I'm amazed that there is
no greater sense of urgency here.

֤Ϲư򤷤ʤȤͳˤϤʤʤϢäƤ
롣ԳΤȡ¿ʬϲǤϢˤȤäƤ
ˤϸʤΤʤ򼺤ä¿ο͡ˤȤä
ϡ뤤Ⱦǯʾ塢1ǯʾ强ȤƤǹ˶ᤤμ
ԤˤȤäƤϴǤΤ۵򴶤ʤȤԻ׵ĤǤʤ


ά

We need to do something to make this economy stronger,
not five years from now, not 10 years from now, but now.
We need to prop this up. Yes, it's true that the aftermath
of financial crises is usually a long period of poor
economic performance. But that's not something to just
accept.

ֲ桹ϲ椬кѤ򶯸ǤʤΤˤ뤿˲򤹤뤳Ȥɬפ
Τ5ǯȤ10ǯȤΤǤϤʤ뤳Ȥɬפʤ
кѤ򸵵Ťɬפ롣ͻη̡̾кѤΰ
Ĺ³ȤΤϡΤȤ٤
Ϥʤ

We're supposed to do something different. When Japan
had a somewhat similar situation in the 1990s, after its
bubble burst, American economists, American officials
were caustic about the unwillingness of the Japanese to
take strong action to deal with their problem, the way
they were just sitting there. And now we're doing the
same thing.

ֲ桹ϰä򤹤ȻפƤ롣ܤ1990ǯˡХ֥
ƤƱͤξˤäȤˡꥫΥΥߥȤ䴱νϡ
ܿͤ褹뤿˶Ϥʹư˽Ф褦Ȥʤ
˿ȽʤƤߤƤȡ桹
ƱȤ򤷤ƤΤ

We are turning Japanese in our economic policy. This is
not something we should be accepting.

ֲ桹ϡк˴ؤơܿͤˤʤäƤޤäƤ롣ǤϤ
ʤ


ǡǤ礦

եɤοͤϡ郎դȴƤ뤳ȤǤ

ǤϡСʥ󥭻᤬ŤǤͳ򿶤֤äƤߤޤ礦
4ĤˤĤơɤäƤΤ

褺ϢˤĹĤ

ˤĤƤϡʬʷиʤĹĤιɤΤ
ʸ̤ȤɤΤ褦Ѥ뤫ˤĤԳΤǤꡢ
Ťˤʤ餶ʤȡ

ϡFOMCɽƤǤ

ޤ˸ͤäݤäǡ̤οͤˤȤäƤϡɤ
Ǥ⤤褦ä⤷ޤ

Сʥ󥭻ϡͤˤʤäȤơʥԤ
Ԥ󤲤ƤޤˤƤϢοդ
Τ񤷤ȡ

軰ϡĶѶФΰǤ

Ūäǡ̤οͤ򤷤Ƥͤ
˾ʤǤ礦ˡʤȤ򤷤Ƥɤ̤
뤫ȡСʥ󥭵ĹϸäƤޤ

बפʤȤäƤΤƨƤϤޤ
ϡˤ٤ǤϤʤȸäƤΤǤ

Ρ

ƹϡ¾ΥѤƤȸ
⡢ºݤʿͤϡ0.15%0.20%ϰ
ˤȸޤ¾ܤѤƤ
ϡΤΤȤꡢ0.001%ȤʤäƤΤǤ

0.001%ȤΤϡۤܥȤǤ

إꥳץ餪Ф黵Ƥǥե򤹤Τ
Сʥ󥭵ĹǤϲ򤹤٤ȸäƤ
ΤǤ

Ρ

ʤȤ򤹤Сեǥե󥺻Ծ줬Ǥޤ
ȡĤޤꡢǤСԾؤλüԤϤʤ
ʤäƤޤǤϤʤȡơԾ򻦤Ƥޤä顢
ʾ֤äȤˡʤ򼺤äƤޤ
ˤʤ롢ȡ

ǸΡեɸͤΰ夲ˤĤƤϤɤǤ礦

Сʥ󥭻ϸޤͽۥեΨξ徺ˤĤʤ
ʤȤ򤹤СϢʪΥȥǽϤ˵
ƤޤѤ礭᤮롢ȡʤȡʪǤʤ
켡ʤβʤ̲ߤʤɤⲼ䤹ʤäƤޤȡ

Сʥ󥭵Ĺϡ4ܤƤϡͤΥΥߥ
ʤƤΤȤ櫓Ǥơˤϥ
ޥ󶵼ޤޤƤꡢäơ䡢Сʥ󥭵Ĺ
롼ޥ᤬ƮƤȤȤˤʤΤǤ

ǡΤȡ롼ޥ󶵼ϡեȯư
衢ȡΤʤСեˤʤȡȤʤǤäƤ
ȤβͤΤǡ͡᤯Ȥʤ»
ʤȹͤȤȡ⡢ʹͤ
͡

ΰǡСʥ󥭵Ĺϡۤɸä褦˥ե
ˤʤСϢʪΥȥǽϤФ뿮ǧɤ
Ǥޤ줬롢ȡ

ĤޤꡢСʥ󥭵Ĺϡϥեζ줬ʤȤϿ
ĤĤ⡢Ǥ⥤եƳʤȤ򤱤Ȥ
ȤΤ褦ʤΤǤ

ϿǰѤΤǤ礦

ǤϤʤΤǤ礦ϡFRB̾ĹȤ̾Ĥ
ȤɸˤƤȤȤǤ礦ʵΩľ
פǤ뤬Ȥäơ⤷ե򵯤Ƥޤ
СFRBĹȤƤϼʤȡΤʤСϢλ
ϥե򵯤ʤȤǤΤ顢ȡ

ˡ

פʻ¤˺ƤϤޤ

ƹϡ͢ФƸѤ¤άΩäƤޤ
ȤȤϡ̱äڤ夲롣ơ¤ɥ
Ĺǧ뤳Ȥˤʤ롢ȡ
ʤСۤäƤƤ⡢
ʪξ徺βǽ礭ȤȤˤʤޤ

ʵ뤫ɤȤϴطʤؤưˤ꺣
ե줬ǽ礭Τȡ

Τ褦ʾͽۤΤˡ⤷եΨɸͤ
3%ꡢơ¸뤿ĹĤ
̹Ԥä顢͡Ϥɤ뤫ȡ
ΤȤʤ顢
ե˲Фդǽ롢ȡ

ơե˲Фդ顢ʬFRBĹʤȻ
äƤȤȤǤ


Сʥ󥭵ĹŤʻǤ뤳Ȥ˶äȤ
å򤪴ꤤޤ
↓↓↓
͵blog󥭥󥰤

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

FRBĹֱ顡ơɲô¤ƤפȤޤ1̡

̵ȸܶԤȤǤäѤäơƹϢϡʤ
ɲúǤФȤΤǤ礦

Ǥ⡢ɤʤĤƤȤΤ

ĹĤ㤤褵Τ

ȤȤǡХʥ󥭵ĹΥԡɤǤߤޤ

Сʥ󥭵Ĺϡޤ4ĤۤɼʤĤƤȸäƤ褦
Ǥ

ʣĹĤ㤤
ʣFOMCʸɽ
ʣĶ¶Фΰ
ʣ˥եɸͤΰ夲

ΤΡʣˤˤĤƤϡΥꥫˤȤäͭǤ
ϸäƤʤ褦ǤǤϡĤ3ĤϤɤľ˼¹Ԥ
ΤǤʤΤǤ֤ˤϡѤ⤢뤬
Ѥ⤢뤫ȡѤ礭褯̣ǡºݤˤ
֤»ܤ뤳ȤŬɤꤹ٤Ǥ롢ȡ

 
Notwithstanding the fact that the policy rate is near its 
zero lower bound, the Federal Reserve retains a number of
tools and strategies for providing additional stimulus. I 
will focus here on three that have been part of recent 
staff analyses and discussion at FOMC meetings: (1) 
conducting additional purchases of longer-term securities, 
(2) modifying the Committee's communication, and (3) 
reducing the interest paid on excess reserves. I will also 
comment on a fourth strategy, proposed by several 
economists--namely, that the FOMC increase its inflation 
goals.

θ³˶դƤȤ¤Ϥ뤬Ϣϡ
ʤɲûɷ֤뤿μʤݻƤ롣ϡǶᡢ
FOMCβǸƤ줿ΤΤ3ĤǤߤʣĹ
ķɲŪʣ˰Ѱξ󶡤βʣ˽¶Ķ
ʬФʧäƤΰ줫鲿ͤΥΥߥ
ƤƤƤˤĤƤ⡢4ܤάȤƥȤ
ϡFOMCեɸͤ夲ȤƤ


A first option for providing additional monetary
accommodation, if necessary, is to expand the Federal
Reserve's holdings of longer-term securities. As I noted
earlier, the evidence suggests that the Fed's earlier
program of purchases was effective in bringing down term
premiums and lowering the costs of borrowing in a
number of private credit markets. I regard the program
(which wassignificantly expanded in March 2009) as
having made an important contribution to the economic
stabilization and recovery that began in the spring of
2009. Likewise, the FOMC's recent decision to stabilize
the Federal Reserve's securities holdings should promote
financial conditions supportive of recovery.

ɬפȤСήư򤵤˶ͿȤǽΰƤϡϢĹ
ķͭۤ礵뤳Ȥˤʤ롣ޤǤ˻䤬ڤȤꡢ
Ϣκķϡ¿ζͻԾˤ֥ץߥȼ
Ȥ뤦ͭǤäȤǡˤ꼨Ƥ롣
֡ʤ2009ǯ3˳礵줿ˤϡкѤΰ2009ǯ
դ˻Ϥޤäʵ礭ʹ׸򤷤ƱͤˡϢξڷͭ
경뤿FOMCκǶηϡʵٱ礹ͻ
Ķ¥ʤΤȤʤ


I believe that additional purchases of longer-term
securities, should the FOMC choose to undertake them,
would be effective in further easing financial conditions.
However, the expected benefits of additional stimulus
from further expanding the Fed's balance sheet would
have to be weighed against potential risks and costs. One
risk of further balance sheet expansion arises from the
fact that, lacking much experience with this option, we do
not have very precise knowledge of the quantitative effect
of changes in our holdings on financial conditions. In
particular, the impact of securities purchases may depend
to some extent on the state of financial markets and the
economy; for example, such purchases seem likely to
have their largest effects during periods of economic and
financial stress, when markets are less liquid and term
premiums are unusually high. The possibility that
securities purchases would be most effective at times
when they are most needed can be viewed as a positive
feature of this tool. However, uncertainty about the
quantitative effect of securities purchases increases the
difficulty of calibrating and communicating policy
responses.

ֻϡĹķɲŪʹϡ⤷FOMCԤȷꤹ
ΤǤСͻ򤵤˴¤̣Ǹ̤ȿ롣
ϢΥХ󥹥Ȥ򤵤˳礹뤳ȤԤå
ϡȼꥹȥȤδɾɬפ롣Ϣ
Х󥹥Ȥ礵뤳ȤΰĤΥꥹϡ˴ؤ
桹Ϸи­Ƥ뤳Ȥ顢Ĺķͭͻˤɤ
褦ʿŪƶڤܤˤĤƤΤμͭƤʤ
ȯ롣äˡķΥѥȤϡ٤϶ͻԾȷ
Ѥξ֤˰¸뤫⤷ʤ㤨СķΥѥ
ȤϡкѤͻ줷ˤ˺Ǥ礭ʤǤ
褦ʤȤϡԾήưϳ餷֥ץߥϰ۾˹⤯ʤ
ƤȤʤΤķι줬ǤɬפȤȤ˼»ܤ
ΤǤСϺǤŪǤȤȤ֤Υץ
ħȹͤ롣ķοṲ̄˴ؤԳΤ
ΤˤΰƤ»ܤ뤳Ȥκ񤵤ޤΰƤ˴ؤ
ȿξã񤷤


Another concern associated with additional securities
purchases is that substantial further expansions of the
balance sheet could reduce public confidence in the Fed's
ability to execute a smooth exit from its accommodative
policies at the appropriate time. Even if unjustified, such
a reduction in confidence might lead to an undesired
increase in inflation expectations. (Of course, if inflation
expectations were too low, or even negative, an increase
in inflation expectations could become a benefit.) To
mitigate this concern, the Federal Reserve has expended
considerable effort in developing a suite of tools to
ensure that the exit from highly accommodative policies
can be smoothly accomplished when appropriate, and
FOMC participants have spoken publicly about these tools
on numerous occasions. Indeed, by providing maximum
clarity to the public about the methods by which the FOMC
will exit its highly accommodative policy stance--and
thereby helping to anchor inflation expectations--the
Committee increases its own flexibility to use securities
purchases to provide additional accommodation, should
conditions warrant.

֤κķɲù˴ؤ⤦ĤηǰϡϢΥХ󥹥
򹹤˳礵ȡϢϾŬʻ˴ºλ
ƽиά»ܤ뤳Ȥ񤷤ʤΤǤϤʤȤ͡ο
㲼롣ˤפȤΤʤȤǤäƤ⡢͡ο
㲼ϡͽۥեΨ夲Ƥޤ⤷ʤʤ
ͽۥեΨޤΤ᤮ȡϥޥʥäꤹ
ˤϡͽۥեΨξ徺ͭפʾ⤢ˤηǰ
뤿ˡϢĶºνиάࡼ˼»ܤ뤳
ȤΤʤΤˤ뤿ΰϢμʤȯϤ򤷤Ƥꡢ
FOMCλüԤϡ¿εȤ館ƤʤˤĤƸ
ä򤷤Ƥ¡FOMCĶºȴФȤǤ뤿
֤˴ؤƸФ餫ˤ뤳ȤˤꡢƤޤ
եͽۤŤդ뤳ȤˤꡢѰϡǧС
ɲŪº»ܤ뤿˽˺ķ»ܤ

A second policy option for the FOMC would be to ease
financial conditions through its communication, for
example, by modifying its post-meeting statement. As I
noted, the statement currently reflects the FOMC's
anticipation that exceptionally low rates will be warranted
"for an extended period," contingent on economic
conditions. A step the Committee could consider, if
conditions called for it, would be to modify the language
in the statement to communicate to investors that it
anticipates keeping the target for the federal funds rate
low for a longer period than is currently priced in markets.
Such a change would presumably lower longer-term rates
by an amount related to the revision in policy
expectations.

FOMCˤȤäƤϡã̤ƶͻ
뤳ȤǤ롣㤨Сʸ뤳ȤˤäƤǤ
롣˸ڤȤꡢʸˤϡ㳰Ū㤤ϷкѾ
뤬ĹݾڤǤȤFOMCͽۤǶȿǤ
Ƥ롣Ѱ񤬸Ƥ뤳ȤΤǤĤμʤϡ⤷
ȤΤǤСʸɽơѰȤ
Ƥϡեǥե󥺥졼Ȥɸͤ򸽺߻Ծ줬ͽۤƤ
Ĺ֤ˤ㤯ݤĤȤȤʬ餻褦ˤ뤳Ȥ
롣ϡͻͽۤ˴ؤ뽤ʬ¿ʬĹ
㲼뤳Ȥˤʤ

Central banks around the world have used a variety of
methods to provide future guidance on rates. For
example, in April 2009, the Bank of Canada committed to
maintain a low policy rate until a specific time, namely,
the end of the second quarter of 2010, conditional on the
inflation outlook.Although this approach seemed to work
well in Canada, committing to keep the policy rate fixed
for a specific period carries the risk that market
participants may not fully appreciate that any such
commitment must ultimately be conditional on how the
economy evolves (as the Bank of Canada was careful to
state). An alternative communication strategy is for the
central bank to explicitly tie its future actions to specific
developments in the economy. For example, in March
2001, the Bank of Japan committed to maintaining its
policy rate at zero until Japanese consumer prices
stabilized or exhibited a year-on-year increase. A
potential drawback of using the FOMC's post-meeting
statement to influence market expectations is that, at
least without a more comprehensive framework in place, it
may be difficult to convey the Committee's policy
intentions with sufficient precision and conditionality. The
Committee will continue to actively review its
communication strategy, with the goal of communicating
its outlook and policy intentions as clearly as possible.

ԤϡͶƳ˴ؤ͡ʼʤѤƤ
㤨С2009ǯ4ʥԤϡե츫̤ξդʤ顢
λ¨2010ǯȾޤ
«μʤϡʥˤƤϹǽƤ褦
뤬δֶꤹȸ뤳Ȥϥꥹȼ¨
Ծ컲üԤϡ«ϵŪˤϡǡ˷кѤѲ
ˤäƤʤΤ褦˥ʥԤտҤ٤Ƥ뤬ˤȤ
ʬ򤷤ʤ⤷ʤ¾ΰƤȤƤϡԤкѤ
ʿŸԤ֤դ뤳ȤǤ롣㤨С2001ǯ3
ܶԤϡܤξʪ경ޤǡ¨ǯ
徺ޤ򥼥˰ݻ뤳ȤԾͽۤ
ƶͿ뤿μʤȤFOMCʸѤ뤳ȤŪ
ʷϡʤƤ⡢ʣʹ¤򤷤ƤäǤʤȡѰ
տޤΤˤƾդ뤳ȤǤ뤫⤷
ʤȤȤѰȤƤϡãμʤˤĤơ³
ľԤȤȤ롣ơѰθ̤տޤǽ
¤Τ뤳Ȥܻؤ


A third option for further monetary policy easing is to
lower the rate of interest that the Fed pays banks on the
reserves they hold with the Federal Reserve System. 
Inside the Fed this rate is known as the IOER rate, the
"interest on excess reserves" rate. The IOER rate,
currently set at 25 basis points, could be reduced to, say,
 10 basis points or even to zero. On the margin, a
 reduction in the IOER rate would provide banks with an
 incentive to increase their lending to nonfinancial
 borrowers or to participants in short-term money
 markets, reducing short-term interest rates further and
 possibly leading to some expansion in money and credit
 aggregates. However, under current circumstances, the
 effect of reducing the IOER rate on financial conditions in
 isolation would likely be relatively small. The federal
 funds rate is currently averaging between 15 and 20 
basis points and would almost certainly remain positive
 after the reduction in the IOER rate. Cutting the IOER 
rate even to zero would be unlikely therefore to reduce
 the federal funds rate by more than 10 to 15 basis
points. The effect on longer-term rates would probably be
 even less, although that effect would depend in part on
 the signal that market participants took from the action
 about the likely future course of policy. Moreover, such an
 action could disrupt some key financial markets and
 institutions. Importantly for the Fed's purposes, a further
 reduction in very short-term interest rates could lead
 short-term money markets such as the federal funds
 market to become much less liquid, as near-zero returns
 might induce many participants and market-makers to
 exit. In normal times the Fed relies heavily on a well-
functioning federal funds market to implement monetary
 policy, so we would want to be careful not to do
 permanent damage to that market.

ֹʤͻ¤軰ϡϢ䤬Ԥν¶
ʧ뤳ȤǤ롣ϢǤϡζIOER
ȤȤΤƤ롣ĶؤζȤȤIOER졼
ϡ25١ݥȤꤵƤ뤬10١ݥȤ
ˤޤDz뤳ȤǽIOER졼Ȥ㲼뤳Ȥϡ
ԤФͻظߤդä뤳ȤûͻԾ
ؤλä¥󥻥ƥ֤ˤʤǤơˤäû
Ϲ㲼ޥ͡ץ饤ˤĤʤǽ롣
ߤξǤϡIOER졼ȤñȤǰǤϸ̤
ŪǤեǥե󥺥졼ȤϸߡʿѤ
0.15%0.20%δ֤ˤꡢIOER졼ȤƤۤܳμ¤
ڤ뤳ȤϤʤޤޤǤIOER졼Ȥ򲾤˥ˤޤǰ
Ȥǡˤäƥեǥե󥺥졼Ȥ0.1%0.15%
ʾϲꤽϤʤĹФƶϡ餯⾮
ǤäȤ⡢αƶϡˤϻԾ줬֤
뾭ѹ˴ؤ륷ʥ˰¸Ǥˡ
֤ϡͻԾͻؤˤƶͿ뤳ȤˤʤϢ
ŪΤ˽פʤȤϡˤû֤ζΤʤ
ϡեǥե󥺻ԾΤ褦ûζͻԾ򡢤ήư
ʤ֤˻餷ȤȤǤ롣ȤΤϡؤɥζ
Ǥ¿λüԤԾ줫Ф뤿ʤȤǤСϢ
ϥեǥե󥺻ԾѤƶͻ»ܤΤǡ桹
ƤϡԾ˥᡼Ϳ褦ʤȤʤ褦դ


A rather different type of policy option, which has been
 proposed by a number of economists, would have the
 Committee increase its medium-term inflation goals
 above levels consistent with price stability. I see no
 support for this option on the FOMC. Conceivably, such a
 step might make sense in a situation in which a
 prolonged period of deflation had greatly weakened the
 confidence of the public in the ability of the central bank
 to achieve price stability, so that drastic measures were
 required to shift expectations. Also, in such a situation,
 higher inflation for a time, by compensating for the prior
 period of deflation, could help return the price level to
 what was expected by people who signed long-term
 contracts, such as debt contracts, before the deflation
 began.

¿ΥΥߥȤˤäƤƤϡӿѤ
ΤǤꡢѰΥեɸͤʪꤷƤ
٥ʾ˰夲褦ȤΤǤ롣ͤȤǤϡ
ʤϡĹ֤ˤ錄ǥե줬Ԥʪΰ뤲
뤳ȤǽϤ˴ؤǰĤ褦ˤʤꡢη̡ͽۤʤ
Υɥ饹åʼʤɬפʤȤˤϰ̣뤫⤷ʤ
ޤˤƤϡ⤤եΨ³ȤĹ
μڤ򤷤褦ʿ͡ͽۤ褦ʡǥե줬ϤޤΥ
ˤޤʪΥ٥᤹Ȥ˰㤦Ǥǥեδ֤
򤹤뤳ȤˤäƤǤ

However, such a strategy is inappropriate for the United
 States in current circumstances. Inflation expectations
 appear reasonably well-anchored, and both inflation
 expectations and actual inflation remain within a range
 consistent with price stability. In this context, raising the
 inflation objective would likely entail much greater costs
 than benefits. Inflation would be higher and probably
 more volatile under such a policy, undermining confidence
 and the ability of firms and households to make longer-
term plans, while squandering the Fed's hard-won
 inflation credibility. Inflation expectations would also
 likely become significantly less stable, and risk premiums
 in asset markets--including inflation risk premiums--
would rise. The combination of increased uncertainty for
 households and businesses, higher risk premiums in
 financial markets, and the potential for destabilizing
 movements in commodity and currency markets would
 likely overwhelm any benefits arising from this strategy.

֤άϸξƹˤȤäƤŬȤϸ
եͽۤϡʬ˲ĤƤꡢͽۥեΨ
ơ¤ΥեΨ⡢ʪꤷƤȤߤϰϤ˼ޤ
Ƥ롣δطǡեɸͤ夲뤳ȤϡåȰʾ
ô򤫤ƤޤȤˤʤβǤϡϢ䤬ϫ
ۤƤ꤬ǡȤȷפĹηײ褬ΩƤ
ʤꡢեΨϤ⤯ư㤷ʤǤͽۥ
ΨϡޤŪǤϤʤʤꤽǤ롣񻺻ԾΥꥹץߥ
⡢եꥹץߥޤᡢŪǤʤʤꡢͽۥեΨ
Ͼ徺ǤȷפȴȤԳΤޤͻԾΥ
ץߥब⤯ʤꡢƤޤ켡ʻԾ̲߻Ծư
԰ˤǽΤǡά⤿餵åȤ
礭ʤꤽǤ


Each of the tools that the FOMC has available to provide
 further policy accommodation--including longer-term
 securities asset purchases, changes in communication,
 and reducing the IOER rate--has benefits and drawbacks,
 which must be appropriately balanced. Under what
 conditions would the FOMC make further use of these or
 related policy tools? At this juncture, the Committee has
 not agreed on specific criteria or triggers for further
 action, but I can make two general observations.

FOMCʤͻ¤ΤѲǽʤϡĹ
ĤιջãʤѹIOER졼ȤΰȤȤǤ
뤬Ϥ줾˥åȤȷäƤ뤬Ŭڤ˥Х
ɬפ롣ɤΤ褦ʾβǡFOMCϤ
ȤˤʤΤ˴ؤѰϡ̤δ˹դƤ
ȤȤϤʤĤȤǤ

First, the FOMC will strongly resist deviations from price
 stability in the downward direction. Falling into deflation
 is not a significant risk for the United States at this time,
 but that is true in part because the public understands
 that the Federal Reserve will be vigilant and proactive in
 addressing significant further disinflation. It is
 worthwhile to note that, if deflation risks were to
 increase, the benefit-cost tradeoffs of some of our policy
 tools could become significantly more favorable.

ˡFOMCϡʪꤷƤ֤鲼˿뤳Ȥ˶
񹳤Ǥǥե˴٤뤳ȤϡߤΥꥫˤȤä礭ʥ
ǤϤʤ͡Ϣ䤬礭ʪ㲼Фѷٲ
Ƥꡢޤ򸫱ۤƹư򤹤򤷤Ƥ뤳Ȥ顢ʪ
ꥹ񹳤ΤϿ¤Ǥ롣⤷ǥեΥꥹ徺
褦ǤС桹ͭȷΥȥ졼ɥդδ
ϡ˹ޤΤˤʤ


Second, regardless of the risks of deflation, the FOMC will
 do all that it can to ensure continuation of the economic
 recovery. Consistent with our mandate, the Federal
 Reserve is committed to promoting growth in
employment and reducing resource slack more generally.
 Because a further significant weakening in the economic
 outlook would likely be associated with further
 disinflation, in the current environment there is little or
 no potential conflict between the goals of supporting
 growth and employment and of maintaining price 
stability.

ˡǥեΥꥹˤ⹴餺FOMCϡкѲη³
ʤΤˤ뤿ˤǤ뤳ȤƹԤ桹Ǥ̳˱äơϢ
ϡѤä¥ʤ뤳ȤȤͷٻ񸻤򸺾뤳Ȥ
Ƥ롣кѸ̤˼ޤ褦Ǥйʤʪ
ȼǤꡢߤξǤϡкĹѤλٱȤɸ
ʪΰݻȤɸδ֤ˤơפξͤ뤳Ȥ
ʤ

 


ǡǤ礦

4ĤμʤҲ𤷤ĤĤ⡢եɸͤϥȡ

ǡĤ3ĤμʤˤƤ⡢ǽȻפΤϡĹ
Ĥ㤤١

ơĹĤ㤤ˤƤ⡢Τ褦ʾˤʤä
郎դƤޤ

Υ롼ޥ󶵼ϡξ˰۵ĤҤ٤Ƥޤ餺
˲Τȡ


ˤƤ⡢Сʥ󥭵Ĺ⿷ʹƻۤѶŪǤ
ʤȤʬޤ


ܶԤϡɤʤȤǤФΤȻפå
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Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

߹ʤȤܡ̵ܤפ

߹ǺλǺȤϡ߹к
äȸСäơפդäȤǤޤ櫓
Ǥ顣

ǡ͢дȤϸǤΤޤޱ߹⤬ʤ褦Ǥϡ
æФ뤷ʤ⤷ʤȡ

ޤʤȤȡ桹˼夤櫓Ǥ
ƶʤȿʤСȤ뤷͢ΩܤϤɤʤ
ƤޤΤȡ

ޤȱ߹κ褯ʬʤΤ

߹ϡ椬λȤζƶ⤿餹Τȡ
ȤʤƤߤƤƤΤȡ

衼ͤƤߤƲ

ȤγæФϡ⺣ϤޤȤƤ櫓ǤϤʤ
Ǥ⤦ǯϤޤäƤΤǤˤϰö
ФƹԤääƤȤ⤢櫓Ǥ

ˡȤȤ٤뤳Ȥ̿Ǥ櫓Ǥ顢
̱ܤȸȤ⡢˹ԤȤϹԤΤȡ

줬ȤȤΤʤΤˡʾ߹⤬³СŤʤƶ
櫓Ǥ

Τˡ߹ˤʤдȤκλʤΤǤ뤳
ȤǤʤСƱ¾ҤȤζ⸷ʤ롢ȡ

Ǥ衼ͤ顢Ȥ˽ФƤ
ͳʬΤǤ

ĤޤꡢʹδȤϡ˿δȤɤ
뱿̿ˤ롢ȡ¦δȤϡ¤ϫƯϤ㥳
ȤǽǤ롢ȡФʹ¦ϫƯϤ
夬㤦ۤɹ⤤ˡ

⤦ȤʬȻפޤ

פˡ椬ȤϺ߹ѤǤ櫓
ܼϡȤζ褬ѤȤȤ˿Ԥ
櫓ǤǡȤζ褬ѤǤͳϡ
ϫƯϤ¤ȡ

ȤСξǤϡ椬¶򲼤С
ʤ˱߹ˤʤȤⶥϤ뤳ȤǽǤΤ
ȤƤ̵

Ĥޤꡢ¶礭ʤɤȤȤϤñˤǤ
äǤϤʤȡ

ȤȤǡ߹򲿤ȤƤ졢Ⱥ椬Ǥ
櫓ǤϡڤǤϤʤ
ɤ夲桢ܤλȤξӥɤΤ褦
Ȥά˾ޤȤȤǤΤǤ

ȤĹӥΤï

ϡȼȤǤꡢޤкѻȾʤǤǤ

ηкѻȾʤäƤ뤳ȤȤСñĤ
夲ƤȤۤ򤹤ФǡšĤޤꡢ߹к
äƤȤФǡ̳̤ƤʤȤ
ȤʤΤǤ

ȤФȤǤ褦ʿͤ椬
Υ꡼ΤǤϤʤǤ礦


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ޤǤۿкѥ˥塼ͭǤα߹ε򤴾Ҳ
ޤ

39桡2009ǯ109ɥ̿

ơ
Ϥ
о٤Ȱإ졼
ԾǷ졼ȤϾ˹ŪʤΤȸΤ
ܤϰز٤ʤΤ
٤ư
ɥ뤬˽ǽ

ݥȡ
ʣ˺ǶΥɥ¤طʤˤϡG20ζͻߥåȤǡк
Զѹɬǧ줿Ȥ롣
ʣ˲30ǯ֤ۤɤδ֡ƹηоֻϤۤܰӤֻۤ
礷ƤƤꡢ2006ǯˤǯ8000ɥֻã
ʣ˥ץ饶դȯɽ줿1985ǯƹηоֻϡ1000
ˤ٤ǤäΤǡ٤СǤϷоֻ
ʤĤäƤȸ롣
ʣˤоֻ礹С˥ɥ뤬夯ʤä
ͤ뤬ɬʤإ졼Ȥ˱ƶ
ͿΤϡо٤ǤϤʤܼ٤Ʊͤ˱ƶͿ
Ƥ뤫
ʣ˷о٤ֻʤۤˤޤãʤ⡢Ʊͤˡ
٤ιʤۤȯƤΤǡפäۤɤˤϥ
¤ˤϤʤäƤʤ
ʣܤΰزȽǤϡŪ˹ԤˡϤʤ
ʣ͢жȼԤʤɤ餹С٤Թ礬褦˸
뤫⤷ʤ٤ˤƤ⡢кѤμ¾˱
ưإ졼Ȥθľɬפˤʤꡢʤ굡򾷤줬

ʣ˺ɥ˽ǽΤϡ餫ͳˤä
ƹˤƥե줬ȡդˡƹηʵ
졢ĤޤǤĶ³뤳Ȥˤꤸꤸȥɥ¤
ơΤȤƹĤ̥Ϥʤä褦ʾ
Ǥ

 

44桡2009ǯ1113Զѹȶɥ

ơ
Ϥ
Զѹդȥɥμ
ƹδطԤζΤ
ܡڤιͤ

ݥȡ
ʣμ׹ϺкѤԶѹդɬפȸȤȤ
˶ɥ򴿷ޤ򼨤Ƥ뤬Ūˤä

ʣƹϡ1982ǯۤܰӤֻ礷³Ƥ롣
ʣ˶ǯΥɥβͤˤĤƤϡ1990ǯνꤴ2000ǯ
νƬˤƥɥλޤƤĴ碌
褦˷оֻƤ롣
ʣ˥ɥ¤ˤʤäƤоֻ̾ǤȤϸʤȸ
äơɥ¤ˤʤʤ¤оֻν̾ϴԤǤʤ
ʣ˥ɥ⤬³ȷоֻϳ礹뷹ˤ롣
ʣƹδطԤԶѹɬʤͳ1Ĥϡ
кѤԶѹդХ֥1ĤװȤǡǤ
žǤ뤳Ȥˤ롣
ʣˤ⤦1ĤͳϡƹκκĸԤˤʤäƤ뤳Ȥ
ٲΤΤǤ롣
ʣˤι⡢ɥεˤäȤϤʤΤǡɥε
ǽϾʤԶѹդĤޤǤ³Ϥʤ
ǡˤ䤫ʥɥ¤ʤȻפ롣


46桡2009ǯ1127߹⽱

ơ
Ϥ
߹ʤΤ
زξȼ¸
߹ȥǥե

ݥȡ
ʣ˱ߤ14ǯ֤1ɥ86ˤʤäơ߹⤬®˿ʹԤƤ

ʣ˱߹Υԡϡ1995ǯ4ˤĤ79.75ߡʽִŪˡˤǤ롣
ʣˤ1ɥ뤬86ߤˤʤäȤ¤ϡߤХɥȤδط
ϤƤ餺ߤŪʼϤΤ뤿ˤϡ¸
إ졼Ȥߤɬפ롣ơ¸إ졼ȤκǶο
ܤߤȡɥ뤬̰¤ˤʤäƤͻҤ롣
ʣˤ˱߹⤬ʹԤƤ뤫ɤΤ뤿ˤϡƹ
ʪưĴ¼١μ¹԰إ졼Ȥ򸫤ɬ
פ롣ơ¼¸إ졼ȤοܤߤȡǶα
     ϲΥԡ٤Сʤ㤤ˤ뤳Ȥʬ

ʣ˿͡ϡإ졼ȤȤȡɤƤ̾ܤΥɥߤΥ졼Ȥˤ
ܤԤǤꡢΰ̣Ǥϡ1ɥ86ȤΤϡ
ʱ߹ȤȤˤʤ롣
ʣ˰زʤäƤ뤬زԤ
ϡߤȤˤʤ뤳Ȥȡ˵®ʱ߹⤬ʤ
ȤȤʤ
ʣâزθ̤˴ؤƤϡƹ񤬴ˤ䤫ʥɥ¤򴿷ޤ
Ƥʾ塢ŪǤ
ʣܤϡ͢Ф͢빽¤ˤʤäƤΤǡΤ
Ƥϡ߰¤ΥåȤ礭ȤϹŪǤϤʤ



55桡2010ǯ25ɥ˽βǽ

ơ
Ϥ
إ졼Ȥ˴ؤ椬б
̲ߤβͤ경
ܤغ»
ɥ˽δ

ݥȡ

ʣ͢Фä뤳ȤˤäƸѤϽФȹͤƤƹ
ϡ2008ǯƤ̱Υ졼ȤɥФƸ
Ƥ뤳Ȥ˻פäƤ롣
ʣ֤ΰإ졼Ȥϡ֤λȿǤƷꤵΤǡ
̾ΰջפưΤߤǡإ졼Ȥ򥳥ȥ뤹Τ
񤷤
ʣˤزͻ̤ơإ졼Ȥˤ٤α
ڤܤȤϲǽ

ʣܤεۤγ߽ϡ̲ߤ¤뤿˹Ԥ
줿زη̤Ǥȸ롣
ʣâ̲ߤɥ˥ڥå褦ˤϵȼ
Ĥޤꡢ̲ߤβͤΰݻͥ褹ʤСͻμͳ٤
ʤФʤʤȤȤ
ʣܤϸߡ100߼γ߽ͭȾƹĤʤ
ɥ񻺤ȤʤäƤ뤬ϡ߽Ūͤ
ɬװʾεϤȻפ졢ޤƤɥФäƤ뤿
ᾭغ»ȯꥹ礭
ʣ˺μ¼GDPǯǯΨ10%ӡƿ̱ɥ
Фǯ5%ʤС78ǯˤGDPƹɤȴ
Ȥˤʤ
ʣGDPƹȴȤ¤˰ռϤȡɥ
ФƤθ礭ѹ˿̱Фɥ뤬˽
뤳Ȥͽۤ롣


73桡2010ǯ611߰¤ܷк

ơ
Ϥ
߰¤ͭˤʤȤ¯
ޡ롦顼ʡξ
߹ûŪƶ
߹ĹŪƶ
üʱ߰¤ˤʤä

ݥȡ
ʣ͢ФŤι⤤ܤξˤϡ߰¤ܷкѤˤȤäƥץ饹
ˤʤȤո뤳ȤΤƤȿҤ٤
ʣˤͤ¯ȸ虜ʤΤʤС
⤷ͤΤǤСǰ׼٤ֻιϡ
̲ߤβͤ⤤ȤȤˤʤ뤬ʤбס
ǰֻϳ礷Ƥޤ
ʣ˰إ졼Ȥǰ׼٤δطˤĤƤϡޡ롦顼ʡ
ȤΤ롣ιܼͤϡإ졼Ȥ㲼
äΡ͢гۤä٤ۤ͢θ٤ˤ
ǰ׼٤ϲ򤹤뤳Ȥ⤢С뤳Ȥ⤢Ȥ
Τ
ʣ˲ˡ߰¤Ƥ⡢ܤ͢ʤο̤ۤɤϿ
ΰǡܤθ񸻤ʤɤ̤͢ؤѤ
ʤȤС߷ƥ١Ǥ͢гۤä뤬ɥƥ
Ǥǰ׼٤Ϥष뤳Ȥ⤢롣
ʣܤ͢дȤ߰¤ˤäפȤΤϡ߰¤
ʤС͢αߴۤäפĤफǤ롣
ʣ˵޷ʱ߹ˤʤȡ͢дȤפ1ߤα߹ǡ߿
֤Ȥ˥塼󤸤뤬ߥ꡼ɤ̤롣
ϡ1ߤα߹ȤϤäƤ⡢줬1ǯ³ФȤդ
Ǥ롣äơ޷ʱ߹⤬ȯƤ⡢줬Ĺ³Ȥ
ʤбƶϷǤ롣
ʣˤˡ1߱߹ˤʤפ߿֤Ȥ׻ˤϡ
߹ȼäƸ񤬷ڸץ饹θ̤ޤޤƤ
Ȥդ٤
ʣ˵޷ʱ߰¤СȤˤȤäƤϱ߰¤ˤغ
»ȯ뤳Ȥ顢ܳꤲꤹ褦ưФ뤳
Ȥǰ롣


ʾ

Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

Ƕα߹⸽ݤϡɤԻ׵ĤǤΤʤС
ǤϤͤ츽ݤꡢ⡢ηк
ѤʤΤ˱߹ˤʤäƤ뤫Ǥ

̡Τ褦ʤˤϡι̲ߤϰ
ʤäƤ٤ǤʤΤ

ˤƤ⡢ޤ̾ܰإ졼ȤǤϤΤǤ
Ѥʱ߹ˤʤäƤ櫓Ǥ

ȤϤƱ߹ˤʤäƤƤ⡢̱
ޤڤȤФˡưƤ롢ȡ


ǡȽŪʿ͡ϸǤ

ʤȤ򤷤ƤȡܤפƤޤǤϤʤȡ

ȡ褦͡ϸǤ

ֿ͡ܤפƤޤΤǤϤʤȷǰ褦
ʤСߤϤɤʤΤ

֤󡢤ʤбߤ

֤ߤƱ߰¤ˤʤ


ʤȤ侮ϺϹͤƤȤǤΤ

ȤϤʤǤ礦͡


ˤƤ⡢᤬ɽ򤷤Τǡ桹δ
̱ޤ˸ƤޤޤΤʤС
äˤʤ櫓Ǥ顣

Ǥ⡢ɤƾϽϤ᤿ΤǤ礦͡

䡢פޤϾǤʤ˿
ƤΤˡʬ׿ˤĤʤΤϤ󡢤ȡ
С´ĹΥݥȤʬϤΤǤС΢
ǽǤä⤷ʤǤϤʤ
ȡ

ǤϡοϴĹΥݥȤ򺹤ФȤǤʤ
äΤʤȤ򤹤СʬäΩĴפ
ƤޤǤ

ȤǡɤäƤ櫓Ǥ

ǤäƤ⡢⤷ο͵ǤСɤ
ΩäưˤϽФʤäȦǤФ
̱δԤ礭äˤʤä̱δԤ΢ڤ
褦ʤȤ򤷤ƤǤϤʤȡ顢ɤŤ
ƤȤǤ⤢ΤǤ

ˤƤ⡢˾᤬ˤʤСޤ񤫤
櫓Ǥǯ3ܤ͡ȡ

λϲȤ櫓Ǥ礦

ֲ桹Ť󤸤̱š

Ȥ顢᤬ˤʤäƤ⡢ûǤǽ뤳
ȤˤʤΤǤ礦


Ǹˤޤ߹äޤ߰¤ˤ褤ΩƤ
ʤΤΤ

ϡʾ岼뤳ȤǤʤ٥ˤޤš
ز⸽Ūˤ񤷤

ƤʤƤߤʡ

Ĥޤꡢ򲼤뤳ȤǤʤʤʤ顢κݶ夲
ƤߤȤȤǤ

֤ʤȤסʵʤäƤޤʤ

Ǥ硩ä顢ȤϤɤȽǤޤܤ
ʵϱסʤäƤޤȡä顢߰¤ˤʤΤ
ǤϤʤȡĤޤꡢ߰¤˴ñͶƳǤȤȤ

夲򤷤Ʊ߰¤¸褦ȤͤϤʤΤǤ礦


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Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ߤ1ɥ83դزޤäƤ
褦Ǥ

ޤˤƤǶᡢQĴΩޤۤ
ѥˤߤƤ顢οʶκ߹ʤΤ
⤷ƤޤβʹƤ饢ۤ餷ʤޤ

꡼ޥ󥷥åʹߡƹ衼åѤϥޥͥ꡼١
ܤξˤ1ۤɤäƤʤ
ޤꡢԾ˽вɥ桼̤ϵƤΤˡ
αߤؤƤʤΤǡߤʤΤȡ
ơα߹򿩤ߤˤϡ䤬äȤäȱߤԾ
뤹٤ʤΤȡ

褯٤μǶäƤΤǤơޤ
οʻä򤵤ƥīΥ٥ϡ

Τƹξ硢꡼ޥ󥷥å˥ޥͥ꡼١
2.5ܤۤɤޤǤ˳礷ƤΤϻ¤Ǥ
ñˡԤʤɤν¶⤬礷Ƥ
ǡºݤ˽в뤪⤬ƤȤ櫓ǤϤ
ΤǤ

ˡ˽в뤪⤬Ȥäơ
Ȥľ˰˱ƶڤܤΤǤϤʤΤǤ
˱ƶڤܤΤϡ˰ޤǤػԾˤ
ȶδطʤΤǤ

դΤȤʬäƤʤΤǤ礦

ޤǤ⡢ΤȤϤȤơ

زޤäƤޤ

Ǥϡºݤ˰زϹԤΤǤ礦

ϡβǽϾȽǤƤޤ

Τ

ˤϡ礭Ĥͳ褦˻פޤ
ϡزФƹ٤Ǥ

餯ƹܤز˽Ф뤳Ȥ˶ȿȯ뤳Ȥ
礦ΤʤСƹǤϰȤƼΨ⤤ˤ
ꡢޤʵθ®ǰޤäƤ뤫ʤΤǤ
ʤ͢ФȤƸѤβޤꤿƹȤƤϡ
ɥ򴿷ޤƤ櫓Ǥ顢ưй
ܤΰزȦޤ

Ǥ⡢ܤǤΤȷǤ
вǤʤ櫓Ǥ⤢ޤ󡣤9ˤϡƼ
Ǿ̤ͽꤵƤǤϤޤ󤫡ǤʤƤ⡢
ʤɤ餤ܤƹΰո̵뤹뤳
ʤɤǤ櫓Ϥʤȡ顢ȯޤ˸
ʤʤäƤȤ櫓Ǥ


زʤȹͤͳϡܤȼ˰
زԤäƤ⡢θ̤ؤɤʤȹͤ뤫Ǥ
ɤ⤷زäƤ߹⤬ʤȤʤä
̤ˤʤäƤޤȤͤ櫓ǤäȤ
ȴʤȤȤˤʤ櫓Ǥ

زͤϡزθ̤ʤؤɹ
Ƥʤ褦˸ޤФҥƥ꡼
֤ˤʤäƤȡ

䤬ʤȤС6ǯۤޤǤ絬Ϥʰز
ԤäƤǤϤʤȤͤ뤫Ȼפޤ

Τ˲椬ϡ2004ǯ3ޤǤοǯ֤ˤơ絬
Ϥʰز򤷤иޤ纬λˤʤä
¸᤬̳äƤäǤ

Ǥϡκβǧ줿Τ

ϡƹ񤬷ʵΰǰĶȤä
ǤĤޤꡢƹϡʵкΤ
2003ǯ62004ǯ6ˤơޤǤκ٥
1.0ˤޤǰƤ櫓ʤΤǤ

ʤȤСϡä㤤ǤϤʤ
ȤäƤǤϤʤȸ줽Ǥ
ϡĶѤƤ⡢ɥ¤ˤϤäƤʤ
Ȥͤƹ¦ˤäΤФϡɥ¤ɱ
ɤɥ¤ˤäƤȤ褦˥󥹤礭
ѲƤΤǤ

ǤϡϤɤƥɥ¤ɱ󤷤Τ

ϡ⤷ɥ۾㤤Ȥˤäƥɥ¤
ʤСܤƨ򤹤뤳ȤƹɤϷǰ
ƤȤȤʤΤǤĤޤꡢȤƹĤ
ʤ褦ʤȤˤʤСѤäĹξ徺򾷤Ƥ
ޤΤǡϤɤƤ򤷤ʤФʤʤȡ

ǡȤ餹Сܤز򤷤ƥɥ㤤
٤ƤСƹϰ¿Ķ³뤳Ȥ
롢ȡ

ĤޤꡢƹܤפƤ櫓ʤΤ
ϰפƤʤȡƹϡΨ
ʤãƤ뤿ˡѤβͥ
˹ͤƤ뤳Ȥ顢ɥ¤ˤ¿Ѥϵˤ뤳
ȤʤɤǤʤΤǤ

ȤȤʤΤǡȤưزˤäƱ߹
뤳Ȥ񤷤ȡ

Ǥϡ߹򤹤ʤϲʤΤ

¤ϤΤǤ

ΤˤʤꤿǤ

̤οͤʤ顢߰¤ͶƳˤϡز򤹤뤳Ȥ
Ǥơز򤹤Сȳ߽⤬
ä椬ܤƹͭä롢ȡ

¤ϡȵդΤȤб߹Ͽߤ뤳ȤǤ
ΤǤ

ĤޤꡢܤͭƤƹĤäѤäƤޤ
Фȡ

ƹĤȤȤϡҤƤϥɥ뤳Ȥˤʤꡢ
ʤбס߹⤬ʹԤ褦˻פǤ礦

Ǥ⡢ϰŪʸݤǤ⤷ܤɤɤ
Ĥ³СƹĤ˽ƹϤƨ
ϤǤʤʤ롢ȡΤʤСĤ˽Ĺε޾
⤿餷кѲ礭­ˤʤäƤޤǤ


ƹϡǡɥ̣ͭ򴶤櫓Ǥ夤ɥ
̥Ū޷ʥɥ¤礭᤮롢ȡơ
ʤСƤƹ϶ɥɤڤɬפ
ʤС߹⤬ߤޤȤȤͽۤʤΤ

Ǥ⡢μʡѤ˥ꥹǤ


Ǹˡؤ˴ؤG7ζǧ򼨤ƤȻפ
ޤ
G7¨7¢ꤿϡؤ˴ؤƼΤ
ǧͭƤޤ

ְإ졼Ȥϡкѥե󥿥륺ȿǤ٤

1ɥ=84ߤȤȤ졼Ȥϥե󥿥륺ȿ
ƤʤȡܤϼĥǤΤǤ礦

Τˡ̾ܥ졼ȤǹͤʤС˱߹ˤʤäƤ뤳
ȤϳΤǤʪưΨ̣¼졼Ȥǹ
ȡȤǤʤۤɤα߹ˤϤʤäƤʤȤ¤Ǥ
ΤǤƤδطǤϡ¤Ūܤǰ׹
³Ƥ櫓Ǥ顣

顢ܤ߹Ǥ뤳ȤƤʤ褦ȤƤ⡢
ޥϤ˷礱櫓ʤΤǤ

դΤȤ⡢ޥߤƻ٤ǤϤʤǤ礦


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ϤȤơ̾ܤǤʱ߹ˤʤäƤ뤳Ȥϡ
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