кѥ˥塼

޸Ρкѥ˥塼̤ưͻ֥Ǥϵ岹Ȳ˻ߤΤúи󾧤ޤиӽиȤϰ㤤ޤߤʴ㤤ΤǤ

2012ǯ03

ǤǤƤ桹ܹ̱ϤؤäȽ񤤤Ƚ

ˤ䤬졪

Ȥ䡢񤭽ǡͽۤƤΤǤĤΤȤǤ顣ʵ񤤤顢ɤۤȽ뤫ΤʤȡƤξ塢ȽФꡪ

ĤޤꡢȽ뤳ȤͽۤƵ񤤤MʤΤʤȤϤʤ

ǡȽˤϡ̳ʽпȤ餽ʵ񤯤ΤʡȾǼƤո¿줿ΤǤϸǤ

֤ĺΰոʹĺϴ򤷤Ǥ

褺λϡܤμڶ򤳤ʤ˿ۤ褦ˤʤäΤ

ϡ1983ǯ1985ǯ2ǯ֡ɹIJݤ˽°ƤΤǤκˡĤȯԻĹ⤬100ߤˤȤƤ顢ܤξפʤΤȿۤ褦ˤʤäΤǤ

ĤȯԻĹ⤬100ߤȸС绨Ĥ˸й̱1100ߡʤʼڶơѤʤȤΤǤϤʤȡμԤä򤷤ФΤǤ

Ǥϡ̤ιĤȯԤȤɤȤˤʤΤ

եβǽޤΤǤϤʤȡʪ㲼븽ߤΤ褦ʥǥեʤ뤳ȤʤեۤäΤǤʤȤƤ⡢ե򵯤褦ʤȤϲ򤷤ʤФʤȡ

θԶ٤ˡʵкȾΤ緿ͽȤޤ졢ơ̤ιĤȯԤȤ褦ʤȤ򷫤֤ƤΤǤ

䤿鿴ۤեϾⵯ뵤ۤϤޤǤΤϡϤβʤ夬񻺥Х֥ǡΥХ֥ĺޤƤƤޤСϤβʤϲǡԡ1/4οˤʤäƤΤǤ

ե줬붲줬ʤɤǥե줬κȤ򺣡ʤСĤȯԤβΤȡľ褦ȤȤʤΤǤ

Τˡľ˥ե줬ʵۤϤʤΤǤ顢ĤȯԤޤ뤿ˤۤɾǤ夲뤳Ȥ˷ˤʤʤƤȤո⾯ϤĤΤǤ

ϡȤܹĤɱ󤹤褦ʻ夬褷ʤȤ¤ʤȤȤǤΤǤ

ΰոȽŪʤȤ񤯿ͤ¿ϡȤΩȤΤʬäƤȤϸޤ󡣤ޤǤ⡢ǤݤĿͤΰոǤʤ

ˤ󤷤Ƥޤ⤷ʤȤȤͤˤϡȤưͽۤ뤳ȤɤƤɬפˤʤΤǤ

ĤޤꡢۤȾʵŪˡԤݤ濴ȤȤĤɤǤƤȤΤǤСȯԤǤˤʤɬפʤȸΤǤ

椬ξϾѲƤƤ뤳Ȥ˺ƤϤޤ

褺ˡ͸θ³ȡϲ̣뤫ȸСͤμ¼GDPä뤳ȤϤäƤ⡢ܤȤƤμ¼GDP褦ʻ뤫⤷ʤȤȤǤΤǤĤޤꡢͤब㲼뤳ȤϤʤƤ⡢ȤȤƤܤηкϤ㲼Ƥޤ줬ΤǤ

Τ褦ʹϤ㲼ǰιĤ򡢺Ȥͭ񤬤äͭ뤹ȤݾڤĤޤǤȤΤǤ礦

ˤΤΤȤꡢܤǰ׼٤ιϷо٤ι줫⤤ĤޤǤ³ȤݾڤʤΤǤ

ΤȤϡǰ׼٤ֻ׾夷Ƥ⡢о٤ϹݤǤƤΤǡ椬ζ;긽ݤ³ƤǤ⤤Ĥޤ³ʬʤ

ȤȤǡľˤǤϤʤƤ⡢椬⤤Τ褦ˤʤ붲줬ʤȤϸʤˤΤǤ

κֻϡ꤬߲ƤưƤ٤ΤǤʤ˾ĽƤɬפ롢ȡ

ʤȤͤȤܤιĤȯԻĹϡ;ˤ礭ʤꤹƤΤǤϤʤ

塢ܤμڶĹ򥼥ˤ褦ʤȤͤɬפϤʤȻפΤǤʤƤĹ⤬ʤ褦ˤ̤ϤϺǾɬפǤΤǤ

ȤȤǡϡǤ˸¤ʤΤǤ餫μʤǺ뤳ȤɬפǤȸäƤΤǤ

ǤǤϤʤˡǤΰ夲³Ǥΰ夲ͤΤǤˡǤΰ夲˴ؤƤϡʤȤ򤹤дȤγæФס®ʤɤȤȽꡢʤʤ¸ǤʤΤǤ˽ǤˤĤƤϡΤª񤷤⤢ΤǤ

䤬ǤƤ֤ؤäפȽ񤤤ΤϡϤ͡ΤȤͤƤʤȤȤǤϤʤΤǤǤϤʤܿͤϤ餹СΤ餤ô򶯤ƤⲿȤѤƤ뤫פȡޤäȤʤΤǤ

ޤȽϤɤǤȽƲ

Ǹ˰ĤäƤޤ

Τ˵򴶤ƿ򼭤Ȥ¤Ǥΰոθʬۤ褦ʳʹˤʤäƤ⡢ΤˤäƤΤǤϤʤΤǤ

꤫࿦塢餫صͿȤ⤢ޤ

ϡʬʤܤ̤ͤƤäǤ



ǤϷɡηϤʤȤ͡Ȼפå򤪴ꤤפޤ

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Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ĤˡˡƤյķꤵ졢Ǥ˸߻Ϥޤ

塢ɤΤ褦ʼǿʤΤ

ˡΧΩȤǤˡƤˤС2ǯ2014ǯ4˾Ǥ8˰夲졢ơǯ2015ǯ1010˰夲ΤȤ

䡢ưǻפȤϡε᤬ڤ̤Ƥ뤳Ȥ˾Ф괶ƤΤǤΤʤ褦˸äƤޤκкѤ˴ؤͤϡȤȿСϤȤơȤʬοǰӤ̤Τϡ괺ɾȻפΤǤ

ϢΩΥæ뤳Ȥˤäơñʤ微ޤ˸ꤹ뤳Ȥ򶲤ơܰդǤϤʤΤξˡƤ˻Ȥꡢޤޤ⤷ޤ

ˤƤ⡢εϡۤɤޤǤ˾ǤȿФΤ

ϡȤȤƤǽΤȻפΤǤǤ˻СɬǤä֤򿩤ȡޤ餳ξǤϲ򤷤ƤʤΤǤ

Ǥϡ˹̱ǤˤѤʤΤ

ϡʤȤϤʤȻפΤǤǤȿФͤΤ⤽ΤȤǤ礦ºݤǤ¸СۤɤΤȤϤʤȡ

ξǤθƤȤǤФ̱ȿбưΤ1986ǯΤȤʤΤǤФƤǤǤ礦ѡʤɾȳ濴ˡܤФѤʴ֤ưꡢɤȤáâ줫3ǯ1989ǯ4ˤϾǤ»ܤ뤳ȤˤʤäΤǤƤΤΤȤꡢ1997ǯ4ˤ϶դβǡ⤬3󤫤5˰夲줿ȡ

ΤˡǤǤǤȿФͤ¿

ȸäơ5ξǤȤƤĤʤŤȴƤͤɤۤɤΤ

ΤˡʺιˤäơϤ;ʤƤؤ¸ߤƤΤϤΤȤǤο͡褬줷ͳϡǤôŤȤ⡢⤽ʤǤΤǤ

Ǥϡ衢ͽꤵƤ褦˾Ǥ8ˤʤꡢ10ˤʤäȤ桹̱ϤɤʤΤ

þƤޤȻפޤ

ʤȤϤʤΤǤΤʤСΥ衼å򸫤Ʋ椬5ξΨڤĶ⤤ղòǤݤƤФǤϤʤǤ

2011ǯ1ߤοͤǤ

ѹ20󡡥ե󥹡19.6󡡥ɥġ19󡡥ǥ25󡡥ǥޡ25󡡥Υ륦25

ʤ˹⤤ΨǤʤ顢̱Ѷ줷򶯤ƤʤäʹʤΤǤɤǥʤɤϡԾкѸºŤк»ܤǡ⤤кĹΨãƤȤ¤⤢ΤǤ

ˡʹ֤ʤơʬҤȤ˽ŤǤݤΤǤСȤƤѤʤȴƤޤΤǤ礦̱ƤƱ褦ǤݤСճˤƤޤΤʤΤǤ

ǤȤɤޤȤΤ餺ޤ̵̤¸ȤΤǤСäϰäȤˤʤΤǤ礦Ž٤ơܤͽФ̵̤¿Ȥʤ褦ǤΤǡ⤬10˾夬äǤϡ桹ˤۤɤΥѥȤͿȤϤȤƤפʤΤǤ

ΤˡǤ5󤫤10˾夬Сǯ֤μμ200ߤοͤϡμƾ˲󤷤硢ǤȤʧʬ10ߤ20ߤ10ߤôˤʤäƤޤΤϤΤȤǤܤϡ줿1/3ϡӤʤɤηѴƤ¤˴դߤȤ٤ô餦;ϤϽʬäƤȻפΤǤ

Ǥ10ˤʤΤȹͤΤȤ⡢ޤ10ǺѤΤȹͤΤ

ˤƤ⡢ǤäˤФȤδؿޤۤɡ椬ˤ꤬ʤȤΤǤ礦

äȤäȤؿ󤻤٤꤬ȦȻפΤǤ


ǤǤ10ǻߤޤäߤȻפå򤪴ꤤפޤ

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Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

4̱ϢĹ˽ǤTBSΰĹNHKƤƤ륤󥿡ͥåƱۿȤˤĤơΤ褦˸ä󤸤Ƥޤ

̱ɤηбİˤĤʤΤǹߤ

ɤפޤ

֤ɤפäƸƤš

NHKͥåȤƱۿԤȡɤ̱ɤϷбĤΡ

⡢οͤΤΤˤʬʤΤǤǤ⡢ȯξȡ̱Ȥסܤʤʤ뤫ȡ

֤äԤä̱NHKΥͥåƱۿ˰۵Ĥ򾧤Τϡ̱ɤɤΤΤȤ⡢ƥӤλİԤ뤳Ȥ򶲤ƤΤǤϡ

֤İԤΥƥΥ줬®ƥӤ򸫤ͤʤʤСʤ饹ݥ󥵡
⸺ȤȤǡš

Ȥǡ䤿ϡīȥƥӤΥåդ뤳ȤϤޤͤ¿ȻפΤǤNHKդ̱͡դ͡ˤƤƥӤˤѤäˤʤäƤ
Ǥ

ǡäˤʤäƤȤäƤ⡢NHKˤϡμȤΤʧäƤΤǡޤNHKˤȤäƤϡ桹ڤʤҤǤΤ¤Ǥ

̱ϤɤǤ礦ī᤯٤ޤǡäȤ¿ȤϤΤΡ̵Dz桹Ȥ󶡤ƤƤΤǤNHKϤäΤˡ̵̱

ʤʢ̱ͤǤ뤳Ȥ

ʤơϻפäƤޤ

Ȥ顢Ѥʷкѥ

ʢʤΤϡ¤ϲ桹̱ǤΤǤ

֤ɤƹ̱ʢʤΡ

¤ϡΤ褦ФľŪΤǤ뤫ɤǡкѳŪʻ׹ͤǤ뤫ɤʬΤǤ

Τ˲桹ϡ̱ФİʧȤϤޤ󡣤ΰ̣Ǥϡ桹̵̱ΥƥȤ򸫤ƤΤϻ¡Ȥ꤬Ȥȡ괺äƤޤ礦

Ǥϡɤ̱ϡ̵Ȥ򸫤뤳ȤƤΤ

Ϥۤ񤷤ǤϤޤ̱ϡ桹İԤİħ뤳ȤϤʤƤ⡢ݥ󥵡ʤɤCMʤɤƤΤǤϤǤɤ餫뤳ȤʤƤϡȤĤळȤʤïǤʤΤǤ

Ǥϡ桹̵̱ȤѤ뤳ȤǤΤϡݥ󥵡ΤǤΤä顢äȥݥ󥵡˴դ٤ʤΤ

ǤʤΤǤΤ˥ݥ󥵡ϡ̱CMʤɤʧǡۤϿߤˤȸƤΤǤݥ󥵡󤿤ϲῴФƤΤǤϤʤΤǤǤ͡

ĤޤꡢİԤǸƤ줽ȤäƤ餤ǼҤʤ򤹤롢ȡơäƻİԤ뼫ʤCM⤷äȾ褻Ƥ뤤
Ǥ

ʬˤʤޤ

Ĥޤꡢݥ󥵡̱˻ʧCMϡ¼Ūˤϲ桹ԤôƤΤǤ顢̱ۤФƤ⡢ݥ󥵡ФƤ桹Ƭ򲼤ɬפϤʤȤǤΤǤ

֤ΤȤʬ뤱ɡȹ̱ʢȤΤϤɤطΡ

ϡ̱ɤΤ褦ˤȤήƤ뤫¸ΤǤ礦

ȤơȤ˾褻ȯơš

ΤˡϤʤΤǤθȤѤơƥӤȤĤिˤϹ񤫤ȵɬפ櫓Ǥդ˸СȵΤʤԤïȤĤळȤǤʤȤǡο͡ϸפƤΤǤ

Ĥޤꡢö񤫤ȵäƿʤ̱֤ɤȤƻȤ򳫻Ϥȡݥ󥵡εۤμ롢ȡơμ϶ȳΤǿߤεϤãƤΤǤ

̱ϡˤʧȤϤʤΡ

NHKޤȵɤϡȻȤΤʧäƤϤΤǤεϤϡμ㤨1/1000٤ǺѤǤꡢ٤ΤΤ˲᤮ʤΤǤ

Ǥ桹̱ϡǤС̤Ƴ̱顢äȤä¿ۤȻħ뤳ȤǤΤǤΤʤоȻ;夲줿ȤǡϴǤCMԤȤǤǤ顣ǤʤɤϡȼԤθˤĤƤϡdzƤ뤳ȤˤƸʿǤ⤢ꡢޤؤι׸ŬڤȹͤʤΤǤ

ɤ桹ϤߤߤߤΥӥͥ󥹤̵̱ǧƤȤǤΤǤ줬桹ѤʢȤͳǤΤǤ

̱ϡС̳򤷤Ǥ˴νȽʤȤϤȤƤפޤ

褺ϡȵ־夷ǡơŬڤвʧäȤ˼Ȥޤ줿ǡǤ礦

NHKΥͥåȤƱۿȽʤơ褯ܥ⤤ȤǤ


椬ȤŰŪ˸ľ٤Ȼפå򤪴ꤤפޤ

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Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

ХΤޤ

This is my last election. After my election I have more flexibility.

ֺ󤬺Ǹ󤬺ѤСäȽ˹ưǤ

ơФɥ١ΤϡΤ褦ΤǤ

I understand. I will transmit this information to Vladimir.

ʬä饸ߡʥסˤˤξ褦

ʲä˥ߥåȤκݡͤδ֤ǹԤ졢ꥫѤʪĤƤΤȤ

ǤϡβʪĤƤǤΤˡꥫΤȤͤʤưפ˾⤹褦٤Τ

¤ϡβäϡХե쥳ǹԤ줿ΤʤΤǤ̩ǹԤ줿ȸäƤ⤤

Ǥϡ̩ǹԤ줿ϤβäȴˤʤäƤޤäΤ

졢ϡťХΤޥΥåڤƤΤȤФפäܲä顢ޥäΤȡ

ĤޤꡢäƤϥХΤܲǤΤǤܲǤСʤ饪ХΤФˤʤäƤ뤳Ȥʬꡢס̱Ƚ뤳Ȥˤʤ롢ȡ

䡢פΤǤХΤܤμǤꡢܤμ꤬Υ꡼ФơʤȤäȤΤǤСŤʤȤϲܤǤФеȤǤ⤢ꡢܿͤʤ餽ۤɶäȤϤʤȻפΤǤ

ʥС餹Τ̱ΤʤȤǥΤˤʤȤäƤȥꥫι̱Τä顢˾ȻפΤǤ

ˡޥΥåäƤ뤳Ȥ˵դʤʤơĥ­ʤȤפޤ󡣤Ϥ̣¤ڤ줫äƤȹͤȤȤǤ礦

Υɥ١ջΤȤƤλʤϤɤʤΤ

ޤˤĤƤϤȤ䤫ϸƤʤΤǤŤǤ⡢θäȤȸС֤ξ򥦥饸ߡ褦פʤơפˡΥ꡼ϼʬǤϤʤȤȤϤäǧƤΤǤ

Ȥǡ̩̤ȸС椬ξˤ⡢ޤ޼Ȥδ֤Ǥ̩β礬ܤƤơξͤȤ⡢ʤȤϷ褷ƤʤȸĥäƤΤǤơޥߤϤΤȤˤĤƲȤξͤȤƤ褦Ǥ̱ϻäš

Ĥޤꡢ̱ФƤޤ޼ФƤ⡢ۤɼ˾򴶤ƤȤϻפʤΤǤ

ɤƤʤΤ

ϡϤᤫԤƤʤΤ顢Ϳޤޤ޼ƱΤͤä򤷹礪ȡɤ澡ˡȡݡäȤäܲääƤäƷ빽Ǥȡ̱¿ϻפäƤȤȤǤ礦


ޥˤʤäƤ뤳Ȥ˵դʤʤơŤȻפå򤪴ꤤפޤ

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Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

The Challenge of Long-term Unemployment

Discussions of the labor market at this juncture necessarily have a "glass half-empty or half-full" tone.  Recent improvements are encouraging, but, as I have noted, in an absolute sense, the job market is still far from normal by many measures, and millions of families continue to suffer the day-to-day hardships associated with not being able to find suitable employment.

 ֤δطˤϫƯԾεϡ夬ȾʬäƤʤ饹Ȥߤ뤫夬ȾʬäƤ륰饹Ȥߤ뤫εˤʤäƤޤǶβϤޤͦŤΤǤ뤬˽Ҥ٤褦Ūʰ̣礤ǤϡϫƯԾϤʤʿफۤɱ󤤤ΤǤ롣ơɴβȷפŬƯõȤǤäƤΤǤ

Although most spells of unemployment are disruptive or costly, the persistently high rate of long-term unemployment we have seen over the past three years or so is especially concerning.  

ּȤδ֤ؤɤϡ𤬵⤬ΤǤ뤬桹3ǯ֤ۤɤߤƤĹ֤μΨӤƹ⤤Ȥѷǰ뤳ȤǤ

In this episode, both the median and average durations of unemployment have reached levels far outside the range of experience since World War II (figure 11).  And the share of unemployment that represents spells lasting more than six months has been higher than 40 percent since December 2009 (figure 12).  By way of comparison, the share of unemployment that was long term in naturenever exceeded 25 percent or so in the severe 1981-82 recession.  

֤ˤĤơȤδ֤ͤʿͤϡβ桹ηиͤ礭Ƥ롣ơ6֤Ķ뼺ȼԤγϡ2009ǯ12ʹ40äƤ롣ߤˡ1981ǯ82ǯοԶˤƤ⡢ĹμȼԤγ25ĶƤʤ

 Those who have experienced unemployment know the burdens that it creates, and a growing academic literature documents some dimensions of those burdens.  For example, research has shown that workers who lose previously stable jobs experience sharp declines in earnings that may last for many years, even after they find new work.2

ּȤиԤϡȤ߽ФôΤäƤ뤷ô˴ؤؽŪʸˤĤΤäƤ롣㤨СΰꤷŻ򼺤äϫƯԤϡǯˤϤäƼ㸺ȤȤ򸦵̤Ƥ롣餬餷ŻõˤƤǤ

Surveys indicate that more than one-half of the households experiencing long unemployment spellssince the onset of the recent recession withdrew money from savings and retirement accounts to cover expenses, one-half borrowed money from family and friends, and one-third struggled to meet housing expenses.3  Unemployment also takes a toll on people's health and may have long-term consequences for the families of the unemployed as well.  

ֺԶλϤޤʹߡĹμȤиȷפȾʾ夬ٽФ˽Ƥ뤿ߤ࿦⴪Ƥ뤳ȤĴηʬäƤ롣ޤȾ²ͧͤ餪ڤƤꡢ1/3ȷפΤ꤯˶줷Ǥ롣ȤϤޤ򹯤ˤƶڤܤ˼ȼԤβ²ˤĹŪʱƶͿǽ

For example, studies suggest that unemployed people suffer from a higher incidence of stress-related health problems such as depression, stroke, and heart disease, and they may have a lower life expectancy.4   

㤨СȤ͡ϡȥ쥹˴طꡢ㤨Сݵȯ¡¤ʤɤˤΨ⤯ʤ뤳ȡơʿѼ̿ûʤ뤳Ȥ椫ʬäƤ

The children of the unemployed achieve less in school and appear to have reduced long-term earnings prospects.5

ּȼԤλҶϡǯûʤꡢơĹμ̤ʤ褦˻פ

In addition, unemployment--especially long-term unemployment--imposes important economic costs on everyone, not just the unemployed themselves.  Elevated unemployment strains public financesbecause of both lost tax revenue and the payment of increased unemployment benefits and otherincome support to affected families.  

ֲäơȡäĹμȤϡȼԼȤǤʤƤμԤ˷кŪʥȤ򤫤ΤǤ롣Ψޤ뤳ȤˤꡢǼꡢƼȼ伺ȼԤβ²ٱ礹뤿λٽФä
ΤǡܤλٽФ礵Ƥޤ

People unemployed for a long time have historically found jobs less easily than those experiencingshorter spells of unemployment, perhaps because their skills erode, they lose relationships within theworkforce, or they acquire a stigma that deters firms from hiring them.  

ĹּȤƤͤϡûּȤƤͤ١õΤ񤷤ȤиʬäƤ롣ϡεǽ뤳Ȥ䡢Żȱ󤯤ʤ뤿ᡢϡ¦ˤۤ͡ʤʤ뷹뤿Ǥ

Loss of skills and lower rates of employment reduce the economy's overall productive capacity over the longer term.  In the shorter term, because the process of matching the long-term unemployed to jobs typically takes more time, the currently high level of long-term unemployment might in itself be a reason that further progress in reducing the unemployment rate, and thus in achieving a more complete recovery, could be slow.6

ֵǽӼڤӸΨ㤯ʤ뤳ȤϡкΤǽϤĹϤ뤳Ȥˤʤ롣ûǤϡĹ֤μȼԤŻŬ礵ˤϤĹ֤뤿ˡĹ֤μΨ⤤ȼΤΨƴʲã뤳Ȥ٤餻븶ˤʤ

A pessimistic view is that a large share of the unemployment we are seeing, particularly the longer-term unemployment, is structural in nature, reflecting factors such as inadequate skills or mismatches between the types of skills that workers have and the skills that employers demand.  

ְĤŪϡ桹ľ̤Ƥ뼺ΨʬĤޤĹμȤϡ¤ŪʤͭȤΤǤ롣ĤޤꡢϫƯԤͭ뵻ǽȸѼ礬뵻ǽȤδ֤ΥߥޥåȿǤƤȤΤ

If this view is correct, then high levels of long-term unemployment could persist for quite a while, even after the economy has more fully recovered.  

֤⤷θΤǤСĹ֤μȼԤˤ뤳ȤϡкѤʬ˲ˤʤäƤδ³Ȥ

And it appears true that over the past two decades or so, structural factors have been responsible for some increase in long-term unemployment.  For example, because an older worker who loses a job typically takes longer to find a new job than does a younger worker in the same situation, the aging of the baby boom generation has probably contributed to a gradual rise in long-term
unemployment.

֤ι¤װϡ20ǯ֤ۤɡĹμȼԤäȤͳˤʤäƤ롣㤨СǯϫƯԤξˤϡƱ褦ʾˤϫƯԤŻĤˤˡ٥ӡ֡ޡι𲽤¿ʬĹμȼԤäƤΤǤ

Factors such as globalization, technological change, and the loss of lower-skill manufacturing jobs have likely reduced the employability and earnings potential of some groups of workers.  

֥Хꥼ󡢵ѳ׿ñϫƯӼʤɤװΥ롼פϫƯԤθǽϤǽϤ򸺾ΤǤ

To the extent that higher rates of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment, result from structural factors, the scope for countercyclical policies to reduce unemployment would be impaired, and the benefits of a more complete economic recovery for many workers who are unemployed or discouraged would be more limited.

ֹ⤤ΨäĹμΨ¤ŪװˤΤǤ¤ꡢΨ㲼뤿ν۴ŪϤ򤽤ǤơȼԤƯߤӼԤˤȤäƤϡ˷ʵȤƤ⡢βäϸ¤줿Τˤʤ

However, although structural shifts are no doubt important in the longer term, my reading of the research is that, at most, a modest portion of the recent sharp increase in long-term unemployment is due to persistent structural factors.7  

֤¤ŪѲϳΤĹŪˤϽפǤϤ뤬䤬Ĵ̤᤹¤ǤϡǶĹμȼԤεΤΤۤΰ¤װˤΤǤϤʤΤǤ

Consider, for example, rates of job finding by those unemployed for varying amounts of time (figure 13).  Unsurprisingly, the rate at which the long-term unemployed find work is lower than that of those who have been unemployed for only a short time; on average over the period from 1994 to 2007, a bit more than one-third of those already unemployed for one to four weeks found employment within the next month.  

㤨С֤ۤʤ뼺ȼԤκƽΨ򸫤Ƥߤ褦ΤȤʤ顢ĹּȤƤԤκƽΨϡûּȤƤԤ㤤1994ǯ2007ǯˤʿѤϡ1֤4֤δּȤƤԤ1/3ʾ夬ˤϿȯƤΤǤ

In contrast, over that same period, only about one-sixth of those already unemployed for more than 27 weeks managed to find a job within a month.

оŪˡƱ֤ˤơ27ְʾ强ȤƤԤΤ1/61˻Ż򸫤Ĥ뤳ȤǤʤäΤǤ

If the recent increase in long-term unemployment were being driven by structural factors rather than, say, the severity of the recession, then the job-finding rates of the long-term unemployed should have fallen sharply relative to those out of work for only a few weeks.  But that's not what we're seeing. Rather, as figure 13 shows, the job finding rates of the more recently unemployed and the long-term unemployed all fell over the recession in roughly the same proportion, and they remain
low.8

֤⤷ǶĹ֤μȼԤäԶΤǤȤ⡢¤ŪװˤΤȤΤǤСĹȼԤκƽΨϡۤοּȤƤԤ㤤ΨˤʤǤ¤ϤǤϤʤΤष13褦ˡǶἺȤԤĹּȤƤԤƤƱ褦ʳǺƽΨƤΤơǤƽΨ㤤ޤޤǤ  

This pattern is consistent with cyclical factors accounting for the bulk of the recent increase in long-term unemployment.  Similarly, the fact that labor demand appears weak in most industries and locations is suggestive of a general shortfall of aggregate demand rather a worsening mismatch of skills and jobs.  

֤ΥѥϡǶĹȼԤε۴Ūװ礹ΤǤ롣ƱͤˡؤɤλȤؤɤϰˤϫƯפ夤Ȥ¤ǽȿΥߥޥåƤȤ⡢פ­Ȥ¤򼨺Ƥ褦˸

Counterexamples like the energy boom in the upper Midwest, where there may be some mismatch in the geographic location of suitably skilled workers or an overall shortage of potential workers with relevant skills, might best be interpreted as the exceptions that prove the rule; a mismatch story would suggest that strong labor demand would be appearing in more sectors or geographical areas by now.

֥ߥåɥȡǤϵ뵻ǽͭϫƯԤ­ȤߥޥåƤǽ뤬ΥߥåɥȤΥͥ륮֡㤬㳰ΤȤƲǤ뤫⤷ʤߥޥå⤬ȤСϫƯפ¿ϰǵƤǤ

An empirical relationship that economists have long used to interpret developments in the labor market is known as the Beveridge curve (figure 14).  That curve--named after the British economist William Beveridge--compares unemployment (the number of workers looking for employers) to job vacancies (the number of workers that employers are seeking).

ϫƯԾư᤹뤿˥ΥߥȤˤäĹֻȤƤ踳Ūʴط٥Хå֤ȸƤФΤǤ롣ζϡѹΥΥߥȤΥꥢࡦ٥Хå̾Ť졢ȡʿԤοˤȵͿʸѼ礬ƤϫƯԤοˤӤΤǤ

In good times, when the unemployment rate is low, businesses are growing and workers are harder to find, so job vacancies tend to be high.  Similarly, in bad times, unemployment is high and few jobs are available (vacancies are low).  Thus, the Beveridge curve, the relationship between unemployment and vacancies, is downward sloping.

ֹˤϼΨ㤯ȤĹϫƯԤ򸫤ĤΤ񤷤ʤΤǡͿ¿ʤ롣ơȼԤοȵͿδط򼨤٥Хå֤ϡé롣

On the usual interpretation, a recession is a period in which the economy is moving down along the Beveridge curve; as output and the demand for labor fall, job vacancies decline and unemployment rises.

̾βˤСԶȤϡкѤ٥Хå֤˱äƲߤȤǤ롣̤ϫƯפΤǡͿϸΨ徺

In contrast, changes in the structural determinants of unemployment are thought to be reflected in shifts of the Beveridge curve to the left or right.  

оŪˡȤι¤ŪװѲˤϡ٥Хå֤˥եȤȤ

For example, suppose that, because of changes in technology or in the mix of industries and jobs, the mismatch between the skills of the unemployed and the needs of employers worsens.  

㤨Сѳ׿仺Ȥ俦κƱΤˡȼԤεǽȸѼ礬뵻ǽΥߥޥåȲꤷ褦

Then, for a given number of job openings, the number of the unemployed who are qualified for those jobs is smaller and the unemployment rate is higher than it would have been before the mismatch problem worsened.  Graphically, an increase in a skills mismatch would be reflected in a shift of the Beveridge curve up and to the right.

֤ΤȤˤϡοФˤĤʤΤ뼺ȼԤοϰ꾯ʤʤꡢޤΨϹ⤯ʤ롣դǼСǽߥޥåξ徺ϡ٥Хå֤˥եȤ뤳Ȥˤʤ

From figure 14, we can see some outward shift in the relationship between job vacancies and unemployment, consistent with some increase in structural unemployment since the onset of the recession.  

ֿ14顢桹ϡͿȼȼԿδطʬ¦ˤƤΤ򸫤뤳ȤǤ롣ϡԶλϤᤫ顢¤ŪʼȼԤʬäƤ뤳ȤȰפ


However, a more in-depth analysis of the evidence suggests that the apparent shift in the relationship between vacancies and unemployment is neither unusual for a recession nor likely to be persistent.  

֤ͤùʬϤ򤹤ʤСͿȼȼԿδط餫ʥեȤϡԶˤȤäƤʤȤǤʤСĤޤǤ³ΤǤʤǤ뤳Ȥʬ

Research has found that during and immediately after the serious recessions of 1973 to 1975 and 1981 to 1982, the Beveridge curve also shifted outward, but in both cases it shifted back inward during the recovery.  

Ĵη̡1973ǯ1975ǯδ֡ڤ1981ǯ1982ǯδ֤οԶӤľˤơ٥Хå֤⳰¦˥եȤƤ뤬ξΥȤ⡢θβˤޤ˥եȤƤ

This temporary outward shift during a deep recession may be the result of a particularly sharp increase in layoffs, which raises unemployment quickly, even as vacancies adjust more slowly.  

֤ηʵˤŪʳ¦ؤΥեȤϡäˡ쥤դεˤΤη̤Ǥ뤫⤷ʤ쥤դΨ޷˲夲ƤޤΤǤ롣ơͤϽˤĴʤΤǤ

Another possible explanation for a temporary shift in the Beveridge curve is extended and emergency unemployment insurance, which induces unemployed workers who might otherwise consider leaving the labor force to continue searching for work.

֥٥Хå֤ΰŪʥեȤФ⤦ĤϡĹݸ۵ŪʼݸΤǤȤ롣ݸΤˡǤʤϫƯԤȤƤΩΥǤȼԤФ³õ褦¥Ǥ

Or employers may be more selective in hiring when their need for workers is not pressing and take more time to fill vacancies in an effort to find especially qualified hires.  In any case, the data appear consistent with the shift in the vacancy-unemployment relationship in recent years having been relatively modest and likely to reverse, at least in part, as the economy recovers further.

ְϡѼϡϫƯԤФפۤɺäƤʤȤˤϺѤ˿Ťˤʤꡢޤ̤ʵǽͭԤѤˤϤ֤򤫤褦ˤʤ뤫餫⤷ʤˤƤ⡢ǡȤȡͿȼȼԤδطǯˤ䤫˥եȤƤ뤫ʵ˲ȿžǤ뤳ȤƤ褦˸

When historical experience is taken into account, these patterns do not support the view thatstructural factors are a major cause of the increase in unemployment during the most recentrecession.9

ֲηиθСѥϡ¤ŪװǶι⤤ΨμʸǤ뤳Ȥ򼨤ΤǤϤʤ

Conclusion

To sum up:  A wide range of indicators suggests that the job market has been improving, which is a welcome development indeed.  


󤹤СкѻɸϡѻԾ줬Ƥ뤳Ȥ򼨤Ƥꡢϼºݴޤ٤ư
Ǥ

Still, conditions remain far from normal, as shown, for example, by the high level of long-termunemployment and the fact that jobs and hours worked remain well below pre-crisis peaks, evenwithout adjusting for growth in the labor force.  

֤Ǥʤʿफۤɱ󤤤Ȥˤ롣㤨СĹ֤μȼԤοϹ⤯ޤѼԿϫƯ֤ϫƯϿ͸äĴʤƤ⡢Υԡ礭äޤޤǤ

Moreover, we cannot yet be sure that the recent pace of improvement in the labor market will be sustained.  

֤ˡ桹ϤϡǶϫƯԾβΥڡݻǤ뤫ɤοʤ

Notably, an examination of recent deviations from Okun's law suggests that the recent decline in the unemployment rate may reflect, at least in part, a reversal of the unusually large layoffs that occurred during late 2008 and over 2009.  

äˡˡ§κǶЪΥݤĴ٤̤ϡǶμΨ㲼ϡʤƤϡ2008ǯȾ2009ǯˤƵ̤Υ쥤դȿưǤǽ

To the extent that this reversal has been completed, further significant improvements in the unemployment rate will likely require a more-rapid expansion of production and demand from consumers and businesses, a process that can be supported by continued accommodative
policies.

֤ȿưλ¤ꡢʤ뼺ΨβΤˤϡȼפε®ʳ礬ɬפˤʤꤽ˻פ롣ϡ³ͻ³뤳ȤˤäƲǽȤʤ

I also discussed long-term unemployment today, arguing that cyclical rather than structural factorsare likely the primary source of its substantial increase during the recession.  

ֻϡĹ֤μȤˤĤƤ¤Ūװʵ۴ķװʸǤ褦˻פ

If this assessment is correct, then accommodative policies to support the economic recovery will help address this problem as well.  We must watch long-term unemployment especially carefully,however.

֤⤷ɾСʵٱ礹ºФƤͭǤ뤳Ȥˤʤ桹ϤտĹμȤ뤷ʤФʤʤ

Even if the primary cause of high long-term unemployment is insufficient aggregate demand, if progress in reducing unemployment is too slow, the long-term unemployed will see their skills and labor for ce attachment atrophy further, possibly converting a cyclical problem into a structural
one.

֤⤷Ĺ֤μȤμʸפʬǤʤȤˤСƼΨ㲼
ԡɤ;ˤ٤ΤǤСĹ֤μȼԤϵǽοʤɤľ̤۴¦¤ŪžƤޤǽ

If this hypothesis is wrong and structural factors are in fact explaining much of the increase in long-term unemployment, then the scope for countercyclical policies to address this problem will be more limited.  

֤⤷β⤬ְ㤤Ǥꡢ¤װĹ֤μȼԤäΤǤСλˤϡʵ۴ķͭˤϸ٤뤳Ȥˤʤ

Even if that proves to be the case, however, we should not conclude that nothing can be done.  

֤ˤǤˤƤ⡢桹ϲΩƤʤȷդƤϤʤ

If structural factors are the predominant explanation for the increase in long-term unemployment, it will become even more important to take the steps needed to ensure that workers are able to obtain the skills needed to meet the demands of our rapidly changing economy.

֤⤷¤װĹ֤μȼԤäͳǤС桹ѲкѤμפ˥ޥåǽϫƯԤȤ失뤳ȤΤʤΤˤ褦ɬפ֤뤳Ȥספˤʤ



Ǹ˻δۤǤĹ֤μȤθ򲿤˵褦Ȥ⡢餯Ψ⤯Ƥȿ̥եΨ㤤֤ϡβϤʤǤ礦ޤ鼺Ψ⤤ޤޤǤ⥤եζ줬ФƤСĹ³ȤϤʤǤ礦




ͻѹˤʤ뤫ɤϡեβǽȻפå򤪴ꤤפޤ

͵blog󥭥󥰤
Υȥ꡼ϤƤʥ֥åޡɲ

Сʥ󥭵ĹֱԤη³򼨺ȤФʤƻƤΤǡ®ιֱƤ򸫤Ƥߤ뤳Ȥˤޤ


Ѹ줬ϡܸɤǤ館з빽Ǥ֤ΤʤϡǸηǤ⤤Ǥ礦Ѹ줬ǻ֤ˤ;͵ʤСѸδޤɤĺС礤򤬿ޤȻפޤ

My remarks today will focus on recent and prospective developments in the labor market.  

ֻäϡѻԾκǶưȺθ̤˾ʤ

We have seen some positive signs on the jobs front recently, including a pickup in monthly payroll gains and a notable decline in the unemployment rate.  That is good news.  

ֺǶᡢѤκˤ뤤Ƥ롣θѼԿäȼΨ㲼Ƥ롣Ϥ˥塼

At the same time, some key questions are unresolved.  For example, the better jobs numbers seem somewhat out of sync with the overall pace of economic expansion.  What explains this apparent discrepancy and what implications does it have for the future course of the labor market and the economy?

Ʊˡפ꤬̤ΤޤޤǤ롣㤨СѤβкѳΥڡĴƤʤɤƤΤ褦԰פƤΤơ줬ѻԾȷкѤκưˤɤΤ褦ʰ̣ĤΤ

Importantly, despite the recent improvement, the job market remains far from normal; for example, the number of people working and total hours worked are still significantly below pre-crisis peaks, while the unemployment rate remains well above what most economists judge to be its long-run sustainable level.

ֺǶβˤ⹴餺ѻԾϰȤʾ֤ˤϤʤȤפ㤨СƯƤͤο䡢ϫƯ֤ϤʤΥԡ˲äƤ롣¾ΨϡؤɤΥΥߥȤĹŪ˸ƻ³ǽʥ٥ȽǤǤ˾äޤޤǤ

Of particular concern is the large number of people who have been unemployed for more than six months.  Long-term unemployment is particularly costly to those directly affected, of course.  

ä˷ǰΤϡ6ĶƼȤƤͤοǤ롣Ĺ֤μȤϡԤˤȤäѥȤ⤯Ĥ

But in addition, because of its negative effects on workers' skills and attachment to the labor force, long-term unemployment may ultimately reduce the productive capacity of our economy.  

֤ϫƯԤεǽϫƯϿ͸ФޥʥαƶΤǡĹμȤϡ桹ηкѤǽϤŪ˸Ƥޤ̤Ǥ

The debate about how best to address long-term unemployment raises another important question:  Is the current high level of long-term unemployment primarily the result of cyclical factors, such as insufficient aggregate demand, or of structural changes, such as a worsening mismatch between workers' skills and employers' requirements?  

ǡˤƤĹμ˼Ȥ٤Ȥ̤󵯤롣ǶιĹμȼԤϡפ­ƤȤ褦ʽ۴Ūװη̤ǤΤϤǤϤʤϫƯԤεǽȴ¦ʤΥߥޥåȤ¤Ūװη̤Ǥȹͤ٤ʤΤ

If cyclical factors predominate, then policies that support a broader economic recovery should be effective in addressing long-term unemployment as well;

֤⤷۴ŪװΤǤȤСʵĹμȼˤȤäƤƱͤ˸̤ͭǤ

if the causes are structural, then other policy tools will be needed.

֤⤷¤ŪʤΤǤСäʤɬפȤǤ
 
I will argue today that, while both cyclical and structural forces have doubtless contributed to the increase in long-term unemployment, the continued weakness in aggregate demand is likely the predominant factor.  Consequently, the Federal Reserve's accommodative monetary policies, by providing support for demand and for the recovery, should help, over time, to reduce long-term unemployment as well.

ֽ۴Ūװȹ¤ŪװξĹȼԤä˵ʤƶͿƤפ³ޤǤ뤳ȤװǤ뤳Ȥ򡢻褦Ȼפη̡ϢζͻºϡפȷкѲٱ礹뤳Ȥˤäơ֤򤫤ĹȤθˤ׸뤳Ȥˤʤ

Recent Labor Market Developments

As background for my discussion, let me provide a brief review of recent job market indicators.  

ֻεФȤơǶθѻԾˤĤƴñ˸Ƥߤ뤳Ȥˤ

As this audience is well aware, job creation has picked up recently.  Private payroll employment (figure 1) increased by nearly 250,000 jobs per month, on average, in the three months ending in February, and by about 190,000 jobs per month, on average, over the past 12 months.  

İγϤ褯ΤΤȤꡢѤϺǶƤƤ롣̱θѼԿϡ2ޤǤ3֤ˤʿѤ25Ͷ᤯äƤ롣12֤ʿѤǤϡ19ͤΥڡäƤ

At the same time, layoffs in the public sector appear to be moderating.  Together with a lengthening of the average workweek, these employment gains have contributed to a significant increase in aggregate hours worked (figure 2).

ƱˡŪΥ쥤դΥڡϼޤäƤ롣ʿŪϫ֤ĹȡѤβޤäơϫƯ֤ä˹׸Ƥ

The increase in hours worked is encouraging, because the decline in hours during the recent recession was extraordinary.  From the peak of this series in December 2007 to its trough in February 2010, aggregate hours on the job by production workers fell by a remarkable 9-1/2 percent; by comparison, production-worker hours declined by "only" 5-3/4  percent during the severe 1981-82 recession.  Currently, hours worked are still about 4 percent below the pre-recession peak--a clear improvement from where we were two years ago, but still far from where we would like to be.

ϫƯ֤äϡǶԶϫƯ֤θäϤŤΤȤʤäƤ롣2007ǯ12Υԡ2010ǯ2ΥܥȥˤƤϫƯ֤9.5㲼Ƥ롣ߤ1981ǯ82ǯԶΤƤϡϤ5.75㲼Ǥ롣ǤϡϫƯ֤ϥԡ٤Ƥʤ4󲼲ȤʤäƤ롣2ǯ٤вƤΤΡʤɸͤϲ

The government estimates payroll employment--the number of jobs--from a survey of businesses--the establishment survey.  A monthly survey of about 60,000 households, which provides the data needed to construct the national unemployment rate, offers an alternative estimate of the number of jobs.  Employment as estimated from the household survey, adjusted to correspond as closely as possible to the concept of employment measured in the establishment survey (figure 3), also shows an improvement in the labor market--indeed, by somewhat more than in the establishment survey.  

ܤϡפη̤ѼԿפ롣Ψ򻻽Ф뤿ɬפʥǡ󶡤롢60ӤоݤȤβȷĴη̤ѼԿФ롣ȷĴη̤鸫ѤѤϡפθѤγǰȲǽʸ¤Ĵޤ뤬򼨤Ƥ롣̤ϡפοͤʬ褯ʤäƤ

I should note, however, that month-to-month changes in this measure are much more volatile than the employment measure from the establishment survey, which is why the Federal Reserve puts more weight on the establishment survey for the purposes of short-term forecasting.

֤βȷĴη̤ϡưפη̤㤷ΤȤʤäƤ롣ΤϢȤƤϡûͽ¬ѤȤƤϡפη̤ˤ꿮֤ȤȤƤ

The positive signs from the labor market have shown through to measures of labor utilization:  After hovering around 9 percent for much of last year, the unemployment rate (figure 4) has moved down since September to 8.3 percent in February, and the share of employment represented by people working part time for economic reasons, an indicator of underutilization, has declined modestly.

ϫƯԾβƤ롣ǯϳ9٤οˤäΨϡǯ9ʹ㲼򼨤2ˤ8.3ޤ㲼ƤƤ롣ơѡȤƯϫƯԤγ⸺ƤƤ

Surveys of households and firms about their attitudes and expectations offer yet another window on job market developments.  Since the summer, household expectations for labor market conditions over the next year have gotten brighter (figure 5), unwinding a deterioration registered earlier last year.  Business hiring plans have also shown modest gains (figure 6).  Other indicators, such as new claims for unemployment insurance and measures of the breadth of hiring across industries, also point to better labor market conditions.

ϫƯԤιưͽۤ˴ؤĴ⡢Ѥβ򼨤ΤȤʤäƤ롣ǯβư衢ȷפθѲ˴ؤ븫뤤ΤȤʤäƤꡢǯλϤ˸줿žƤƤ롣¦θѷײ㴳򼨤Ƥ롣ݸοѤιʤɤ⡢ϫƯԾ줬Ƥ뤳Ȥ򼨤Ƥ

Notwithstanding these welcome recent signs, the job market remains quite weak relative to historical norms, as I've already noted.  After nearly two years of job gains, private payroll employment remains more than 5 million jobs below its previous peak; the jobs shortfall is even larger, of course, when increases in the size of the labor force are taken into account.  And the unemployment rate in February was still roughly 3 percentage points above its average over the 20 years preceding the recession.  Moreover, a significant portion of the improvement in the labor market has reflected a decline in layoffs rather than an increase in hiring.

֤Ƕϴޤ٤ǤΤ˻䤬Ҥ٤ȤꡢΥѥ󤫤ߤСޤޤǤ뤳Ȥ¤Ǥ롣ѤβϤޤäƤ2ǯ;꤬ФĤ̱θѼԿϡԡ5ɴͰʾⲼäƤ롣ϫƯϿ͸äƤ뤳ȤͤС­Ϥ礭ʤäƤΤǤ롣2μΨϡ20ǯ֤ԶʿѤ3ۤɾäƤ롣ˤƲƤƤΤϡѤäȤ쥤դƤ뤳ȤȿǤƤ뤳Ȥդ٤

This last observation is illustrated by the data on gross job flows (figure 7).  The monthly increase in payroll employment, which commands so much public attention, is a net change.  It equals the number of hires during the month less the number of separations (including layoffs, quits, and other separations).

ֺäȤϡ١ưǤ롣θѼԿá줬ܤȤǤ뤬ϥͥåȥ١ѲɽΤǤ롣ĤޤꡢѼԿä쥤դ伫࿦ʤɤͳǿΥ줿򺹤ͤǤ

In any given month, a large number of workers are being hired or are leaving their currentjobs,illustrating the dynamism of the U.S. labor market.  For example, between 2001 and 2007, private employers hired nearly 5 million people, on average, each month.  Total separations, on average, were only slightly smaller.  Taking the difference between gross hires and separations, the net monthly change in payrolls during this period was, on average, less than 100,000 jobs per month--a small figure compared to the gross flows.

־¿ϫƯԤѤ졢ޤΥ롣㤨С2001ǯ2007ǯδ֤ˡִ̱ȤʿѤ5ɴͤۤäƤ롣ΰΥԤοʿѤƤ򾯤äƤ롣οѤȿΥ줿ԤκͥåȤθѼԿȤʤꡢʿѤ10̤ȤʤäƤ

The recent history of these flows suggests that further improvement in the labor market will likely need to come from a shift to a more robust pace of hiring.  As figure 7 shows, the declines in aggregate payrolls during the recession stemmed from both a reduction in hiring and a large increase in layoffs.  In contrast, the increase in employment since the end of 2009 has been due to a significant decline in layoffs but only a moderate improvement in hiring.  

֤οͤʬ뤳ȤϡϫƯԾ줬˲뤿ˤϡ϶ѤɬפˤʤǤȤȤԶˤäѼԿͳϡθѤäȤȥ쥤դ̤˹Ԥ줿Ǥ롣оŪˡ2009ǯʹߤθѤβϡ˥쥤դθˤΤǤäơθѤβϤޤ϶ʤΤǤ

To achieve a more rapid recovery in the job market, hiring rates will need to return to more normal levels.

ָѻԾ줬äȵ®˲뤿ˤϡκΨ̾Υѥ뤳ȤɬפȤʤ

The Change in Unemployment and Economic Growth:  A Puzzle?

What will lead to more hiring and, consequently, further declines in unemployment?  The short answer is more-rapid economic growth.  Indeed, the improvement in the labor market over the past year--especially the decline in the unemployment rate--has been faster than might have been expected, given that the economy during that time appears to have grown at a relatively modest pace.  

֤ɤʤФäȿθѤꡢη̼Ψ뤳ȤȤʤΤǸСäĹΨޤ뤳ȤǤ롣¡ǯϫƯԾβϡä˼Ψ㲼ϡŤδ֤ˤкѤĹΥԡɤŪ䤫ʤΤǤäȤͤȡͽ۰ʾᤤڡǤä
ʤ

About 50 years ago, the economist and presidential adviser Arthur Okun identified a rule of thumb that has come to be known as Okun's law.  

֤褽50ǯΥߥȤΤθǤä顼ϡˡ§Ȥ̾Τи§ȯ

That rule of thumb describes the observed relationship between changes in the unemployment rate and the growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP).  

֤ˡ§ϡΨȼ¼GDPĹΨδطˤäƴѻ

Okun noted that, because of ongoing increases in the size of the labor force and in the level of productivity, real GDP growth close to the rate of growth of its potential is normally required just to hold the unemployment rate steady.  

ϫƯϿ͸礭䤨äΤǡĹϤ˶ᤤ¼GDPĹΨ̾ZΨοˤ뤿ˤɬפȤ뤳Ȥˡϵդ

To reduce the unemployment rate, therefore, the economy must grow at a pace above its potential.  

ֽäơΨ㲼뤿ˤϡкѤĹϤ륹ԡɤĹʤФʤʤ

More specifically, according to currently accepted versions of Okun's law, to achieve a 1 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate in the course of a year, real GDP must grow approximately 2 percentage points faster than the rate of growth of potential GDP over that period.

֥ˡ§κǿǤ˽С1ǯ֤ǼΨ1ݥȰ뤿ˤϡ¼GDPGDP⳵2ʾä䤹ȤɬפǤȤ

So, for illustration, if the potential rate of GDP growth is 2 percent, Okun's law says that GDP must grow at about a 4 percent rate for one year to achieve a 1 percentage point reduction in the rate of unemployment.

֤η̡⤷ĹΨ2ǤΤʤСˡ§ϡΨ1㲼¸뤿ˤGDPǯΨ4dz礷ʤФʤʤȽҤ٤ƤȤȤˤʤ

In light of this historical regularity, the combination of relatively modest GDP growth with the more substantial improvement in the labor market over the past year is something of a puzzle.  

֤Ūʵ§˴դߤȤǯŪGDPĹΨȡѻԾβδط1Ĥȸ

Resolving this puzzle could give us important insight into how the economy is likely to evolve.  

֤СкѤɤΤ褦˿ŸƤʬǤ

To illustrate the tension, consider the relationship between the recent changes in the unemployment
rate and in real GDP relative to the predictions of Okun's law (figure 8).  As illustrated by the position of the square labeled "2011" relative to the Okun's law relationship, represented by the line, the decline in the unemployment rate over the course of 2011 was greater than would seem consistent with GDP growth over that period.  Indeed, with last year's real GDP growth below 2 percent, less than what most economists would estimate to be the U.S. economy's potential rate of growth, one might have expected little change in the unemployment rate last year or even a slight increase.  

ֺǶμΨȼ¼GDPѲ򡢥ˡ§ͽۤΤ٤Ƥߤ褦2011ǯˤ뼺Ψ㲼ϡδ֤GDPĹΨ٤ȡ褢٤Ѥ礭ʤΤˤʤäƤ롣ǯμ¼GDPĹΨ2򲼲äƤꡢޤؤɤΥΥߥȤĹΨȹͤΤ򲼲ΤǤꡢΤᡢǯμΨؤѲʤष㴳ΤǤϤʤͽۤƤ⤷ʤ

What is this confluence of the significant decline in the unemployment rate and the modest recent increase in real GDP telling us about the state of the economy, and how will the Okun's law puzzle
be resolved?

֤μΨ㲼ȡ¼GDPˤĹʤä¤ϡкѤξ֤ˤĤơ桹ФɤΤ褦ʤȤȤƤΤơǡˤƥˡ§椬򤱤Τ

The apparent failure of Okun's law could reflect, in part, statistical noise.  For example, it may be that future data revisions will show that real GDP grew more quickly over the past year than currently estimated.  However, although it is certainly possible that revised data will ultimately explain part of the puzzle, at this point we have no specific evidence suggesting that such a revision might be in the offing.  

֥ˡ§μԤϡϡ׾ΥΥȿǤΤǤ롣㤨СGDPפθľˤäơǯGDPĹΨäȹ⤤Τ˽ˤ뤫⤷ʤ׿ͤ뤳ȤˤƤ⡢ˤơΤ褦ʽʤǤȼڵʲʤ

For example, gross domestic income, an alternative measure of economic activity constructed using source data that are mostly different from the data used in estimating GDP, provides some check on the information provided by the better-known GDP measure.

㤨СGDPפΤ˻ѤǡȤؤɰۤʤǡפϡGDPοͤåͿƤǤ

However, gross domestic income is currently estimated to have increased less quickly than GDP in 2011 and so does not point to an explanation of the drop in the unemployment rate.

֤οΨϡ2011ǯˤƤGDPοΨˤ䤫ǤΤǡΨ㲼뤳ȤϤʤǤʤΤǤ

Another logical possibility is that the decline in the unemployment rate could be overstating the improvement in the job market.  For example, potential workers could be giving up on looking for work to an unusual extent.  Because a person has to be either working or looking for work to be counted as part of the labor force, an increase in the number of people too discouraged to continue their search for work would reduce the unemployment rate, all else being equal--but not for a positive reason.  A story centered on potential workers dropping out of the labor force might seem in line with the low level of the labor force participation rate (figure 9).  

֤⤦ĤŪʲǽȤƤϡΨ㲼ϡѻԾβɾƤȤȤǤ롣㤨СŪϫƯԤδ֤Ϥ꿦õƤǽ롣ϫƯϿ͸ΰȤƥȤ뤿ˤϡͤϻŻ˽Ƥ뤫õ򤷤ƤɬפΤǡõ᤿ͤ;ˤ¿ʤ᤮ȡ¾ξ郎ƱǤСʹŪͳ˼Ψ뤳Ȥˤʤ롣ϫƯϿ͸鳰줿ŪϫƯԤˤĤƤʪ줬ϫƯΨ㲼ȰפƤ褦˻פ

But other data cast doubt on that idea.  For example, a broad measure of labor underutilization that includes people only marginally attached to the labor force has declined about in line with the unemployment rate since late 2010 (figure 10).1   

֤¾Υǡιͤ˵ꤲ롣㤨СԲƯϫƯϤȤǰλɸϡ2010ǯʹߡΨƱ褦㲼Ƥ

On balance, an assessment of a broad range of indicators suggests that a substantial portion of the decline in the unemployment rate does reflect genuine improvement in labor market conditions.

ַɡϰϤλɸϡΨ㲼ϡϫƯԾξ郎ȤȿǤƤ뤳Ȥ򼨺ƤΤǤ

Yet another interpretation of the recent improvement is that it represents a catch-up from outsized job losses during and just after the recession.  In 2008 and 2009, the decline in payrolls and the associated jump in unemployment were extraordinary.  In particular, using the Okun's law metric, the run-up in the unemployment rate in 2009 appears "too large" relative even to the substantial decline in real GDP that occurred.  

âǶθѤβˤĤơԶȤľ̤μȤȿưǤȤ⤢롣2008ǯ2009ǯˤѼԿθȼΨä̤ͭΤΤǤääˡˡ§ѤС2009ǯμΨϡδ֤˵¼GDPθ;ˤ礭褦˸

This point can be seen by returning to figure 8, which shows the Okun's law relationship.  

֤ϡˡ§δط򼨤8Ǥ

The open triangle labeled "2009" in the upper left of the figure shows an increase in the unemployment rate in that year well above the one implied by the contraction in real GDP and Okun's law.

֤οޤκ2009ǯȽ񤤤ѷǯμΨ¼GDPν̾ȥˡ§ˤäƼ礭äƾ徺Ȥ򼨤Ƥ

In other words, employers reduced their workforces at an unusually rapid rate near the business cycle trough--perhaps because they feared an even more severe contraction to come or, with credit availability sharply curtailed, they were trying to conserve available cash.

ִСѼϡ۾ʤۤɤε®ʥڡϫƯϤ︺Ȥˤʤ롣¿ʬäȿʷʵब뤳ȡͻǤڤ뤳ȤǰƸݤ褦ؤ᤿ΤǤ

The diagram suggests that what we may be seeing now is the flip side of the fear-driven layoffs that occurred during the worst part of the recession, as firms have become sufficiently confident to move their workforces into closer alignment with the expected demand for their products.  

֤οޤϡ߲桹ƤΤϡԶκǰ˵ݤ˶줿쥤դ΢֤Ǥ뤳Ȥ򼨤Ƥ롣ȤϡʬʪФפϫƯϤ碌뤳Ȥ˼Ĥ褦ˤʤäƤΤǤ

Such a dynamic would explain the position of the square labeled "2011" in that figure being far below the line representing Okun's law.  Of course, Okun's law is a noisy relationship, and we don't really know if the better-than-expected labor market performance of 2011 has largely offset the worse-than-expected performance in 2009.

֤Τ褦ưŪϡ2011ǯȽ񤫤줿սˤĤƤˤʤǤβսϡˡ§ƳФ礭äƤ롣󡢥ˡ§ϡȼطǤꡢ桹2011ǯͽۤϫƯԾβ2009ǯͽۤ򲼲밭˥СΤǤ뤫ɤˤĤƤʬʤ

However, to the extent that the decline in the unemployment rate since last summer has brought unemployment back more into line with the level of aggregate demand, then further significant improvements in unemployment will likely require faster economic growth than we experienced during the past year.

֤ǯβưʹߤμΨ㲼Ψפο˰פΤǤСΤȤˤϹʤ뼺ΨβΤˤϡ桹ǯиʾᤤڡǤηкĹΨɬפȤǤ

It will be especially important to evaluate incoming information to assess whether the recovery is picking up as improvements in the labor market feed through to consumer and business confidence; or, conversely, whether the headwinds that have impeded the recovery to date continue to restrain the pace at which the labor market and economic activity normalize.

ϫƯԾβԤȴȤμŤۤɷʵΥڡ®ޤ뤫ɤˤĤơ줫ɾ뤳Ȥä˽פȤʤդ˸Сʵ˸ˤʤäƤ⡢ϫƯԾȷкѳưﲽ륹ԡɤΤ򸫶ˤΤפȤʤ

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ꥫϷ褷ƳˤȤʤɤʤ⤽⺣Τںߤ֤ˤ⡢ʼΥܥ󤬳Ǽ줿򤤤Ĥ⤽Ф֤ƤΤǤϤʤΤǤ礦

Τˡʤ餺ԹȤƥꥹȤιȤˤͭ뤳ȤǤƵƤϤʤʤ

¿ι񤬳ˤͭƤȤ¤ǡγˤιΥ롼פήФʤ褦ˤΤѤ˺ʤȤǤΤǤΤʤСʼ⾦оݤˤʤ뤫Ǥޤ餳īϳʼγȯԤäƤΤǤ

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ꥫꥫפФͤƹư뤫顢ɤƤΩŪϤιԻȤݤǤ褬ߤळȤʤ

˥ꥫʤɳƹͭ뷳1/3٤ٻȿ˰Ѥͤ뤳Ȥˤäơʿ¤붯ϤΩŪʷ뤳ȤǤСʿ¤μ¸ưפˤʤȻפΤǤʤСƥꥹȤоݤιǤϤʤΤɽٻȿˤʤ뤫Ǥ

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󡢤줭νФϰ轻̱ʤʤ򼨤ʤǤϡ줭νѤ⤯ĤȤˤʤΤǤѤ⤱й⤤ۤɡ줭줿ΤܤϤ¿ۤΤ뤳ȤǤƤޤ줭ȤŻ߽Ф뤳ȤˤäϰкѤβ٤ˤʤΤǤ

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ʤȤäƤȻפޤ줭ν˻ä뼫ΤΤʤˤϡϼȤޤ뤳ȤݥȤˤʤΤǤĤޤꡢ⤤ʧä¾ƻܸʤɤ˽򤪴ꤤ뤯餤ʤ顢ǯϤäƤ⤤顢ʬθԤǽ򤷤ȤΤ⤢Ǥ礦顢ϼȤ⤬줭˻ä٤ǤΤǤ

ơ⤷Ϥ¿¾ƻܸλٱɬפʤȤΤǤС֤򤫤ϸǤäȽ򤹤ФäǤꡢޤǤϤʤ᤯줭νʤ᤿ȤΤǤС¿Τˤơ¾ƻܸλٱĤФäǤ

Ƥºݤ˵ǽΤʤƿۤȻפΤǤ˻ä뼫ΤʤоʤۤɡΤˤ뤪¿ʤǡʤϸν̱䤹ʤΤǤ

줭ͭ͡ʪޤޤƤǽȤƤޤ⤷Τ褦ʤΤȯ줿Ȥˤϡߤ֤üʪˤĤƤϡƹȶĤ򤹤ФΤȤʤΤǤ

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Τ323ݥǡǤ뤳ȤϤΤȤʤΤǤż¤ϡ2ǯ2010ǯ323˥ꥫǤϰݸˡΩơꥫ˳ݸ٤ȯ­ǤΤǤХΤθӤˤĤƤϡɾ񤷤̤ȻפΤǤΰݸˡΩȤϻȤƤ⤯ɾƤΤǤ

ΤΤ褦˥ꥫǤϤ٤ФȽ⺬˰ȽФƤǤ¸Ǥ硩ơ326ϺǹۤǤˡΧ˴ؤʾ٤θƬϤޤꡢ6ˤϺǽŪȽ褬ФȤΤǤ

ĤޤꡢɤΤ뤲뤳ȤǤʤäݸ٤ҤäȤǤȷդǽ⤢ΤǤ

Ǥ⡢ɤƤޤṉ̀ݸ٤ȿФͤ¿ΤǤ礦

򽸤Ƥȡ̱ˤ夦㤨ȤȥޥȤ㤨ȹ϶뤳ȤϤǤʤΤ顢ݸȤʤˤĤƤ㤨ȶǤʤʤưոΤǤ

ΤˡʹȤγǰŰ줷ƤСΤ褦ʹͤéĤȤͤǤŤޤȤݸȤӥͥ˸ФȤˤäơѤ̵̤Ψȯ뤳ȤǰΤǤǤ⡢ï⤬ۤʤŹ԰٤뤳ȤǤȤåȤ٤СäѤ곧ݸ٤ȤΤͭ񤵤򴶤ˤϤʤΤǤ

ϡƹͤˤϳݸ٤ȿФͤ¿ͳϲȤͤˤʤޤ

ԾкѤθܤγǰٻ뤫顩

Ǥ⡢ˤϤϻפʤΤǤԾкѤλۤ侮ܤγǰޤ줿ΤϱѹȻפΤǤαѹ䲤Ǥ϶ˤƼݸ٤äƤΤǤĤޤꡢԾкѤλۤȹ̱ݸ٤ɬʤߤˤΤǤϤʤȡ

Ǥϡƹȱѹ񰿤ϲΰ㤤ϲǤ礦

ϡƹ¿̱²ȤǤȤȤǤĤޤͼΤĤܡʹνпȼԤޤꥢꥫȤƤ롢ȡǡʤСΤȤʤ顢ϰĤȤϤäƤ⡢ȩοΰ㤤佡ΰ㤤ʤɤˤäƤ줾Υ롼פŤơ˭ʿ͡ϡϤ͡ΰô뤳ȤФƵȿ򼨤ȡ

桹ܿͤˤ˭ʿͤϤͤǤƱܿͤ˭ʿͤ¿¿ݸô뤳ȤƤΤǤ

Ǥϡܤˤī䥢եꥫƤ¿ο̱͡ƤɤǤ礦⤷οͤΤ˰ô褦ʤȤꤵ줿顩

ϤܿͤΤʤˤ⡢񤫤褿ͤݤߤ뤿˰ô뤳Ȥ񹳤򼨤ͤ⸽ȻפΤǤĤޤꡢʤСܤ⥢ꥫΤ褦ˤʤäƤޤȡ

ꥫϱѹ񡣤ơѹϿ»Τι񡣿»Τԡ褷ȩοäˤäƿͤϪ˺̤褦ʤȤ򤷤ƤϤʤʢΤʤDzͤƤƤ⡢ưϤޤǤͥˡ

ȤȤǡꥫͤ¿ˤĤƤ⡢ʢΤʤǹͤƤ뤳Ȥȸ˽ФƸȤ㤦ȤȤγݸ٤ȿطʤˤȻפΤǤ

󡢥ꥫͤȾ̱ݸ٤˻Ƥ뤳Ȥ餹СƤοͤͼﺹŪȯۤ򤷤ƤǤϤʤΤǤ礦ǤʤͼΰۤʤϺؤΤ˼ʬ⤤ô餤ʤȤ뤳Ȥ¤ǤΤǤ礦

޳ΩݸˡˤҤäȤ٤뤫⤷ޤ󡣤Ǥ⡢ȤäƤ餷ˡΧˡȿơ޳ѥȤݸ٤űѤƤޤ褦ʤȤʤȤ򵧤äƤߤޤ

ݸ˲Ƥʤˡ±ˤ⤤ʤͤ͡⤤褦ʹ񤬡ɤ
ǥʥСʤɤȸǤ礦





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̲¶ΰδطԤδ֤ܤƤΤǤϤɤפޤ

褺δۤҤ٤СáǤ⤻롣̲¶ʤΤ餢ΤˡκܤƤΤïФĤΤɤǼǤʤΤǤ

ˤƤ⡢̲¶ˤĤơɤۤɹ̱ȤΤ򤷤ƤȤΤǤ礦⤷̲¶ΰ̣褯ΤʤǤʤ顢̲¶׼褦ȤΤǤСȤǤʤäȸ虜ʤΤǤ

̲¶Ȥϲ䡩

¶¤ʧᤷǸˤƤ㤨10ǯвᤷΩ¶¤Τ¶ܿͤȤϢʤΤ򡢶ͻؤϡֵ̲¡פȤƴƤΤǤâͻ¦ϡ¶λĹװ⡢¶Ԥʧᤷ᤬ˤϡʧᤷʤɤ׵˱ƤΤǤ

Ĥޤꡢ̲¶Ȥϡͻؤ˸ܤä¶Ǥʤ顢¶Ԥ׵᤬Сͻؤĥ뤳Ȥʤ¶ԤθǧȤðۤʰ򤹤¶ȤȤˤʤΤǤ

ǡε̲¶⤬椬ΤǴ¸ߤ뤫ȸС͹ԡѶˡȹιפ880ߤȤΤǤơΤǯ֤ʧᤷ᤬Τ350ߤۤɤ롢ȡȤȤϡǯ¶ԤܡäȤƤ뤪ǡͻؤ¶Ԥ500ߤۤɤΥץ쥼ȤäƤȤ׻ˤʤΤǤ

ơ500ߤۤɤΤȤܤĤΤϸ̱ΤΤǤäƶͻؤΤΤǤϤʤ顢Τΰ˻ȤȤˤǡȼĥƤΤǤ

ƤӼ䤷Ȼפޤɤפޤε̲¶ΰ

ϡɤͤƤ⡢ܤθʬˤʤȻפޤ

ȤΤ⡢ˡΧ򸷳ʤŬѤСĸԤ¶Ԥ10ǯְʾ帢ιԻȤդäȤˤäƻΩä¶θ¶Ԥͻؤ˰ܤʤΤˡΤΰ˹񤬸ͤùळȤǤȤΤȤ䤬뤫ʤΤǤ

⤷ɤƤ̲¶ΤΤˤСŪǡΤȤϤΩˡ֤ɬפˤʤΤǤâˤΤ褦Ωˡ֤ʤƤ⡢ͻؤΰջ̵֤뤷ưŪ˶ͻ¦פ򿯳ΤϺ⻺ݾ㤷ˡ˰ȿ붲⤢ΤǤ

Ǥ⡢ηˤĤ¨Ǥˡ¦ԶȳäƤΤߤƤȤɬפǤ礦

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¶ԤΤ⤬ԤפˤʤΤϤ
֤ʬʤΤǡԤϤޤ֤餫ˤ٤
Ϥ˻ȤȤǤ롣

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¶Ԥε᤬Сʧ˱Ƥ롣
˹񤬸¤ˤϥȤ롣
̲¶ܤȤΤϡ⻺οˤʤ붲줬롣

¦ϡ¶ԤΤ⤬ԤפˤʤΤϤȼĥƤ褦ǤΩ¶⤬ͻ¦ΤΤˤʤΤǤϤʤǤ礦ˡͻ¦ȤƤ⡢ΩȤäƤ⡢¶Ԥ᤬лʧ˱ƤǤ顢ͻ¦θʬˤʤäƤǤ礦

ˡ˿󤲤褦ˡ̲¶γۤ϶Ϥ880ߤۤɤˤʤʤΤǤäƤϲʤΤǤ;ܤθäƤ뤳Ȥߤߤä

ޤ˵̲¶ܤμ˷׾夷褦ȤС˵̲¤Ū˴ɬפ⤢Ǥи̤̤ǤΨŪȤϸʤȻפΤǤ

ϡǤǤ˸ͤäƤǤǤɬפˤʤ뤫ȸС;ˤۤʼڶ򤳤ƤޤäƤ뤫Ǥγۤϡ碌1000ߡ

ΰǡε̲¶880ߡĤޤꡢε̲¶1ܰʾ礭μڶ⤬ˤʤäƤȤˡ¿˻Ǥ٤ϤιάôäԳȤߤߤää򤷤ƤΤǤ

ɤƤ⡢̲¶ѤܤΤǤСܤ̱˵̲¶¸ߤ礤PRƵ̲¶¸ߤ˵դ¶Ԥˡ¶ФƤ餦ƱˡΤ˴դƤ館кѤळȤǤ

ĤǤ˸СʤɤΤ᤬ʤΤζۤʳۤ˾äƤʹޤäΤγѤޤڤɤ褦ʵΤǤǡǤ礦




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