May 06, 2009
Revlon Dutyが適用される場面
情報としてはやや古いのですが、Lyondell Chemical Corp. v. Ryan, C.A. 3176 (Del. Mar. 25, 2009)においてRevlon Dutyが適用される場面が明確化されたそうです。
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/03/26/supreme-court-rejects-post-merger-stockholder-claims/
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/04/22/delaware-supreme-court-clarifies-when-revlon-duties-apply/
またまた自分の参考のために、ハーバードのブログがまとめたポイントは以下です。
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/03/26/supreme-court-rejects-post-merger-stockholder-claims/
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/04/22/delaware-supreme-court-clarifies-when-revlon-duties-apply/
またまた自分の参考のために、ハーバードのブログがまとめたポイントは以下です。
The Supreme Court rejected the view that Revlon duties arise simply because a company is “in play,” holding: “The duty to seek the best available price applies only when a company embarks on a transaction – on its own initiative or in response to an unsolicited offer – that will result in a change in control.”
The Court ruled that Revlon duties only arose when the directors chose to begin negotiating the sale of the company. The decision thus again makes clear that a board has no duties under Revlon to seek the “best price” in a sale or other transaction simply because a stockholder or other potential bidder tries to put the company “in play.”