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In English

ʸ֥[2014/5/1]ž Roth, A. (2008), Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions, International Journal of Game Theory, 36: 537-569. In this survey article on the Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm,

We got the following e-mail from Atila. Hi all, We will finish the Hatfield and Milgrom paper in the first 30 minutes of the class this week. Then I will talk about school choice. I will talk about my following articles: School Choice: A M

The following is the memo I took from the Tiroles book The Theory of Corporate Finance. Sketch of the theory of corporate finance The theoretical literature on the microeconomics of corporate finance can be divided into several branches. The

Professor Salanie sent us the syllabus below. This should be most useful for French speaking people. The aim of this course is to present a non-exhaustive survey of what has happened in this field since about 1980, both in theoretical modelling and

This is a memo for the first lecture of Contract Theory by Professor Salanie. Outline of the course a) Introducing both theoretical results and some empirical work. b) Putting huge weight on multi- stuffs, e.g., multi-agent, multi-principal, multi-di

Cabral (2005) "Collusion Theory: Where To Go Next?" mimeo This paper is a note which is written as comments on Feuerstein (2005), a survey of collusion theory. I would like to introduce this note because the present paper itself serves as a good survey

The following is a short version of An essay on Kandori and Matsushima (1998) "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion" (Econometrica, 66), the term paper of the class by Professor Dutta. Summary The present paper analyzes the role of commun

Fudenberg and Maskin (1990) "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games" JET, 51 The paper considers discounted repeated games with private monitoring and provides conditions under which the sets of Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium pa

Tomala (2005) "On Subgame-perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring" mimeo The paper generalizes the results of private monitoring with public communication initially examined by Kandori and Matsushima (1998). In thei

Fudenberg and Maskin (1990) "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games" AER, 80 The paper proposes an equilibrium selection of repeated games, using the model which facilitates evolutionary concepts. It is widely known as the Folk theorem that

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